

**Malawian Migration in Relation to
the South African Farming and Mining Economy**

**A Study of the
Geo-political, Demographic, Economic, and Social
Factors underlying Migration**

**Inaugural-Dissertation
for the Doctoral Degree,
submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy
and the Social Sciences of
the Free University of West Berlin**

**Presented by:
Dominic Milazi, BA, MA.**

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Referent : Prof.Dr. Gerhard Grohs

Co-Referent : Prof.Dr. Theo Pirker

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INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of labour migration today is assumed to be the best barometer of Malawi's social, political and economic stability. Beyond examining the validity of this premise, this study is intended to serve the purpose of exploring the pressures underlying Malawian migration in their multi-varied dimensions. It, therefore, represents a departure from earlier studies on Malawi that singled out migration for mono-causal treatment.

The industrial 'island' of farming and mining development in neighbouring states such as the Copperbelt (Zambia), Salisbury-Bulawayo economic bases (Rhodesia) and the Witwatersrand (South Africa) also come in for close scrutiny, because certain aspects of these territories weigh most heavily on the question of conditions and motives for migration.

A further dimension in the study is the comparative analysis of Malawian migration in relation to neighbouring black states. An important crystallization has been the emergence of dependent territories with foreign policies and internal politico-economic structures whose vulnerable stability points out the role of the economic dominance - via labour migration, capital investment, economic co-operation, etc. - which so-called white Southern Africa exercises upon these sovereign states. In view of this, the study examines the political and economical initiatives by various African governments as development strategies aimed at reducing the regional dependence. Special emphasis is placed on the domestic mobilization of manpower within the framework of agricultural, mining, and industrial development.

Chapter I

GENERAL BACKGROUND TO MALAWIAN MIGRATION

1. Geographic, Historical and Ethnographic Outline

The recent history, the tradition, the colonial encounter and its aftermath in former Nyasaland, are all accidents of imperial penetration and are strongly manifest in the present-day Malawi. Located in the extreme southern end of the 'Great Rift Valley', Malawi occupies a total area of 45,000 square miles of which 11,000 square miles are under water. Her present boundaries¹, inherited from colonial Nyasaland, are but a small part of the region previously known by its name, 'Maravi', the remainder being occupied by the Portuguese or forming part of the Republic of Zambia. In the centuries before European colonialism², it formed part of the hinterland of Kilwa from where Arab and Yao traders spread into the interior in search of ivory and guns. As a result of these early contacts, Malawi today has the largest number of Muslims in the Central African area, representing the southern-most outpost of Islam on the East African coast and hinterland.

But in recent times, the political and economic orientation has been, sometimes unwillingly, southwards. The first modern invaders of Malawi were the Nguni tribesmen from Zululand and the early colonial administration was closely bound to the thrust of European hegemony from the south. Because the country possesses no mineral wealth or the possibility of industrial development, large numbers of its able-bodied men have annually migrated to the industrial centers of South Africa and Rhodesia. In the immediate past, Malawi was an unwilling partner of the

¹ For a fuller account of Malawi's geography, see Agnew, S., Stubbs, M.: Malawi in Maps, London 1972.

² The following paragraphs rely on the work of Pike, G.T.: Malawi: A Political and Economic History, London 1972.

Central African Federation that drew the country more closely into the Southern African political and economic orbit. On the other hand, the political aspirations of the people have received their stimulus from the nationalist movements which were instrumental in bringing about the break-up of the Central African Federation. But, because of economic need, subsequent political developments, and colonial geography, the country still finds itself an economic hostage of southern white-dominated states.

Ethnographically, historical records speculate that before the waves of 'Bantu' migration arrived in the fifteenth century, Malawi was probably very scantily settled. The migrant Bantu of the north, expanding southward from 'about' the tenth century onwards, sent successive waves of transients through the country on their journey to the south. Some stayed in Malawi as permanent settlers, forming into distinct ethnic communities based on common ancestry.

The historical fact dominating the formation phase is the empire of Maravi¹, a commonwealth of loosely-knit ethnic groups owing political allegiance to one paramount ruler, the Karonga, whose headquarters were in the present-day Malawi. In a period of constant movement and social change in the 18th and 19th century, this loose social structure led to the fragmentation of the empire into autonomous social units². Prior to British rule, ethnic organization did not co-incide sharply with territorial boundaries; it was the tribal heterogeneity

1 Murdock, G.P.: Africa: Its Peoples and their Cultural History, London 1959, p. 295.

2 For notes regarding tribal migration and early settlement, see Chimbambo, Y.M.: My Ngoni of Nyasaland, London 1942; Sanderson, G.M.: Relationship Systems of the Wagonde and Wahenga Tribes, in: JRAI, Vol. III, London 1923; Rangeley, W.H.J.: The Early Inhabitants of Nyasaland, in: NJ, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1963.

caused by intermarriages that characterised the indigenous social order. As Lord Hailey put it: 'Any study of the tribal distribution in Malawi is confused by the tendency to intermarriage. This is especially true of the Shire Highlands where the Anyanja, Yao, Angoni, Alomwe and Achikunda live side by side in the same villages.'¹ Patriarchal and matriarchal tribes in the area 'mix' and intermarry in a way that is probably unique in East Central Africa.

Little is known about the intertribal composition in Malawi as a whole, but present-day ethnography includes representatives of all major divisions of the Bantu : i.e. 'the Western Bantu in the northwest region of Zambia, Eastern and Southern Bantu from Zululand. There is, consequently, wide heterogeneity in the region including agricultural and cattle-keeping people, matrilineal, bilateral and patrilineal descent, unrilocal societies, people with and without circumcision and female initiations and with many different languages.'²

¹ Hailey, L.: *An African Survey*, London 1957, p. 493.

² Mitchell, J.C.: *Race and Status in South Central Africa*, in: *Social Stratification in Africa*, New York 1970, pp. 303-38.

2. General Economic Framework

Since the attainment of political independence, the Malawi government has given increasing attention to the more difficult task of economic development. Outlining development plans for the next decade, a recently issued government documentation entitled 'Statement of Development Policies 1971 - 80', notes that since the vast majority of Malawi's population depends for its livelihood on peasant farming, top priority must be given to raising agricultural productivity. Out of an economically active population of approximately 1.5 million, less than 150,000 are in paid employment and about 250,000 are working in neighbouring countries. This leaves over one million workers, and their dependants, whose only income is derived from small-scale agriculture.

What cash economy there is, has been largely dominated by the European and Asian commercial population. But the Malawi government has expressed concern regarding limited trade in the hands of the Africans of the country who found it difficult to start business for several reasons, mainly lack of capital. From an earlier development philosophy that 'capital formation meant creating new wealth from anything that one does and from which new wealth can be produced'¹, the new policy of capital formation in Malawi rests upon state participation in foreign-owned business enterprises: instead of buying shares from expatriates or external share-holders as in the past, state participation through parastatal organizations, is in the form of additional equity capital. The new policy is approved in recognition of the over-riding government policy to maximize economic development and the inflow of foreign capital on the most favourable terms.²

¹ See 'This is Malawi', Information Ministry, Blantyre, September 1969, p. 19.

² Monthly Development Digest, Cambridge, September 1972, p. 22.

In other areas of local participation Malawi has taken a middle course. There has been no attempt at outright government takeover of foreign-controlled firms, banks, and insurance companies. However, principally through the medium of the Malawi Development Corporation, the government has secured a degree of local participation in a number of major commercial and industrial corporations operating in the country. In this way Malawi has been able to move appreciably closer to full economic autonomy without cutting off the flow of foreign investment.¹

In the long-run, however, Malawi's potential for diversification is a crucial factor in economic development. Such a potentiality is far greater than in many African countries, because the soil is good, rainfall is more than adequate, and differences in elevation make it possible to grow crops suitable for both temperate and tropical climates. Other fields of economic development, aside from agriculture, are tourism and commerce in which the war against budgetary deficit and economic inviability is being waged. The development of the tourism industry which is at present a small but growing factor in the country's economy, is regarded by the government as being of prime national importance. Malawi is not only conveniently sited on the continent of Africa, but it has a number of large, interested markets nearby.² Its friendly peoples, relative political stability and equable climate, are important tourist assets. In addition, the country is fortunate in possessing a wealth of natural attractions, including Lake Malawi.

1 Africa Research Bulletin, April/May 1972, pp. 2361-62; see also 1974 Economic Report, Malawi Economic Planning Division; 1973 Economic and Financial Review, Reserve Bank of Malawi.

2 In the field of regional co-operation relating to tourism, an important milestone has been the founding of the Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTC). The aim of this organization is to pool resources in order to attract longhaul tourists. Malawi was instrumental in the initiation of SARTC and Blantyre will be the headquarters of the new organization. Five member countries - Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius and Portugal - have so far signed the articles of agreement.

Regarding the field of manufacturing industry, where high degrees of capital intensity predominate because of lack of effective choice of technology, Malawi government is in search of lower levels of capital intensity to help in raising domestic incomes and it is the policy of the land to encourage more labour intensive manufacturing activities. Indeed the establishment of capital-intensive industries by foreign capital would make little direct contribution to the elimination of poverty and may even reduce domestic income; therefore, as a general rule, Malawi's development strategy must rule out the promotion of highly capital-intensive undertakings, unless their function is essential. The establishment of a growing range of intermediate agro-allied and other natural resource industries over the next years will undoubtedly help to achieve this aim.

3. Scope and Limits of Migratory Studies on Malawi

Viewing migration studies on Malawi analytically, several key tendencies emerge:

- (1) The focus on the origins of labour migration in terms of 'the accidents of white settlement, the presence of minerals, and ultimately, the whims of diplomats in Europe' that gave the shape which Malawi now holds.

In the words of Robert Rotberg: 'The immigrants, most of whom have obtained some experience in South Africa, wanted the services of African labour in order to assist the development of newly alienated lands. They demanded that their governments should, by any one of a number of means, encourage Africans to forsake their tribal chores for employment opportunities on white-owned estates. As a result, the governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia used the tax as an instrument with which to induce Africans to offer their labour to whites in return for artificial rates of pay that were geared entirely to the level of the prevailing tax assessment. They consciously set the rate of tax at a level that would successfully draw African males away from their homes to the usually distant centres of white agriculture and industry. Although a relatively few Africans had previously begun to migrate from their trans-Zambesian homes to South Africa before the coming of the Europeans to Central Africa, taxation became the compelling reason for a twentieth century migration that transformed the countryside and destroyed a traditional way of life.'¹

¹ Rotberg, R.: *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, Cambridge/Massachusetts 1965, pp. 41-42.

- (2) The exploration of African migration in terms of economic push-pull explanations.

According to Margaret Read¹, migratory streams correlate with the lack of economic opportunity, but are also affected by variations in levels of aspirations and standards of living influenced by contacts with the wider world; similarly, Jaap van Velsen² sees migrant savings as important for the economic well-being of dependants in villages of Malawi; through employment migration, repatriated capital flow into impoverished areas, raises the socio-economic standards of migrants families and reduces the social risks for the residual community in a village economy. Clyde Mitchell argues that the principal reasons for labour migration in Malawi are 'overwhelmingly economic'³; he places emphasis on the specific reasons for migration such as wage differentials, rural poverty, etc. which prevail in the African-dominated peasant economy. According to Mitchell, economic factors are probably necessary but not sufficient in explaining migratory behaviour; he considers the rate of labour migration as probably determined by economic conditions, where as the incidence may depend upon social and psychological conditions.

1 Read, M.: Migrant Labour in Africa, in: ILR, Vol.XIV, No. 6, June 1942.

2 Velsen, J.v.: Labour Migration as a Positive Factor in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society, in: Economic Development and Cultural Change, 8, (3), April 1960, pp. 234 - 241.

3 Mitchell, J.C.: The Causes of Labour Migration, in: Inter-African Labour Institute Bulletin, 1959, p. 22; see also Mitchell, J.C.: Factors Motivating Migration from Rural Areas, in: Apthorpe, R.J.: Present Interrelations in Central African Rural and Urban Life, Lusaka: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1958, p. 17.

- (3) The overemphasis on economic factors and the temptation to overlook or dismiss other factors as irrelevant.

It is clear that migration is not a response to one catalytic influence but to a range of continuously present factors.¹ Thus, economic motives are dominant in encouraging the migration of workers to towns, but they share place with non-economic motives.² In recognition of this, several observers have come to impart equal weight to non-economic factors in the Malawian migration; in the words of Margaret Read: 'The evidence of Nyasaland investigation shows that even if the economic situation is favourable for growing export crops, sociological considerations may nevertheless encourage migration. These sociological factors arise partly from the tribal organization of the people, and partly from the degree of western contact which has changed their outlook and activities'.³ Wincott examines the exodus of the very large numbers of Malawian workers into neighbouring territories in historical and 'missionary' perspective and asserts that 'because of the efforts of the missionaries who followed in Livingstone's footsteps, educational standards in Malawi have been relatively very high for years past, which makes Malawians sought after as migrants'.⁴

1 Connell, J.: Migration and the Rural Job Situation: The Evidence from Village Studies, a Preliminary Report, Sussex University, December 1972, p. 25.

2 Caldwell, J.C.: African Rural-Urban Migration, Canberra 1969, p. 214.

3 Read, M., op. cit., p. 613

4 Wincott, H.: Malawi: Land of Promise and Problems, in: 'This is Malawi', Information Ministry, Blantyre, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 1967, pp. 16-17.

4. Statement on the Problem

For a complex phenomenon such as migration, it would be no contribution to relate movements of workers to economic trends alone and yet not simple to substitute purely economic causes for a list of other factors; nor would it be great improvement to divide such a list between circumstances at home that repel and those abroad that attract, that is, between 'push' and 'pull' factors. Given a sedentary population and an inducement to leave home, typically, some persons go and some stay behind. Push and pull factors, in short, do not exert their force equally.

Thus, because of the complex configuration of circumstances under which migration occurs, it would seem that any fruitful sociological system - as distinct from the statistical measurement of the phenomenon - cannot proceed without the use of causal links, between a plurality of influential factors: colonial history, internal demography, geo-political factors, as well as the general character of the political economy - all of which, in addition to the 'attractions' of farm and mining industry in neighbouring states touched upon in the 'Introduction', have helped to stimulate migratory movements within Malawi's traditional society.

It is within the framework of such a multi-dimensionality that the multi-faceted problem of Malawian migration is examined.

Chapter II

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS UNDERLYING MIGRATION

In a country as geographically diverse as Malawi, it is not surprising to note that internal movement patterns follow the country's regional resource endowments.

1. Southern Region

The major population concentration in the southern region of Malawi, particularly in the Shire - Highlands, is noteworthy since it appears that with its excellent resources: fertile and cultivable soils, ample though sometimes erratic rainfall, scenic attractions and temperate climatic conditions, it has attracted not only the early settlement of European farming and agricultural communities, but also made possible the all year-round agricultural production; it is indeed the ecological suitability of the zone for the country's vital exports such as tea, tobacco, groundnuts, sugar, bananas, that has exercised un-doubted influence on the 'high-density belt'. Many of the geographic explanations cited could more or less apply to Malawi's central region.

2. Northern Region

The underlying causes for migrant streams in the north are considerably more difficult to explain than in other regions. Physical factors which might assist in understanding the relative sparseness and which have been noted by various observers, include:

- (a) The widespread absence of permanent and dependable water supplies.
- (b) The greater need to practise shifting agriculture than in either of the other belts because of poorer soils. Exceptions, however, assume a distinguishable pattern of high density 'islands' such as those around Karonga, Mzimba, and Mzuzu.

Economically, there is no doubt that the northern region is relatively poorly developed. Little is produced for export. Low development of commercial agriculture characterises the entire area, and it is the great economic and cultural isolation that led to the notion that the 'dead north' lagged behind the Shire - Highland in economic development. The ecological suitability and the influence of environment in the southern region, provided the 'pull' factor for essentially three categories of migrants: (a) Malawians from the other regions, (b) Africans in neighbouring territories, and (c) European settlers.

It was the high density concentration of this multi-ethnic structure in the fertile base that was to constitute a further stimulus to migration in succeeding years.

3. Consequences of Regional Migration

Until after Malawi's independence, the problem of regional variations and the concomitant differential economic development had attracted minimal attention. New development schemes designed to generate alternative economic directives and re-canalization to counter the disequilibrating tendencies of migration to the industrial south, are in operation. One such regional population redistribution strategy is the 'Lilongwe Project'. Intended to stimulate expansion and diversification towards the 'dead north', the new South African-financed scheme is essentially the transfer of the old country's capital from Zomba in the south to Lilongwe in the central region, 'to help correct the development imbalance'. In this respect, President Banda is reported as saying that the new capital construction in Lilongwe will attract agro-industrial trade and other commercial opportunities with positive results for the territory's economy, particularly in the fields of mass immigration, unemployment and regional inequalities in the distribution of infrastructural resources.¹

¹ IAF, February/March 1968, pp. 86-87

The economic advantage of establishing a new focus of development in the centre of the country will have an immense impact on domestic and external migration. Alone in the Lilongwe land region, where 63 percent of the men have worked abroad, 49 percent for two or more years¹, the capital's agro-industrial and commercial development will offer opportunities for alternative employment to possible migrants to South African mines.

A more comprehensive and realistic rural improvement programme is the government's 'Karonga Project'. Created to serve the similar goal of redirecting future internal urbanization streams and to counterbalance the negative consequences of present migration in draining away the region's best working forces, the project is geared to promote the developments of a whole region, through a co-ordinated attack on all the obstacles to agricultural growth. It provides for irrigation and drainage works, for rice growing, improved cultivation of maize, cotton, and groundnuts, livestock development, credit to farmers, the improvement of health services and transport on Lake Malawi. Prior to this developmental process in the northern region, the range of possible economic strategies open to the local resident communities have been relatively narrow; the 'Karonga Project' affords the necessary conditions for such a needed broad-based economic and industrial development.

That geographic factors constitute an important basis for movement analysis, is beyond doubt. The preceeding lines have focused on regional differences, recognising the usefulness of building into variations in regional resource endowments causes of internal and external migration. Taking into consideration the empirical evidences, there is a close correlation between regional ecological factors, centers of urban-industrial and agricultural heartlands of Malawi, on the one hand, and the flow and

¹ A Socio-economic Survey, Contribution to the IDEP Seminar, cited in: Report II : Employment, Status, and Conditions of Non-National Workers in Africa, ILO, Geneva 1973, p. 76

concentration of migrant streams, on the other. In some regions, such as in the north, it has been possible to indicate, that poor economic conditions offer explanatory linkages for out-migration to the south, whereas in the southern 'high-density belt', migration is, in general, very high. The long-established farming and commercial zone with its geo-economic pull factor, are stimulants to such mobility.

Chapter III

COLONIAL CAUSES OF MIGRATION

1. The Missionary Factor

Nyasaland was dominated by the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, which always felt a special responsibility for the African welfare there. Scottish missionaries pioneered development and government before the territory became a British protectorate, persuading the British government to protect the colony against slave trade and a German take-over during the scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century.¹

¹ For historical data on early missionary activity, see Mkwamba, S.: *The Church of Scotland, Blantyre Mission and the Making of Malawi: An Historical Appraisal*, Seminar Paper, University of Malawi, 1969; Long, N.: *Bandawe Mission Station and Local Politics 1876 - 1886*, in: JRCI, XXXIII, December 1962, pp. 1 - 22. For details on the war with Arab slavers, see Fotheringham, L.M.: *Adventures in Nyasaland: A Two Years' Struggle with the Arab Slave Dealers in Central Africa*, London 1891; and on imperialist scramble for Central Africa, see Robinson, R., Gallagher, J.: *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent*, New York 1961.

Throughout Malawi, missionary societies constituted an important factor in the origins of socio-economic migration. Arriving in the 1860's virtually on the heels of Livingstone¹ in the Lake Nyasa area, they set about introducing a pattern already implemented on the continent's west coast, that of 'commerce, christianity, and civilization', with the aim of 'generating the native society' and establishing defence against Arab traffic in human life. The initial incentives motivating the 'Nyasa' missions seemed, as other observers have confirmed, to have been more a matter of religion and philanthropic sentiment than economic profit.

Nyasa missions, however, for practical as well as moral reasons, found industrial and vocational training a necessity. Noted institutions such as the Livingstonia mission in the north² offered practical training in carpentry, brick-laying, book-binding, telegraphy, smithing, printing and other related technical disciplines, essential for the development of mission stations. This missionary role in technical education led to the development of an African elite with far-reaching implications for the almost non-existent structure of employment opportunities. For the first time in Malawi's 'labour' history, a reservoir of industrial elites became a common feature of unemployment. Since there was little demand in local villages for such skills, the Livingstonia elite entered

1 For a personal account, see Pachai, B.: Livingstone, Man of Africa: Memorial Essays 1873 - 1973, London 1973; Seauer, G.: David Livingstone: His Life and Letters, London 1940; Blaikie, W.G.: The Personal Life of David Livingstone, New York 1881.

2 For account of the first generation of missionaries and mission work, see MacCracken, K.J.: Livingstonia as Industrial Mission 1875 - 1900, in: Religion in Africa, Edinburgh 1964; MacCracken, K.J.: Livingstonia Mission and the Evolution of Malawi 1873 - 1939, PHD Thesis, Cambridge University, 1967; Ross, A.C.: The Foundations of the Blantyre Mission, Nyasaland, in: Religion in Africa, Edinburgh 1964, pp. 97 - 113.

European employment, forming an important auxiliary to European economic penetration. From the initial role as religious and humanitarian movements, the mission centres developed into institutions for the supply of cadres of skilled workers, many of them in the clerical employment of the imperial administration. In general, the educational activities of industrial missions had three major consequences for the labour migration.¹ One immediate result was the disparity existing between educational and economic opportunity which northern 'Nyasas' in particular faced, necessitating, for many of them, the 'trek' southwards in search of wage employment. Second, the problem of finding additional employment opportunities for successive generations schooled in industrial mission centres, influenced the patterns of out-migration to neighbouring territories. Third, the mission centres came in conflict with the colonial labour officials who attacked missionaries as a threat to their labour supplies. Industrial missions tended to encourage the development of a de-tribalized, urban class, upwardly mobile, having little economic and social ties with migrant labour.

2. The Settler Factor

Besides the missionaries, who in their persistent pleas for British annexation served as forerunners for the imperial advent, were the continuous streams of hunters, traders, commercial planters, and individual entrepreneurs attracted by the possibilities for commercial agriculture. Arriving as temporary settlers, they set about initiating a series of experiments in tea and tobacco estates², which were later to develop

1 For a cogent discussion of migration flows during this period, see Sanderson, F.E.: The Development of Labour Migration from Nyasaland, 1891 - 1914, in: JAH, ii, 1961, pp. 259 - 271; Michael, G.: Migration of African Labourers in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in: The Journal of Local Administration Overseas, ii, 1963, pp. 149 - 153.

2 Rangeley, W.H.J.: A Brief History of Tobacco and Tea Industry in Nyasaland, in: NJ, Vol.X, No. 1, 1957, pp. 62 - 68.

into vital bases for Malawi's export-economy.¹

Two major economic impediments stood in the way of settler exploitation of the Nyasaland colony. One apparent limitation was the absence of precious minerals of any kind. Second, no large areas seemed suitable for European settlement. However, the limited possibilities of growing profitable cash-crops, particularly tea and tobacco in the fertile belt of Cholo and Mlanje areas, held the only serious economic motivation. Agriculture, rather than mineral resources, influenced successive economic developments.²

1 Today, tea and tobacco represent two most important items of Malawi's export goods. See ARB, October/November 1968.

2 The economics of colonialism in the land of Marawi can be summed up in several stages: first, the protectorate assuming the status of a captive territory of the British Empire in which European settlers were utilised as the main component of agricultural development. Second, the appropriation of land from the African owners, who were relegated to a secondary role in development. Third, the subsequent logical step was the determination of the particular crops to exploit, which explains the various private and public experiments attempted to solve the difficult problem of finding profitable export commodities.

The important characteristic of the work situation, particularly with regard to the practical operations in the plantation settings, was the predominance of labour-intensive methods¹; and because the methods of cultivation involved limited technology and mechanization, the keystone in the plantation enterprises throughout the colonial era remained the dependence on local physical labour.

The foreign exploitation of Malawi's natural and human resources was not without significant consequences. Subsequent population growth and land-alienation through 'crown land' systems in the interest of expatriate agriculture caused acute land shortages. The 'grow-more-crops' philosophy superseded the vital interests of the African peasantry,² so that simultaneous with the increasing process of African proletarianization was the development of a landless, mobile population dependent upon an agricultural wage economy.

1 On this issue, see The Central African Planter, 11 November 1899. From the beginning, one of the settlers' main problems was that of securing adequate supplies of labour, their inefficient plantations being labour-intensive. Hence the lobby to outlaw recruiting of labour by outside agencies.

2 For a development of this theme as well as the state of African subsistence and cash-crop economy, see Terry, P.T.: African Agriculture in Nyasaland 1854 - 1894, in: NJ, Vol. 14, July 1961, pp. 27 - 35.

3. The Company Factor

Established in the 1870's along missionary principles of 'legitimate Trade', the Scottish business institutions, under the name African Lakes Company, sought primarily more social and religious returns than economic gains. In the process of aiding christian missions and founding networks of trading centres throughout Central Africa, the companies envisaged the possibilities of financial loss. Indeed, it was the deliberate intention to succumb to the principle of financial loss in the major interests of religious and humanitarian ideals that characterized Scottish companies as economic super-structures of an ideological base.¹

In the 1880's, however, financial bankruptcy and the exhaustion of capital resources hindered the full realization of initial expectations. But despite financial shortcomings, company institutions had important consequences for the development of Nyasaland's socio-political scenery. As administrative infra-structures, they served the important task as stepping-stone for the imperial rule:² Company administrative apparatus provided the necessary basis for colonial administration facilitating, in the process, the transfer of power from the local to the imperial control.

With the annexation of Nyasaland as British protectorate in 1890 -91, an alien government with far-reaching implications for the indigenous peoples, came to power; and henceforth all political, economic, and social interactions between the colonizer and the colonized occurred within the context of a

1 Duignan, P., Gann, L.H.: Colonialism in Africa 1870 - 1960, Vol. 1, London 1970, p. 119

2 For a fuller account of the transfer of power, see Barnes, J.: Politics in a Changing Society, London 1954, pp. 29 - 30, 36 - 39 and 55 - 62; Stokes, E.T.: Early European Administration and African Political Systems in Nyasaland, 1891 - 1897, in: Conference of the History of the Central African Peoples, Lusaka 1953; Frederick, L.D.: The Rise of Our East African Empire: Early Efforts in Nyasaland and Uganda, London 1893.

colonial situation. Britain succeeded in ploughing a new colonial expansion sphere while simultaneously asserting her authority over Lake Nyasa area thwarting, as well, Portuguese, Arab and German aspirations.¹

4. The Military Factor

The stabilization of the British administration became a political reality following the fulfillment of two major pre-requisites. One important pre-condition was the local inter-tribal co-operation. With the administrative, financial, and military weakness characterising the new order, there was no question of the establishment of colonial administration in the sense of imposing it without regard to the wishes of the indigenous peoples. On this issue, Jasp van Velsen writes: ' It was a process of growth and reciprocal adjustment in which the administration used diplomacy rather than force and ruled through negotiation. In adopting this approach, the administration was no doubt influenced by the fact that the government did not have large military forces at its disposal. The administration could not afford to ignore the desires of the local inhabitants.'²

¹ A well-documented account of British imperial presence at this time is to be found in: Wills, A.J.: An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, London 1964; Pollock, N.H.: Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia: Corridor to the North, Pittsburgh 1971.

² Velsen, J.v.: The Establishment of the Administration in Tongaland, in: Leverhulme Inter-College History Conference, UCRN, Salisbury, September 1960. See also Duff, H.: Nyasaland under the Foreign Office, London 1906.

For the purpose of consolidation of the early administration, Harry Johnston, the first architect of the Nyasaland colony, who in keeping with the times, envisaged a racially - stratified society 'ruled by whites, developed by Indians, and worked by blacks',¹ obtained the military services, not only of several British officers, small armies of Sikhs, Muslims, and other Asian ethnic communities who saw action in a number of engagements throughout the 1890's, but also of the large majorities of local tribesmen. It was undoubtedly the mobilization of the local African into the military in the interests of legitimizing the new administration, that opened up the much needed opportunities for alternative employment. Between 200,000 and 250,000 men were recruited as carriers during 1906 - 1918.² Consequently many young men looked upon military service as additional form of wage employment.

1 Hanna, A.J.: *The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia, 1859 - 95*, Oxford 1956, pp. 226 - 227; see also Baker, C.A.: *Johnston's Administration*, Malawi Department of Antiquities, 1973; Gore-Browne, S.: *The Relations of Black and White in Tropical Africa*, in: *Journal of the Royal African Society*, XXXV, 1935, pp. 378 - 386.

2 Pike, op.cit., p. 119; for a more detailed account of military service and expeditions, see Shepperson, G.: *The Military History of British Central Africa*, in: *RLIJ*, Manchester, December 1959; Duff, H.: *White Men's Wars in Black Men's Countries*, in: *The National Review*, London, September 1924; Moysse-Partlett, H.: *The King's African Rifles*, Aldershot 1956.

5. Consequences of Colonial Causes of Migration

The colonial infrastructures, be they settler farming communities, business companies, or military establishments, not only served the complementary function in paving the path towards the advent of British social and economic imperialism, but also in their role as limited economic bases provided the local motivation for European-type employment. To this, must be added the fact that not only was the colony a strategic asset, providing an outlet for settlers' surplus capital, but it was also to yield exportable labour to mining and plantation economies in neighbouring territories. Altogether, the 'Nyasa' worker was perhaps the most satisfactory type of labourer: Because, in addition to being a British subject, accustomed to British rule, he was reputable as a good worker;¹ not too ambitious and easily manageable, reliable, industrious and amenable to comparatively lowly paid employment; he had neither the education nor the opportunity for enterprise to rise above the level of manual labour. These characteristics made him all the more indispensable as migrant labourer.

¹ Nyasaland Report for 1962, London 1964, p. 30.

6. The African Revolt

Available information, too much of which is derived from the reports of expatriate participant observers, indicates that the peoples of Nyasaland, particularly to the south, opposed the annexation of their country and the superimposition of new rules of political behaviour in an essentially ad hoc, unco-ordinated fashion through the attainment of x's of a number of chiefs to vague agreements, that later served as a pretext for the further 'protection' of the remainder of Nyasaland's districts. Resistance had proved ineffective. Indeed, by the turn of the century the majority of the local inhabitants began, albeit tentatively, to accept and to operate within the constraints of the colonial context. Some had even started to shape the institutional forms of the whites to African ends.

Largely due to the cross-fertilization of ideas at the end of the century between the Afro-American leaders¹, the attempt at African emancipation took a new turn. In Nyasaland, regionally based christian revolutionaries, such as Chilembwe, Domingo, and Kamwana, provided an important initial thrust towards organized political resistance. Trained in the egalitarian doctrines of African independent and separatist churches and, having been in contact with missionary radicalists and fundamentalists of the 'apocalyptic vision', they set about demanding an end to the de facto economic vassalage. Thus, indigenous rebellions during the First World War were directed primarily against the administration's employment of Africans in external wars of Europe, and against the system of economic exploitation of the times reflected in the practice and

¹ For a more detailed description of the leading ideological influences (Garveyism, Watch Tower Movement, etc.), which originated from North America, and their cross-fertilization among 'Nyasaland' migrants, see Kadalie, C.: My life and the ICU: The Autobiography of a Black Trade Unionist in South Africa, London 1970, pp. 50, 79 - 80, and 137 - 38; Shepperson, G.: Notes on Negro-American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism, in: JAH, Vol. I, No. 2, London 1960, pp. 299 - 312; Thrupp, S.L.: Millennial Dreams in Action, The Hague 1962, pp. 144 - 159.

demands of compulsory labour migration, the insistence upon the collection of taxes from families of military recruits,¹ and the widespread alienation of land,² which had compelled numerous Africans to accept what for them were burdensome conditions of residence and employment. The social and economic conditions for a territorial revolution intensified.

Some missionary sympathisers, who shared the cause for black emancipation, offered blueprints as alternative to colonial

1 Before First World War, an acting governor noted that Nyasaland, depended directly upon forced labour and taxes of more than one million Africans for 70 percent of the colony's annual revenue. They also worked to produce the crops grown by 107 planters, and made life comfortable for the 200 missionaries and 100 administrators. See Confidential Notes on Nyasaland, GOA 5/3/1 : Pearce, Zomba Archives, August 1913.

2 On the question of 'land-grabbing' and alienation in the colonial era, Nkrumah notes, succinctly, that 'it was a relatively easy matter for white settlers to appropriate land in Malawi; by 1892, more than 16 percent of the land had been alienated, and three quarters of it was seized by settlers the African owners became in some cases tenants or leaseholders, but only on land considered not fertile enough for white farmers; with the seizure of the land, with all its natural resources, that is, the means of production, two sectors of the economy emerged: the European and the African, the former exploiting the latter. Subsistence agriculture was gradually destroyed and Africans were compelled to sell their labour power to the colonialists, who turned their profits into capital. It was in these circumstances that the race-class struggle also emerged as part of the class struggle. See Nkrumah, K.: Class Struggle in Africa 1972, pp. 14 - 15.

domination. An exemplary collaborator, Joseph Booth¹, urged independent African activity in all economic fields, 'equal rights, political, social, and economic, for Africans as well as Europeans', and demanded, inter alia, that 'the whole protectorate should revert to native ownership after twenty-one years.'² The 'Africa for Africans' doctrine and demands for a reversion to 'native' ownership posed, however, a serious threat to the colonial regime. To neutralize the liberating influences both within the colony and from the metropolitan centres, the administration resorted to measures of political deportation and systematic murder. The 1915 military confrontation in the south fatalistically ended Chilembwe's rebellious operations. Protectorate rulers engineered Booth's deportation. The only remaining, revolutionary element, Kamwana, whose successes alarmed the administration, was exiled to South Africa, thereby averting the threat of an impending 'Chilembwe' rebellion in the north.

Further north, the colonial administration had interfered little with the Livingstonia mission, which for many years assiduously exercised a moderating, socializing influence. Elsewhere in the colony, the establishment of separate christianities,

¹ A baptist missionary, born in Derby 1851, came to Malawi in 1892, became political mentor and benefactor of Nyasaland's first nationalist leader, John Chilembwe; between 1895 and 1896 he wrote a book entitled 'Africa for the African', arguing not only for African emancipation, but also for the 'negro' colonization in Africa and against Europe's scramble for Africa.

² Shepperson, G., Price, T.: The Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, setting and significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915, Edinburgh 1958, p. 79

independent churches, and schools with their biblical fundamentalism, social radicalism and racial egalitarianism, continued to expose the myth inherent in the civilizing mission of the new British protectionism.

Whatever concept the 'christian revolutionaries'¹ may have had of the role a national church should play in the creation of national feeling, their nationalism, like other nationalisms, constituted a revolt against an inferior political and economic status. The religious insights which had developed in a predominantly peasant society were being ploughed back by urbanised evangelicals who were unaware of the extent to which their religious ideas had been conditioned by their own social and economic environment. In this, overseas missionaries, through their religious efforts, vocational programmes, and control over the means of ideological formation, not only helped to shape the framework of colonial rule, but also provided liberating impulses through which Malawians realised their full stature as men who sought to grasp their freedom.

Today the political co-ordinates of the country with respect to its historical past have changed. The decolonization and independence struggle in Malawi and elsewhere in Africa have unquestionably increased orientations aimed at bringing about social and political development; however, as white colonialism is subsequently replaced by a political and economic subjection to local bureaucratic and europeanised elites, the situation of subordination and deprivation persists and will continue to produce rebellious movements of a compensatory character.

¹ For a detailed and well-documented account of this theme, see Shepperson, G.: The Politics of African Church separatist Movements in British Central Africa, in: Africa, XXIV, July 1954: see also Kidney, E.: Native Sons of Nyasaland, in: JAS, XX, 1921, pp. 116 - 126.

Chapter IV

MIGRATION TO ZAMBIA

1. Introductory Note

The following section presents the identical context of colonial political economy and history in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia as a point of departure. Within the context, analysis is made of the nature, scope, incentives and justifications of the inter-territorial migration. Specifically examined are the economic drives operating through the network of administrative pressures such as the imposition of taxes and land appropriation. A paternalistic regime based on the dependency of 'natives', to the point where they cannot exercise initiative and defiance without great risk to themselves, provides the political framework within which contract migration gained impetus from the promotional efforts of recruiting organization searching for a stable and reliable labour force. A significant facet is that emigration from Nyasaland developed at a time when the internal socio-economic conditions were deteriorating, such that increases in the number departing correlated with depressing conditions there and with the immense mining expansion in the receiving country¹. The resultant institutionalization of labour migration, the vicissitudes of mining industrialization and the formation of political awareness through 'native' associations as vehicles of protest and national mobilization, are

¹ For historical review of mining development in Northern Rhodesia, see Slinn, P.: Commercial Concessions and Politics during the Colonial Period: The Role of the British South African Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890 - 1964, in: African Affairs, 70, 281, London 1971, pp. 365 - 384; and 'Zambian Anglo-American Limited, Proposals for the Expansion and Development of the Company, in: Financial Times, (UK), 12 July 1974, p. 30.

noted as crucial turning-point in the colony's labour movement, fostering and accelerating the advent of a new political dimension that was to provide a framework of migratory movements in line with an independent African governmental policy.

2. Guiding Policies on Labour Migration

The pre-World War I Nyasaland administration appears to have had no definite labour migration policy towards neighbouring territories: instability and vacillation characterised policies controlling the early movements of labourers into the Rhodesian mining colony. The underlying philosophy of the times, the 'reservoir philosophy'¹, with its strangely apt echo of African reserves, dominated territorial labour policies; and according to the philosophy, out of the poverty-stricken subsistence economy, African labour would enter wage-paid employment.

The burdens of official taxation compelled and drove men from the rural areas. The least desirable consequences of mining industrialization were viewed by the company management as temporary accompaniments of the 'adjustment' process. Where indigenous reaction developed a revolutionary battle-arm, such as the open rebellions, in defiance of the system of labour migrancy, the administrations unleashed massive networks of increased taxation, and in the case of default, demolition of huts and land appropriation, all of which rendered inevitable the continuous supplies of rural labour.

¹ On the concept of reservoir philosophy, see Hunter, G.: Employment Policy in Tropical Africa: The Need for Radical Revision, in: ILR, Vol. 105, No.1, January 1972.

3. Migration Forms: 'Free-flow' and 'Contract' Migration

From the standpoint of organization, migration to Northern Rhodesia occurred in two major ways: first, the 'free-flow' movements, free from quota systems and without the framework of administrative hurdles. To this category of migrants belonged the various peoples from Nyasaland, who have been working there since the mines were opened. The length of time that missionary schooling has been within their reach, contributed to their demand as clerical hands on the 'Copperbelt' mines, when there were no men of equivalent status anywhere near.

Second, organized migration, otherwise referred to as contract labour, replaced and oftentimes complemented the free-flow movements. Generally, legislation regulated extra-territorial migration of this kind.

4. Inter-territorial Labour Agreement

The inter-territorial agreement which came into effect in 1947, abandoned the traditional concept of labour emigration and replaced it by the notion of 'inter-territorial worker'. It abolished the priority of the individual colony's labour market. The freedom of movement thus defined was not, however, limitless. The right to migrate in search of work was subject to limitations on grounds of maintaining the minimum of tribal order. To this effect, the agreement stipulated the temporary suspension of inter-territorial migration in the event of a grave danger to social security in tribal areas.

It was the obligation of colonial administrations, individually and in the interest of the dominant community as a whole, to retain within their territorial spheres, sufficient and able-bodied male Africans to meet local labour requirements and to maintain the minimum integrity of the tribal structures¹.

¹ See 'Social and Legal Provisions', in: Inter-territorial Labour Agreement, Lusaka/Salisbury 1947.

The labour agreement entered into by the central African colonies, Northern and Southern Rhodesia as well as Nyasaland, envisaged uniform but reciprocal labour arrangements. The latter included:

1. the identification and control of migrant workers;
2. the repatriation after a 'contracted' period;
3. the maintenance of families and dependants of migrant workers during their absence;
4. a system of deferred-payments for migrant workers;
5. the provision of adequate medical services, housing and feeding; and
6. the provision of a migrant labour inspectorate.

The inspection and registration of migratory labourers upon arrival in any of the respective territories ensured the repatriation of the farm and mine workers after an economic period, which did not exceed two years. Upon return to his homeland, the migrant worker was assured of deferred payments and family remittances in his district of origin. The organization necessary to handle remittance and deferred-pay schemes as well as the necessary employment stamps, was formed in the three constituent territories through a network of area labour offices: while in Northern Rhodesia it was through British postal orders, in Southern Rhodesia family remittances and deferred payments were made to Nyasalanders through the sale of employment stamps. These, in addition, created specialization within their organizational framework for medical examination of migratory workers (a) proceeding to another territory for employment and (b) returning to their home territory after engagement abroad. In order to facilitate the movement of labour between the three countries, free transportation, the 'Ulere' system, was instituted as an integral part of the migratory scheme.

In view of the likelihood of increasing stabilization of labour at the place of employment, migratory workers with (a)

the qualification of an uninterrupted residence of 10 years and (b) the concurrence of their employers subject to the provisions of local legislation, could establish themselves permanently or semipermanently with their families in the neighbourhood of their employment: with the result that provisions of the agreement insofar as they related to repatriation and the liability to deduction from wages in respect of family remittances, were waived. On the other hand, migrants of less than 10 years residence in the host territory, but with intentions to stabilise themselves at the place of work, were issued with endorsements of 'permits' which also enabled families residing with their breadwinner, to extend their stay as long as they remained in employment.

In sum, the agreement established a far-reaching system for the unhindered movement of workers, which for all practical purposes created a common labour market out of three migrant reserves - a key factor in the relentless and systematic exploitation of indigenous labour in the interest of metropolitan transplanted economies.

5. Migration and Underdevelopment

The fundamental problem of labour migration cannot be divorced from the general question of political and economic underdevelopment in the Nyasaland territory during its colonial history.

Nyasaland was in a deeply depressed economic situation derived directly from the reality of colonialism; the imperial government and the local administration viewed the colony, especially the Shire Highlands, as the important area of settlement and agricultural development. The latter meant that the imperial authorities subordinated Nyasaland's local interests to what they saw as higher interests¹, viz. the imperial concentration on production of raw materials for exports and other economic activities largely directed to production for export. This, together with land taken by settlers, had a profoundly disturbing impact upon

¹ The Nyasaland Times, 20 April 1920.

the economy of Nyasaland: the predominant form of economic organization which was largely self-sufficient village and tribal economies, both agricultural and pastoral, suffered under conditions of colonial reduction in total acreage available.

In the post-war slump, the colony entered into what a later governor called 'the times of starvation'. Nyasaland was henceforth prevented from devoting her revenues to such things as African education, medical services, road-building, agricultural development, and the establishment of veterinary services. Having been assigned to a distinctly secondary place in the attention of her imperial rulers, she was used for purposes that hindered her economic development.¹

With a financial position which was being transformed into fiscal insolvency and chaos with each passing year, a scandalous low ebb in areas of social services, particularly sanitation, education, and technical services, and above all, a lack of African-based agricultural infrastructure, Nyasaland

¹ Investigators have addressed this question with differing results. Some, like Sir Keith Hancock, have asserted that 'Nyasaland's economic problems arise from the comparative poverty of her resources'; see Hancock, K.: Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, II: Problems of Economic Policy, 1919 - 1939, Part 2, London 1942, p. 120. Others have reported on the reality of colonialism as responsible for Nyasaland's chronic underdevelopment; see Vail, L.: The Making of an Imperial Slum, in: JAH, XVI, I, 1975, pp. 89 - 112.

became 'the slum of the empire'.¹ It was such a depressing state of economic underdevelopment that was reflected in the policies of the metropolitan power and its stringent financial practices: the secretary of state for colonies confirmed that Nyasaland was 'a treasury-controlled territory conducted as such territories are apt to be, on the absolute minimum of expenditure';² and a similar policy decision regarding the over 90 percent Nyasaland labourers migrating south on foot, was implemented: thus in line with the norms of treasury-controlled territory, the 1957 'Nyasaland minimum wage order' stated quite bluntly it does not take into account a worker's family responsibilities.³

The above combination of circumstances led to Lord Passfield's determination to ensure that 'the protectorate should at least be maintained in a condition to avoid grave public discredit which would attach to HMG both in this country and abroad should the present scandalous state of Nyasaland attract attention'.⁴ Despite this, and the subsequent population pressures on the country's carrying capacity⁵ accompanied by rampant land alienation in the interest of experimental stations

1 *Ibid.*, p. 90

2 Jones, G.: Britain and Nyasaland, London 1964

3 Nyasaland Report of 1935, Zomba

4 C.O. 525/135, Bottomley to Treasury, Zomba Archives

5 On this point, the Report of the Post-War Development Committee of 1945 declared that 'the fact of rapidly increasing population and rapidly declining soil fertility have already been sufficiently emphasized to make it clear that the country's capacity for supporting its own people is under an increasing strain.' See Report of the Post-War Development Committee, Government Printer, Zomba 1946, p. 16.

and geological surveys for mineral prospection, the imperial administration by no means felt the political necessity to modify traditional colonial concepts or even to broaden the economic base of colonial areas.

The reality of colonialism dragged the territory's economy and government into a situation from which there was no apparent escape other than the mass migration of her citizens to mines and plantations in the south. This threatened to create a dangerous disequilibrium between the rich industrial centres and the colony's countryside, ultimately depriving the latter of its livelihood. This is how John Pike describes the country's social and economic dismantlement: 'As one result of this pressure a large number of able-bodied men emigrated to the industrial centres of Southern Africa. This in turn produced a number of social problems and led to a less able-bodied population's being left to deal with agriculture on a more intensive scale.'¹

The transfer of surplus labour, which at this point was more than considerable, was virtually a 'gift' from the poor colony to the rich areas which benefited from it; and this is sufficient in itself to explain the further stagnation of Nyasaland's economy in the years that followed.

6. Statistical Components

Until the achievement of political independence in 1964, when Zambia introduced a policy of replacing the system of migrant labour by one of increasing stabilization at the place of employment, emigration from Malawi found an immense outlet in various openings on the Copperbelt. Partly due to the growing realization that higher wages by Malawian standards could be

¹ Pike, J.G., op.cit., p. 193

earned on the mines, and the fact that mining companies, in comparison to neighbouring colonies, initiated concessions in opening various semi-skilled jobs to local Africans and Nyasaland's Livingstonian graduates, Zambia ranked third in importance, after Rhodesia and South Africa, as labour-importing country. Labour movements between the two countries, which were in existence since the early 1890-s, increased sharply in the two decades preceding the federation. Estimations made during the forties and fifties suggest the magnitude of the Nyasaland emigration into neighbouring central African territories:

Year	Absolute Numbers
	(To the nearest 1000)
1945	139,000
1946	121,000
1947	143,000
1948	140,000
1949	146,000
1950	143,000
1951	148,000
1952	153,000
1953	159,000

Source: Statistical Compilations of the Central African Labour Council, following the Inter-territorial Labour Agreement of 1947.

These excessive migration flows persisted in the period following the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia into the federation. It is estimated that 69,000 males and 25,000 females, a total of 94,000 Malawians¹, were issued with identity certificates for travel to Zambia - during the 15 years (1953 - 67) period.

¹ These are the estimates extracted from the 'Report of Ministry of Labour 1963 - 1967', Zomba, and the 'Outside Malawi Register', a special enquiry about relatives living abroad conducted concurrently with the 1966 population census of Malawi.

7. The Rise of African Political Consciousness

In the more than fifty years of British rule, the men who run the copper industry have, despite their other notable achievements in the fields of copper mining and the establishment of supporting network of administrative infrastructures, failed to provide what the Montreaux Conference on Development called 'a meaningful collaboration between centres of wealth and power and the areas of poverty and weakness'¹ within the mining industry.

A significant development has been the increasing growth of African political consciousness as migration revolutionised the distribution and structure of the colonies' working class population under similar discriminatory practices.

With political, economic, and social influence out of all proportion to their numbers, the expatriate-run miners' unions laboured against the advancement of selected Africans into skilled occupations, except beyond certain low levels of clerical employment². Wage discrimination became an entrenched aspect of the mining industry and indeed of the entire colonial economy³. Until the late forties, the unionization of African workers was illegal, so that only limited 'native' welfare associations for primarily non-political interests, were tolerated. It is clear that these societies pursued political objectives, the

1 WCC : Fetters of Injustice : Report of the World Consultation on Ecumenical Assistance for Development Projects, Geneva 1970 p. 163

2 Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia, col. No.145, 1938, 19

3 Lewis, J.: The Colour Bar in the Copperbelt, SAIRR, Johannesburg, 1941

word 'welfare' being interpreted in the widest possible sense.¹

In the Nyasaland colony political consciousness mainly among the Livingstonia intelligentsia, took a similar associational shape. Using the 'migration' argument² as pretext, regionally based 'Nyasa' associations³ pressed for compensatory reforms, improvements in race relations and infrastructural changes, 'including redress in the manner in which state-owners took unfair advantage of African women on the estates, doing something about the high prices prevalent in rural stores'⁴, improving road networks in order that Africans might thereby be enabled to export their agricultural produce.

Such system-provocative appeals evoked customary official reaction. Colonial governors began to identify with traditional chiefs and aristocracies as paid servants in the

1 Mitchell, J.C.: *The African Middle Class in British Central Africa*, in: *Development of a Middle Class in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries*, Brussels 1952, p. 231

2 Rotberg, I.R., op.cit., p. 118

3 For detailed studies on 'native' associations, see Velsen, J.v.: *Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi*, in: Stokes, E., Brown, R.: *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*, Manchester 1966, pp. 376 - 412; Tangri, R.: *Inter-War Native Associations and the Formation of the Nyasaland African Congress*, in: *Trans-African Journal of History*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1971, pp. 84 - 102; and Mumba, S.L.: *Native Associations in Nyasaland*, in: *Zo Ona*, Blantyre, 24 April 1924.

4 Rotberg, I.R., op.cit., p. 46; Gray, R.: *The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland*, London 1960, pp. 120 - 127

colony's administrative machine.¹ The indigenous intelligentsia, despite their non-violent tactics of 'persuasion', persistence, and petition', met with official contempt as genuine channels of African protest.

The limited constitutional and political aims which shunned mass interests whilst embracing European organizational patterns, lacked national appeal; the association elites demanded reform rather than radical change, and in the process sought a degree of vertical mobility within the dominant socio-economic structure of the administering powers. It was the fusion of the various associations into a broad-based national organization commanding the entire mass following that was to lead the protectorate from colonial dependency to a sovereign state under black rule². In the process of political transformation in which political power shifted from an economically dominant white minority, racially defined, to a formerly subservient African majority,³ the nationalist movement, under Hastings Banda, placed political self-determination above economic advantage.⁴ Economic considerations

1 The key to British indirect rule imposed in Nyasaland from 1933 and in Northern Rhodesia from 1930, sought to transform chiefs and chiefs' councils into local governments by investing them with political, administrative, and judicial powers, subject to the veto of a European district commissioner. As one official commented: 'every district which has been 'taken over' by the chiefs is in actual fact largely carried out by the district commissioner.' See No. 1/20/1-3, Zomba Archives.

2 Rotberg, I.R.: *The Rise of African Nationalism: The Case of East and Central Africa*, in: *World Politics*, XV, 1962, pp. 78 - 83.

3 Mitchell, J.C.: *Race, Class, and Status in South Central Africa*, in: Tudem, A. et al.: *Social Stratification in Africa*, New York 1970, p. 303.

4 Upon his return from forty-two years of self-exile, Banda 'conceived his task as being that of organising the people of Nyasaland behind him to bring about the degree of pressure required to right the basic wrong regarding political rights'. See Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, London 1958/59, p. 28.

were relegated to the period of reconstruction following independence. In the event of serious threats to the viability of the state, Malawi's leaders thought then in terms of associational links with black independent states. 'The nation's fate', Banda declared, 'must be joined with that of Northern Rhodesia, the Congo, Tanganyika and other like-minded lands'.¹

¹ East Africa and Rhodesia, 19 May 1960, p. 890.

Chapter V

MIGRATION TO RHODESIA

1. Introduction

It is within the scope of this chapter to present a causal analysis of the major factors underlying the historical upsurge in the Malawian migration to Rhodesia, in particular, their political and economic context, geographic concentration, as well as the supporting role of inter-territorial labour agreement - all of which are crucial to the Rhodesian political economy that is largely controlled by a relatively small expatriate population.¹ A classificatory scheme of Malawian migrants on the basis of duration of residence in Rhodesia is attempted in order to determine the extent of their assimilation in the labour-importing colony.

¹ Though small in population size, the Rhodesian expatriate community has several strong points. These include the relative stability of the civil service and public corporations, the comparative resilience of the economy under international pressure, and the political, military, and financial support of international capitalism as well as the relative cohesion and morale of the armed forces, and similar factors. There are, however, weak points too, especially the rapidly deteriorating quality of the white population and its institutions (judiciary, university system, parliamentary democracy, etc.) as well as the departure of liberal Europeans following the bitter fruits of independence since 1965. For an insight into the changing character of Rhodesia's white minority, see Clements, F.: Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society, London 1969.

2. Early Migrant History : ' Discretionary ' versus ' necessary ' Character of African Labour

The situation of the African migrant worker in Rhodesia, as in other trans-Zambesian ex-colonial territories, has to be understood against the background of a rudimentary capitalist economy; an important characteristic of such an economy is its dependence upon migratory labour in the development of capitalist agriculture and mining industry. As early as 1903 Rhodesia expressed interest in the recruitment of extra-territorial labour; through the establishment of native labour boards, the colony's administration sought to centralise and co-ordinate recruitment, to forestall conflictual competition among employers and to regulate the mobility of Africans within the capitalist sector of the economy.¹

Two distinct stages distinguish the historical development of migratory labour in the Rhodesian colony.² The initial phase is the 'discretionary' period of African economic life, roughly before 1920, when local consumption was discretionary and subsistence economy unaccumulative, reflecting no essential trend toward promotion of surplus commodities. But, with the systematic introduction of compulsory labour methods (hut taxes, labour legislation, low wages, recruiting agencies, political control

1 Gann, L.G.: A History of Southern Rhodesia, London 1965, p. 124

2 As regards the periodization of labour trends in Rhodesia, see Arrighi, G.: Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia, in: JDS, Vol.6, No.3, April 1970; Barber, W.J.: Economic Rationality and Behaviour Patterns in an Underdeveloped Area: A Case Study of African Economic Behaviour in the Rhodesias, in: Economic Development and Cultural Change, VIII, 1960, pp. 237 - 51.

over traditional chiefs and land, etc.) the capitalist economy was 'forced' upon the indigenous peoples. This resulted in the violent outbreak of rebellions of resistance¹.

Successful suppression of the economic revolts meant the onset of the 'necessary trend' toward participation in the capitalist labour market, which assumed a determinative character only after 1920² when the need for the development of commercial agriculture and mining industry intensified the labour shortage. The expatriate farming period of greatest demand co-incided with the month's peak activity in the peasant sector, such that there was the tightening up of political legislation over land, exercising a restricting control over African agriculture and pastoral potential. This was confirmed by the commission appointed to investigate the increasing proletarianization of the local peasantry; its report revealed that 'the African was not likely to

1 On Studies regarding causes underlying the various expressions of rebellious resistance (loafing, desertions, industrial 'explosions', etc.) on Rhodesian farms and mines, especially around 1896 - 1903, 1905 - 1911 and 1918 - 1919 when the African resistance to compulsory labour was at its height, see *The Labour Problem in Rhodesia*, Bulawayo 1901, p. 20ff; *Chinese Question in Rhodesia*, Bulawayo 1901, p. 6; *Rhodesian Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1902*, p. 64; Ranger, T.O.: *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898 - 1930*, London 1970, p. 141; and Onselen, C.v.: *Worker Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern Rhodesia 1900 - 1920*, in: JAH, XIV, 1973, pp. 237 -255.

2 For analyses of structural changes in the Rhodesian economy prior to and since Second World War, see Barber, W.J.: *The Economy of British Central Africa*, London 1961, pp. 119 - 122; and Thompson, C.H., Woodruff, H.W.: *Economic Development in Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, London 1954, pp. 1 - 30.

progress agriculturally owing to the fact that 70 percent of the able-bodied men spent some part of every year in the European areas'.¹

Subsequent economic growth was affected and to some extent distorted by the racial land apportionment, whereby the intended results of unbalanced apportionment - overpopulation and congestion - provided the rational basis for the colony's labour policy of 'turning tribesmen into efficient labourers rather than transforming them from subsistence plottolders into productive farmers'.²

Under the land apportionment act, Africans were regulated to the 'grenzwildnis' ('no-man's land'), where the traditional adjustment both of expansion in the face of population growth and pastoral farming in the face of draught or soil infertility were impossible; with (a) demographic growth rate which is 3.6 percent (and one of the highest in the world), (b) the racial population ratio between blacks and whites assuming alarming proportion (22 to 1), and (c) the African population at 5,500,000 and expected to rise to 14,000,000 by the end of the century, stolid Rhodesians are well aware that they are sitting on a

1 Second Interim Report, Development Co-ordinating Commission, Salisbury 1949; Phillip, J. et al.: Report of the Advisory Committee on the Development of Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia, with particular Reference to the Role of African Agriculture, Ministry of Native Affairs, 1962

2 Sadle, J.L.: Rhodesia Economic Report, in: ARB, September/October 1967, p. 833; see also Clarke, D.G.: Domestic Workers in Rhodesia: The Economics of Masters and Servants, Mambo Occasional Papers, Socio-Economic Series, No.1, 1974; Pearson, S.D.: Employment Trends in a Developing Economy: The Case of Southern Rhodesia, in: East African Economics Review, Vol.II, No.1, June 1964.

population 'time-bomb'.¹

3. Rhodesian Federation: The Political and Economic Context of Migratory Labour

The settler preoccupations of the thirties and forties, which underlined the basic desire for co-ordination of the territorial economies, centred around two major issues: (a) the elimination of the imperial chartered company as the dominant economic force, and (b) the replacement of the colonial office government by a settler regime based on the political amalgamation of the territorial colonies north and south of the Zambesi.²

The fact that Africans outnumbered whites in the Nyasaland colony by one thousand to one,³ made a 'greater Rhodesia' that much more desirable. The struggle for political and economic power and the degree of consciousness of various separate interest groups intensified to the extent that a phlothera of interested groups - planters' and merchants' associations - embarked upon political mobilization in the Nyasaland colony, to sell the idea

1 Observer, (Uk), 16 December 1973; Africa Confidential, 27 April 1973, p. 2

2 For a development of the 'federation theme', paying attention to its appraisal in historical perspective, see The Federal Scheme for Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Prepared by a Conference held in London, January 1953, Cmd. 8754, 1953; Welensky, R.: Toward Federation in Central Africa, in: Foreign Affairs, XXXI, 1952, pp. 142 - 149; Rotberg, I.R.: The Federation Movement in British East and Central Africa, 1889 - 1953, in: JCPS, II, 1964, pp. 141 - 160; Melland, F.A.: A Central African Confederation, in: JAS, XVII, 1918, pp. 276 - 306.

3 Nyasaland Times, 20 June 1935

of closer association for economic and racial reasons.¹

For the territorial black majorities, the politics of amalgamation evoked fears of political and economic domination under new guise; integration as a model of social development was the underlying idea behind the central African federation, but the 'partnership' or multiracialism contained in the model, was rejected by the African leadership of what was then Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, because integration's pace of political development was too slow and de facto maintained the dependency of the indigenous peoples.

In the case of Nyasaland, despite her role in the African campaign against federation, the small protectorate had never been wanted by the federation's white politicians in the first place. Economically, Nyasaland was dependent on the two Rhodesias, and politically its secession, though of symbolic importance to Africans, could have been survived easily by Salisbury. It was Northern Rhodesia with its relatively large settler population, its great mineral wealth and importance as a market for Southern

¹ For a full discussion of the racial and economic determinants of 'closer association', see Central African Territories: Report of the Conference on Closer Association, Cmd. 8233, 1951; Clegg, E.: Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, London 1960; Gray, R.: The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, London 1960, pp. 155 - 160; Report of the Commission on Closer Union, Cmd. 3234, 1929.

Rhodesia, that was the coveted prize.¹

Over and above the fact that her southern region was the only essentially rich agricultural area with farming products as chief items of export, Nyasaland as a whole was poor and accounted for only 5 percent of the net domestic production of the federation. Its mineral resources had not been tapped sufficiently and industry did not develop at the same time as other sectors; so that men tended to go abroad and earn an easier living than at home. At the height of the federation, in 1956, more of its African workers were in employment outside the territory (175,000) than within (163,000).²

Thus, in terms of economic rationality i.e. in terms of the possible benefits for the three territories accruing from the rational co-ordination of rail and road services, capital inflows, etc., the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland made a perfect sense, but in terms of political aspirations it was a tragic blunder. Indeed, the range of political strategies open to federal leaders were relatively broad: the representatives of European interests at that time enjoyed a dominant position in the federal legislature, and a parliamentary democracy with full responsibility for their internal affairs. The trans-Zambesian territories, on the other hand, and particularly Nyasaland,

¹ A more detailed account on Northern Rhodesia with regard to the enormous potential in mineral wealth and commercial possibilities is to be found in: Gann, L.H.: The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper: 1922 - 1952, in: JRLI, XVIII, 1955, pp. 1 - 18; Prain, R.L.: The Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia, in: JRSA, CIII, 1955, pp. 196 - 216; Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia, col. no. 145, 1938.

² Report on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland 1958 - 1959, Salisbury 1959, p. 163

could hardly hope ever to qualify for dominion status on the basis of their own slender resources;¹ so that internal inequalities - the political and racial imbalance in a federation of 7, 000,000 Africans and 250,000 whites - which plastered over the real divergencies of interests and aims within the 'mixed' societies, provided the legitimization basis for allegations of partnership in a society that was racially stratified on the basis of a 'horse and rider' relationship.² The predominant economic and political power of the federal government tended to tip the balance between territorial and central interests strongly in favour of the federal government.

1 Because Nyasaland had no mining industry and little manufacturing development, economists took the view that the Central African federation had impeded Malawi's economic development since all industries and foreign capital were channelled to the more developed areas within the federation, specifically Southern Rhodesia. See 'Malawi : Hostage of the South', in: Africa 1971, p. 308; also Hazlewood, A., Henderson, P.A.: Nyasaland: The Economics of Federation, Oxford 1960; Williams, S.: Central Africa: The Economics of Inequality, London 1960; and Frost, D.: The Economic Outlook for Nyasaland, in: Race, iv, 1963, pp. 59 - 72; Strack, H.R.: Rhodesia - Malawi Linkages: Dependence or Co - operation ? Paper presented at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Denver, USA.

2 For a telling account of this relationship, see Creighton, T.R.M.: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation: The Anatomy of Partnership, New York 1960, pp. 101 - 102; Kaunda, K.: 'Rider and Horse' in Northern Rhodesia, in: Africa South, 111, September 1959, pp. 52 - 56.

The dissolution of the federation, therefore, was a necessary pre-requisite for the reassessment of priorities for development in the trans-Zambesian territories. The rampant African nationalism throughout the Central African region,¹ was in part a revolt against an inferior economic and political status.

In the case of Nyasaland, political involvement in the central African federation retarded her economic development since it confirmed the colony in its status as the exporter of cheap labour, primarily to Rhodesia, the main employer of Nyasaland's emigrants. It was the 'Nyasaland disturbances' of 1959 which provided the crucial turning-point in the history of the federation, following which campaigns of violence waged with success in what are now Malawi and Zambia, rendered possible the political task in persuading Britain to break up the federation.²

¹ See Hodgkin, T.: Nationalism in Colonial Africa, London 1965, pp. 115 - 120; Leys, C.: Nationalism in Africa, in: The Listener, London, 2 June 1960.

² The process of political disintegration of the federal scheme with special reference to Malawi has been documented by Chiume, M.W.K.: The Nyasaland Crisis, in: Africa South, 111, July - September 1959, pp. 45 - 51; and Nyasaland Demands Secession and Independence, London 1959; Nyasaland: State of Emergency, Cmd. 707, 1959; Report of the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference held in July and August, 1960, Cmd. 1132, 1960.

4. Migration in the Post-UDI Era: Legislative and Policy Developments

With the shift from the official ideology of partnership to one of separate development (provincialization) since the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, the groundwork for a new structure of society approximating the South African model was systematically and overtly laid down.¹ This became clear as each new piece of legislation was passed, or details given of what was yet to come.²

An especially important policy development has been the 'Closed Labour Areas Order' operating since 1964 and underlying the general policy of the Rhodesian administration - similar to that in South Africa - which aimed at the gradual substitution of foreign labour with local supplies. Its subsidiary objective has been the control of Malawian - and Zambian - labour in certain 'closed districts' where non-Rhodesian Africans were prevented from taking up employment. These included the urban municipalities of Salisbury, Bulawayo, and other large industrial centres situated within the radius of ten miles of these localities. In this manner the labour administration manipulated the prospects regarding the destination of foreign migrants in the interests of mining empires and capitalist agriculture, particularly the

¹ For an inter-state comparison of the two countries' racial and ideological positions, see Wilson, N.H.: *A white Standard of Living for Southern Rhodesia: The Two Pyramids Policy*, Salisbury 1953; *Ökumenischer Rat Berlin, Gleichstellung ohne Schranken: Ein Bericht aus Rhodesien*, Berlin, September 1971, pp. 4 - 15, 'Rhodesia', in: *Current History*, Vol. 64, No. 381, May 1973, p. 237.

² See, in particular, Palley, C.: *Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front from 1963 - 1969*, in: *Race*, Vol. XII, No. 1, July 1970.

tea, sugar, tobacco, and wattle plantations in the Matebeleland, the Midlands, and Mashonaland.

The implications of the restrictive 'closed area' policy of the Rhodesian administration with respect to Malawian migratory labour are quite evident. A glance at the available statistics makes this perfectly clear. On the basis of the Rhodesian population census in 1962 there were estimations of 186,000 Malawians in Rhodesia, in the following main areas:

Salisbury	50,000
Bulawayo	30,000
Lomagundi	20,000
Hartley	15,000
Makoni	10,000
Mazoe	10,000
Wankie	6,000

Source: Migration News, No. 4, Geneva 1971

From the statistical trend above, it may be seen that the greatest concentration of Malawians is in Salisbury and Bulawayo, in the European farming areas and in the mines. The figures assume alarming proportions when compared with the religious statistics by dioceses¹ which indicate the following approximations of Malawian immigrants:

Salisbury	128,000
Bulawayo	33,000
Umtali	16,000
Gwelo	15,000
Wankie	6,000

¹ See Haan, S.M.M., Houlihan, P.M.: Malawian Migrants in Rhodesia and South Africa, in: Migration News, No. 4, Geneva 1971, p. 18.

In spite of some differences in these various estimations or censuses, it seems that no great error is made, if the Malawian government estimate of Malawians in Rhodesia is accepted as being a quarter of a million. As to annual in and out movements, no detailed statistics are available; however, the use of passports by Malawians going abroad on contracts to mines and plantations, is likely to provide an important source of the estimates of the size of migratory movements. Thus, according to (a) some official data from the Rhodesian Central Office, before the independence of Malawi, and (b) the number of passports and identity certificates issued to Malawians on contract, the trend, volume, and development of migratory labour in and out of Rhodesia has been documented as follows:

Year	Annual Average
1946-50	22,800
1951-55	40,700
1956	50,800
1957	49,200

Source: Annual Report for Nyasaland for 1957

Clearly, the number of migratory workers entering Rhodesia from Malawi showed a consistent pattern of progressive increase. Giovanni Arrighi describes some of the internal factors underlying the constant upsurge of migrant labour in Southern Rhodesia and points to the initial 'rush' for education, in the 1940's and 1950's, the increasing politicization of the African masses and the awareness of their proletarianized status necessitating qualitative changes in the indigenous manpower structure within the capitalist economy, that is, qua proletarians rather than qua migrants peasants. Structural transformation in the colony's economy evidenced by the appearance and dominance of foreign oligopolies and the manufacturing industries, co-incided with the need for qualitative manpower, so that for the industrial development, upgrading of a section of African labour appeared necessary. It was partly such a mobility into the growing sectors of the secondary and tertiary

industries and its increasing stabilization there, which ruled out the possibilities of high turnover migratory conditions that rendered necessary the recruitment of extra-territorial labour. Considering this, Arrighi writes: 'Recruitment of labour outside Southern Rhodesia was certainly one of the major factors in determining both the rise and distribution among sections of the total African labour.'¹

A similar conclusion has been reached by Johnson in reference to the situation in Rhodesia where the indigenous African employee worked in the higher paid sectors, whereas the migrant worker from outside Rhodesia laboured in the lower paid sectors, especially agriculture.²

During the 1960's, the most significant factor in the decline of extra-territorial labour appears to have been associated with the termination of the inter-territorial agreement in 1961 when migration streams of workers entering the Rhodesian plantations showed substantial decrease. The comparative statistics four years prior to and five years after the termination of the labour agreement, attest to this decline in Malawian emigration into Rhodesia:

¹ See Arrighi, G.: The Political Economy of Rhodesia, in: Markovitz, I.L.: African Politics and Society, New York 1970, p. 400.

² Johnson, R.W.M.: The Economics of Subsistence, Technical Paper in Agricultural Economics No. 1, Department of Economics, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Labour Migration before and after the Termination of the
Tripartite Labour Agreement

Year	Numbers (To the nearest 1,000)
Before Termination of Agreement	
1958	44,000
1959	39,000
1960	36,000
1961	35,000

After Termination of
Agreement

1962	29,000
1963	27,000
1964	22,000
1965	15,000
1966	10,000

Source: Report of the Secretary of Labour and Social
Welfare, Salisbury, December 1967

These figures illustrate that the 'biggest' single sector-employer of Malawian labour in agriculture during the forties and fifties, was no longer the dominant migrant labour-market for the two-thirds of those workers emigrating from Malawi. Several reasons have been advanced in support of the down-ward trend in inter-territorial labour. Among these, are the following crucial developments: (a) the general policy of Rhodesian authorities of replacing non-indigenous with local Africans;¹ (b) the

¹ See the Foreign Migratory Act of 1958, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Salisbury, Chapter 113.

drop in actual employment of Rhodesian Africans, and (c) the concomitant threats by local trade unions against the employment of foreign workers in the face of acute domestic unemployment.¹

A critical analysis of reasons accountable for migratory labour declines in the 1960's must also take into account the structural changes in the political economies of both the labour exporting and receiving countries, which arise from pressures produced by internal and/or external factors.

- (a) In the case of the Malawian economy, especially agriculture, the period at the beginning of 1964 when the central African federation came to an end and independence was at hand, saw the mounting lack of confidence within the commercial sector: imports were depressed and trade was stagnant. With the return of confidence, given the relative political stability since independence there has been an increase in the value and volume of agricultural production resulting from better climatic conditions that had prevailed in 1963 and 1964, and assisted by improved agricultural practices.²

¹ This issue on foreign labour and the related question regarding the recent history of trade union movements in Rhodesia has been critically examined by Lawrence, W.G.: A Decade of Free Trade Union Work in Rhodesia, in: Free Labour World, October 1974, pp. 5 - 7.

² Pike, C.J., op. cit. pp. 182 - 183; Pollock, N.C.: Industrial Development in Malawi, in: Geography, 53, (3), July 1967, pp. 316 - 319; Harper, W.H.: Trading Opportunities in Africa: Malawi, An Expanding Market, in: Board of Trade Journal, 194, (3707), 5 April 1968, pp. 1043 - 1046

(b) In so far as the Rhodesian economy is concerned, it has been able to survive, though at a critical level. Continually aggravating this situation are the mandatory sanctions, dwindling reserves of foreign exchange and the lack of significant foreign investment. It is questionable whether the former aspect, i.e. the real logic of sanctions - to weaken the white economy to the point at which the blacks can challenge its superior organization and technology - is working. More serious is, however, (a) the grimmer logic of guerilla warfare which presently faces a community of 250,000 within a population of over five million potential enemies,¹ and (b) the effect of the military security on the economy. The 'call-up' on part-time military or police reserve service has not only hit industry and business, it has also contributed to the increasing emigration rate, as young people leave the country to avoid service.²

1 For a cautious but interesting analysis of future possibilities of uncontrolled conflict across the Zambezi and the likelihood of white minority controlled implementation of majority rule in Rhodesia, in return for a restoration of an acceptable measure of regional security, see Wilkinson, R.A.: *Insurgency in Rhodesia 1957 - 1973: An Account and an Assessment*, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Adelphi Paper No. 100, London 1973.

2 The 'Smith' government is facing a growing slump in white immigration. In 1971, the net gain, was 9,400; in 1974 it was only 600, and the figure was 'kept in the black' only by whites fleeing from Mozambique. Last year (1974) over 9,000 whites left Rhodesia, the highest number for 10 years. See 'Rhodesia's glum Outlook', in: *The Economist*, 12 April 1975, p. 59.

In recent years Rhodesia has placed emphasis upon substantial revenues allocated to advertisements, assisted passages and subsidised housing for European immigrants. The political and economic aims of such a move, to boost the number of European immigrant workers, reduce job opportunities for the potential African labour force, and thereby further distort the comparative power base, is evident.¹ This and related political developments of the mid-sixties, particularly the unilateral declaration of independence, set economic boundaries to labour markets and tended to restrict or even discourage permanent inter-territorial migrations.

The real effects of economic sanctions on labour emigration following Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence remain unknown;² however, the fact that selective migration

1 See Estimates of Expenditure: 1971/1972, Salisbury 1972, p. 91.

2 Existing 'fact-finding' studies are of dubious and conflicting nature, and render difficult a clear analysis of Rhodesia's true state of economic affairs. While some investigations report favourable economic developments (see 'Rhodesian Mining Reports Sharp Gains', in: Newsweek, 22 October 1973, p. 50; 'Rhodesian Exports show Rise', in: The Financial Times, UK, 30 April 1973), others depict pessimistic trends resulting from economic sanctions ('Rhodesia: Effects of the Sanctions War', in: Africa Bureau Fact Sheet 34, April 1974). Part of the explanation for the contradictory results lies in the secrecy surrounding illicit transactions between Rhodesia and some foreign countries that offer lip service to UN resolutions and a blind eye to sanctions busting inside their own borders. On this issue, see disclosures by 'The Observer' (17 March 1968) on Rhodesian agents organizing 'deals' in several European cities, including Geneva, Paris, Hamburg, Lisbon, Genoa, Rotterdam and Las Palmas. Further disclosures on international commercial conspiracy dedicated to beating UN sanctions on Rhodesia are to be found in Niese Wand, P.: International Conspiracy to beat Sanctions, in: The Guardian, 24 November 1973, p. 3.

was permitted to continue even at the lower level of 1967 - 69 indicates that the demand for migratory labour, especially in the farming sector, was not entirely satisfied by indigenous Africans. Indeed until 1972, the Rhodesian African Labour Supply Commission attracted a small number of Malawians for employment on farms in Rhodesia. During 1972, a total of 2,386 Malawian workers was attested in Malawi for employment in Rhodesia under the auspices of that commission.¹

Comparative statistics of the RALSC recruitment and 'free-flow' movements from Malawi show the following distribution over the years:

	RALSC	'free-flow'
1967	3,183	9,477
1968	3,707	10,694
1969	3,868	6,192

Source: Statistics of the RALSC Office in Salisbury,
October 1970

The repercussions of the 1965 political changes touched upon and even affected the fundamental aspects of Malawian migrant labour policy, especially in the redirection of its migrants to new destinations where migration tended to flow fairly steadily in fixed channels.

¹ External Employment Service - Contract Labour, in: Malawi 1972, An Official Handbook, Ministry of Information, Blantyre 1973, pp. 121 - 122

5. Assimilation and Stabilization of Malawian Migrants

Following a period of over 70 years of inter-territorial migration in the interests of state, industry, business, and commercial agriculture, several thousands of Malawian migrants in Rhodesia have been integrated and assimilated into the local communities.¹ In many ways the socio-cultural similarities have acted as strong stimulus to local adaptation; so that it is legitimate to state that while the demand for labour has been the main cause of economic migration, sociological factors have influenced it.

Assimilation and integration into selected areas in the mining, industrial, and farming districts within the Rhodesian wage economy is thus a function of several interacting factors:

- (a) The similarities of the cultural elements of the indigenous peoples of both the country of immigration and that of migrants which eased and even facilitated the process of social adaptation - the underlying assumption being that the more closely the cultural level of the migrants' place of origin resembles that of the host country, the greater the prospects of assimilation.

¹ The relationship between immigrants and the native population has been variously categorised by social scientists: acculturation, accommodation, fusion, adoption, adjustment, absorption, amalgamation, assimilation and integration, are some of the terms used. See Heeren, H.J.: *Transmigratie in Indonesië*. Mepple/Boom 1967; Eisenstadt, S.N.: *The Absorption of Immigrants*, Free Press 1955. The method of choice of terms used in this section (Assimilation, integration, stabilization, etc.) is therefore purely eclectic.

- (b) The degree of social attachment-marriage, family, and kinship ties - the migrants felt to their host society which in turn affected the degree of attachment to the society of origin; and
- (c) to a greater extent, the openness of the settler agricultural and mining economy in the period before and after the Second World War during which era labour stabilization through inter-territorial agreements played a crucial role.

On the basis of these key generalizations, Malawians 'settled' in Rhodesia may be divided into three categories:

- (a) Those who have been living in Rhodesia for 30 or 40 years. They are often married to Rhodesian women and their children usually cannot speak Chichewa, the home language in Malawi. They are entirely assimilated into their present social surroundings and do not relate or identify in terms of the former social structure of their homeland.
- (b) Those who immigrated during or after the Second World War. They are found on private farms, private mines, or work as domestic staff. Several migrated with their dependants, such that the 'whole-family' migration constituted a large part of the overall migration process to Rhodesian mines and plantations in the 1940's and 1950's.
- (c) Those who immigrated via labour exchange offices. Their contracts are for 18 months or more. They are to be repatriated to Malawi upon the termination of their contracts.

The first group, because of its total incorporation into the local community, does not need much attention. The other groups, less assimilated, do not plan to settle in Rhodesia permanently. They regard themselves as Malawians and value their Malawian nationality as well as the 'independence' status of their homeland. It is especially the latter groups that favour and plan the education of their children in terms of the Malawian context.

Chapter VI

MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

- (a) Foreign Capital Investment: Limits and Possibilities of Policy Strategies, and their Implications for Domestic and Foreign Migratory Labour

1. Introductory Note

This section examines the three possible positions on foreign capital investment in South Africa available to those wishing to change the racist nature of the South African regime. Inadequacies and possibilities of these policy alternatives are analysed to determine their effect on internal change.

(1) The Argument for Increased Involvement

This policy alternative seeks to promote increased investment and accelerated infusions of technological expertise, in the belief that the economic growth thus stimulated will inevitably alter the economic conditions and social structure, and ultimately lead to the involvement of blacks (Africans, Coloureds, and Indian South Africans) in the political process.

(2) The Argument for Reform

Its objective is to press business interests to raise black wages, offer training and better promotion opportunities for black workers, and plough back a portion of their profits into educational and other benefits for the black community.

(3) The Argument for Withdrawal

Attempts to stop direct economic and material support to the white minority regime and advocates the withdrawal of investment and the severing of economic links as the

consistent moral alternative which at the same time offers solid support to Southern Africans committed to winning their freedom.

It is useful to analyse these alternatives in turn, examining the potential effects of each upon the South African situation. To do so in such a brief treatment entails simplifying matters of enormous complexity, but may, nevertheless, give some indications of the most appropriate response to the operations of multinational corporations and international capital in South Africa today.

Discussions of foreign economic involvement in South Africa sometimes become confused between policy and tactics. Loans by foreign governments and corporations to the South African government, doing business with or changing business practices in South Africa, or withdrawing capital from that country, involve policy. On the other hand, individuals or organizations who invest in corporations which do business in South Africa may use tactics to influence corporation policies. This analysis deals primarily with policy, examining the policy alternatives open to companies and the extent of their effectiveness in bringing about change in South Africa. Particular emphasis is placed upon the impact of these strategies upon domestic and foreign migrant workers.

2. Policy Alternatives

(1) The Argument for Increased Involvement

The thesis that economic growth entails the breakdown of traditional economic and social structures has many

articulate proponents.¹ The 'Financial Mail', South Africa's influential business weekly, which speaks for a large segment of the country's industrialists, argues that every new investment is 'another ray of hope for those trapped on the dark side of apartheid', and postulates that 'economic development will bring change that will loosen chains, just as it did in the Middle Ages in Europe'.²

These arguments are based on the undeniable fact that as the economy expands, pressures for a more efficient use of black labour will grow. The leap from this accepted premise to the proffered corollary that more rational utilization of the country's labour will lead to black

¹ For elucidation of this policy position, see Decke, B.: Industrialisierung und Herrschaft in Südafrika, Neuwied 1972; 'Südafrika beliebt', in: Wirtschaft - Rundschau, Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 July 1973, p. 7; Business as Usual: International Banking in South Africa, London 1974; also notes on the confidential papers known as the 'Frankfurt Documents' (reported in: Africa Bureau Document Paper 9, March 1974) originating from sources within a US-based multinational banking firm, the European-American Banking Corporation. These materials reveal that a group of forty banks from the United States, Europe, and Canada have been jointly involved in direct loans to the South African government and its agencies since the late 1970.

² Financial Mail, 11 September 1970

political and social advancement is a largely unproven one.¹

It is important at the outset to distinguish between the structure of South African society where political power is in the hands of a minority to which the country's wealth also accrues, and the official government policy of separating black and white. The germ of truth in the 'growth' theory is that economic development does tend to strain government credibility as more and more black workers stream to the urban areas where industry needs their labour. The countervailing tendency, however, is that an influx of blacks to the cities reinforces the electorate's fears and brings on greater repression such as characterised the last decade. There is a great difference between alteration of the techniques of domination and abandonment of white supremacy.

¹ For statements and findings to this effect, see Archer, S.F.: Inter-racial Income Distribution in South Africa : Data and Comment, unpublished discussion paper, Abe Bailey Institute of Inter-Racial Studies, University of Cape Town, November 1971; the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) surveys in: Horrell, M.: A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1971, SAIRR; the publications of the Bureau of Market Research (UNISA) : Income and Expenditure Patterns of Urban Bantu Households, Research reports No. 3 (Pretoria) ; No. 6 (Johannesburg) ; 8 (Cape Town) ; 13 (Durban) ; and Income and Expenditure Patterns of Urban Coloured Households, Durban Survey Research Report No. 11 ; Mathews, A.S.: Security Laws and Social Changes in the Republic of South Africa, in: Adam, H.: Sociological Perspectives, Oxford University Press, London 1971, pp. 229 - 243.

One response to this movement of African labour into 'white' industries and 'white' cities is the border industry policy, which seeks to divert industrial development to the borders of African Bantustans where cheap labour is within easy access of industry.¹ Such a development fits in neatly with the economically planned picture in the apartheid ideology. Under the terms of such measures as the 'Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act' of 1967, the government is encouraging the establishment of new industries in these border areas. Among the incentives offered to companies to move into these areas has been the authorization of African wage rates lower than those in the cities.

If the 'growth' arguments were accurate, one would expect the boom years of the sixties to have produced concurrent prosperity for the entire population; but this is not the case. African miners' salaries were actually worth less in 1970 than they were in 1911; and between 1966 and 1971, the gap separating white and African pay in the mines widened from a ratio of 17.5 : 1 to 23.3 : 1.² South Africa's miners have

¹ On this point, see Rautenbach, P.S.: Industrial Decentralization in South Africa, paper delivered to the council of the SAIRR, 27 - 30 January 1970; MacCrystal, L.: Labour Policies for Economic Growth in the Seventies in the Border Areas, paper given at the National Labour Conference, 29/30 April 1971; Sadie, J.L.: Labour Supply in South Africa, paper given at the same conference; Biesheuvel, S.: Black Industrial Labour in South Africa, in: SAJE, Vol. 42, No. 3, September 1974.

² See Wilson, F.: Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911 - 1969, Cambridge University Press 1972, pp. 45 - 46; also Hume, I.: Notes on South African Wage Movements, in: SAJE, September 1970, pp. 240 - 252.

always been notoriously exploited. In real terms (allowing for inflation) this leaves them as badly off as they were before the First World War, a fate not shared, so far as is known, by any other group of workers anywhere in the world.¹

South Africa's economic boom therefore, has enriched the coffers of the dominant group, brought Africans no real gains and in fact in recent years, made the relative wages and conditions worse.² The argument that the prosperity generated by investment accrues to blacks is not supported by any evidence and there is no reason to expect that future capital inflow would alter the pattern.

1 The Economist, December 1968

2 This is evident from the reports of the average income of white South Africans which is now six times the average income of Asians and Coloured (mixed blood) South Africans, and 18 times the average of black South Africans. See The Economist, 22 March 1975, p. 29.

(ii) The Argument for Reform¹

While it is possible to show historically that industrialization and progress for South Africa's blacks are not corollaries, one has also to consider the alleged intentional involvement by businesses in the process of promoting social change.

¹ An influential exponent of the reform argument is Harry Oppenheimer, multi-millionaire chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. In a statement entitled 'Economic Growth: The Key to real Advancement for Africans in South Africa' (The Economist, 9 June 1973, p. 91), he argues that 'there is no way in which the black people of South Africa can advance toward the standard of living at present obtaining in Western Europe except on the basis of a great deal of economic growth, which rests in turn on the supply of investment capital.' Similar statements suggest that Oppenheimer is an exponent of increased foreign capital investment as well. According to the latter, 'the time now seems ripe to move ahead in a much more systematic and determined fashion towards the ultimate objective of a high wage capital intensive economy.' See report entitled 'Wages - Oppenheimer View', in: South African Digest, 15 June 1973, p. 3. Detailed accounts on foreign institutions which favour a similar approach to black economic development through foreign capital investment are documented in: 'The Commons Committee on South African Wages', in: The Guardian, (UK), 17 May 1973, p. 14; Report on British Firms in South Africa: Summary of the Evidence of the House of Commons Committee on Wages and Conditions of African Workers employed by British Firms in South Africa, London, 30 June 1974; Hance, W. A.: The Case for and against United States Disengagement from South Africa, in Hance, W.A. (ed.): Southern Africa and the United States, New York 1968.

There are several 'experiments' by Polaroid Corporation, Palabora Mining Company, and Anglo-American Corporation as well as several other multinational institutions primarily manned by optimistic liberal South African industrialists, which offer a ready-made opportunity to examine the 'reform' option in action, and this has enabled intensive exploitation of those few at the top of the pyramid of the black 'working class'.

The reform experiments seek to improve wages and working conditions of the black workers; to divert part of the South African profits to support African education within the South African apartheid education system; to render possible job openings previously reserved for whites only.

An examination of the facts, however, makes clear a primary difficulty of the 'reform' argument: there is no method of policing improvements.¹ Critics have difficulty gaining access to the facts with which to evaluate a company's policies. In the case of the Polaroid Corporation, their sales, the Polaroid's ID3 identification systems, are known to be in the direction

¹ South Africa's new General Law Amendment Act prevents disclosures of foreign companies' employment practices and pay scales in South Africa. Section 2 says that, except with the permission of the minister of economic affairs, 'no person shall in compliance with any order, direction or letters of request issued or emanating from outside the Republic, furnish any information as to any business, whether carried on in or outside the Republic.' See Financial Mail, (SA), 18 October 1974.

of the South African Defence Force¹; as for job openings, throughout the South African economy, performance of previously white - held jobs by blacks is not a new development but merely a continuation of the pattern which has evolved throughout the country's history. In any case, all attempts to promote blacks are limited by the government, which has repeatedly made it clear that supervision of whites by blacks will not be tolerated.² The racially structured hierarchy in the economy has therefore been preserved.

The South African government cannot permit companies to take actions which are considered a threat to the status quo; but neither is it to be expected that the tensions caused by the racial policies are a basis for

1 WCC: Investments in Southern Africa, Central Committee Meeting, Utrecht, August 1972

2 In an interview, (see 'Die Vaterland', SA, 18 June 1971) the minister of labour is reported to have said that the aim of the government's labour policy was to protect the standard of living of the whites and to prevent the erosion of the traditional labour pattern by both legislation and administrative means. The key to nationalist labour policy as set out in election manifestos (see Current Affairs in Southern Africa, Vol. 4, No. 10, July 1974, p. 2) is the system of job reservation which, in practice, excludes Africans from all skilled occupations, including working class jobs. For an elaboration of this theme, see Reese, K.: Job Reservation in der Republik Südafrika, in: IAF, July/August 1974; Doxey, G.V.: Enforced Racial Stratification in the South African Labour Market, in: Adam, H.: South Africa, Sociological Perspectives, New York 1971.

demanding that corporations should remain in South Africa and institute labour reforms. There is a myth in the belief that the economics of reform, on a constructive basis, enable technological expertise, industrial education, improved standards of living, etc. to spill over to proletarianised blacks. Indeed the indiscriminate association of multi-national corporations with liberal reform qualities, their accreditation with more enlightened racial attitudes than 'Afrikaners', is very much false. A glance at the index of economic race relations in countries in which these companies are based, especially with respect to the social and economic rights of their foreign migrant labourers, should suffice to disillusion 'reform' optimists.¹ In the words of a black university graduate who is himself, by South African legislation, a migratory labourer: 'Western economies, of which South Africa is one, are closely interrelated because they are governed by the same perception of the world and view of life, to the extent that the multi-billion dollar concern in South Africa is part of the Anglo-Saxon way of life.'

¹ For striking examples of supporting evidence see Willi, V.: *Überfremdung, Schlagwort oder bittere Wahrheit*, Bern 1970; Bingemer, K.V.: *Leben als Gastarbeiter : Geglückte und Missglückte Integration*, Köln 1970; Lawrence, D.L.: *Black Migrants, White Natives*, London 1974; Rose, A.M.: *Migrants in Europe: Problems of Acceptance and Adjustment*, Minneapolis 1969.

It is academic to speak of western investment when you are referring to South Africa, as if South Africa were not part of the West.'¹

As profit-making institutions, international businesses can only carry out such programmes, and implement them in such ways as they feel will ensure their future security. The principal aim of trading partners is the promotion of trade and investment and the maintenance of good training relations between the countries involved to the benefit of those in power. Thus, one cannot assume that it will be in the interests of foreign investors to grant advancement opportunities to blacks where these advances are opposed by the dominant power structure. Still it would be incorrect to assume that economic policies, short of political change, will promote fundamental changes in the system of apartheid. According to Nyerere: 'Many schemes have been put forward for the solution of the racial problem in Africa. But I must say from the outset that any scheme which leaves unimpaired the European's monopoly of political control will not solve the problem. As long as one community has a monopoly of political power and uses the power, not only to prevent the other communities from having any share in political power, but also to keep those other communities in a state of social and economic inferiority, any talk of social and economic advancement of the other communities as a solution of racial conflict is hypocritical.'²

¹ Sono, P.: Change through Realism, in: Africa Report, March/April 1973, p. 29

² Julius Nyerere quoted in: The Economist, 13 March 1973.

By pressing for certain limited economic reforms but not for deep-rooted change, liberal industrialists will be able to achieve a number of economic objectives:

- (a) greater productivity than is possible with white workers;
- (b) overcome the problem of not having a regular supply of cheap labour;
- (c) produce at lower unit costs, because of paying lower wages to non-whites for doing the same jobs, thus increasing their profits;
- (d) at the same time maintain the artificially high standards of living of the privileged race-class; and
- (e) put on a face to the rest of the world that their intentions are honourable.

In considering the reform argument it must also be noted that the denial of trade union rights to African workers has been key to apartheid both in principle and in practice.¹

In the case of South Africa's domestic labour market, there is an additional factor. The creation of new jobs will in all likelihood increase foreign immigration. In the ten years 1961 - 1970, a total of 374,667 immigrants

¹ See, in particular, South Africa's Labour Relations: The Role of Trade Unions, in: Africa Digest, Vol. XXI, No. 5, October 1974, p. 87; Leibenberg, J.H.: The Standpoint of the Conservative Trade Unions, paper given at the National Labour Conference, 29/30 April 1971.

arrived in South Africa.¹ The main countries of origin of the immigrants were as follows:

United Kingdom	172,819
Portugal	32,231
Germany	28,611
Italy	13,423
Greece	13,305
Netherlands	12,856
Source: UN, Unit of Apartheid, May 1972	

The reasons for the emphasis on overseas immigration in a country which has such a reserve of unemployed African labour are obvious. Immigrants settling in South Africa will automatically become part of the exploitation of the African labour force. Through their recruitment into labour-intensive sectors of the economy where legislation prevents black workers from performing certain skilled occupations, European immigration will have a crucial role in the safeguard and preservation of the existing economic status quo.²

1 Since then the Republic of South Africa envisaged 'approximately 40,000 foreign immigrants per year.' See Race, Vol. XIV, No. 3, January 1973, p. 325.

2 For a development of this theme, with special reference to reports on the volume, occupational status, and national character of overseas immigrants moved under the auspices of the International Committee for European Migration (ICEM), see Kailembo, A.: Immigration to South Africa, in: Free World Labour, January 1975, pp. 21 - 22..

The two policy alternatives discussed have, undoubtedly, introduced new conflicts and tensions into group relationships in South Africa, the result of which has been the overall collaboration between foreign investments and white government to preserve the monopoly of power. The profit motive based on internal repression of black workers by a minority regime massively supported by a solid framework of international capital, are combinative factors responsible for the monolithic approach to African underdevelopment. 'The consequences of united white power', according to the commission on the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS), 'are to be seen in the black-white wage differentials, the migrant labour system, and the unequal distribution of income as well as poverty and its corollaries.'¹

It is for this reason that the liberal rhetoric of black economic development through capital intensification and reform through overhaul of the apartheid system are being rejected by black liberation movements in favour of capital withdrawal.

¹ On this point, and related issues of 'change via industrialisation', see Power, Privilege Poverty: Report of the Spro-cas Economics Commission, Johannesburg 1972, pp. 60 - 71.

(iii) The Argument for Withdrawal¹

The policy of economic withdrawal revolves around the fact that a pivotal feature of the Southern African conflict is the extent of international support to the racist regime by international capitalism.

The role of the latter and of foreign investments in South Africa generally must be seen in the context of the supply and control of cheap African labour, which is embedded in the pattern of apartheid policy, notably in the system of African reserves, which restrict African land ownership and occupation to 13 percent of the country's land area. This has been confined to a land area too small to provide for the needs of the rural population.² Land shortage and land poverty,

¹ For a penetrating exposition of the case for capital withdrawal, see Firth, R. et al.: *The South African Connection: Western Investment in Apartheid*, London 1972; SASO Policy Document, 1972; AAM Annual Report, August 1970; Sechaba 1970; Ökumenischer Rat der Kirchen: *Zur Frage der Investitionen im Südlichen Afrika*, Geneva 1973.

² Mid-year (1974) estimates for South Africa's population groups are: blacks 17,712,000, and whites 4,160,000. See *Development: Southern Africa*, April 1974, p. 33. By the year 2,000 population in South Africa will have doubled; associated with this demographic growth are massive social, economic, and ecological problems. On this point and for a general statement on the impact of population growth on South Africa's economic and political systems, see Galli, A.: *Bevölkerungsprojektion, ein Hebel, gegen die Apartheid*, in: IAF, July/August 1974, pp. 488 - 489; Sadie, J.L.: *An Evaluation of Demographic Data pertaining to the Non-white Population of South Africa*, in: SAJE, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 1970.

together with the imposition of a money economy and of compulsory taxes, have ensured the flow of Africans into the labour market controlled by the dominant minority, and since control of land and economic power are in the hands of the whites, foreign investors in South Africa automatically develop a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

The political implications of investing and doing business in South Africa are obvious. Such participation of foreign investment in the minority government lends an element of legitimacy which is essential to its stability and survival. The central role of capital inflow from abroad lies in fulfilling key political and strategic objectives for apartheid. That foreign investments are crucial to South Africa's regime and to the continuation of its racist policies, is evident from the words of the South African prime minister: 'I have complete confidence in our future. This is obviously shared by foreign investors, the best barometer for the stability of a country.'¹

In western capitals, the most consistent pressure on the organs of government for more sympathetic policies towards South Africa come from business leaders and their

¹ See Sunday Tribune, Durban, 16 October 1966, p. 5. Statements of a similar nature by both key members of the 'verkrampste' and 'verligte' fractions have been proliferating in recent years: thus, Professor Steenkamp of the University of South Africa is reported as saying that 'our large international economic relationship are our best shields in a world which has chosen us as scapegoats'. See Steenkamp, W.J.F.: Labour Policies for Growth during the Seventies, in: SAJE, Vol. 39, 1971, p. 99. Similarly, Heribert Adam writes: 'The psychological and political consequences of western investment seem more important now to South Africa as a safety guarantee' Quoted in: Adam, H.: Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics, University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.

organizations. In every capital transaction, the latter have interpreted and met the needs of the South African economy, and even fought among themselves for the opportunity to treat.¹ With the conflict in Southern Africa getting sharper,² and the Africans posing a real challenge to power, the outside groups with interests in the region will react to it as a threat to their investments and move even closer to supporting the status quo. They will also demand that western governments should give support to the white regime and thus face the real danger of external intervention on the side of present rulers³ and against the forces of African freedom.

1 See Business as Usual: International Banking in South Africa, London 1974

2 There is already concern in some circles at the ever-increasing military budget by the South African government although the country does not have any imperialist neighbours. See Race Relations News, Vol. 36, No. 7, July 1974, p. 6; also Shaw, T.M.: South Africa's Military Capability and the Future of Race Relations, in: Mazrui, A., A., Patel, H.H.: Africa in World Affairs: The next Thirty Years, New York 1973.

3 Consider the telling statement by a former governor of South Africa's central bank: 'Foreign investment is valuable not only because it provides additional risk capital to speed development, but something of a sheet anchor in troublous times'. See Rissik, G.: The Growth of South Africa's Economy, in: Optima, June 1967, p. 56.

The increasing uncertainty regarding the attitude of a fully independent Frelimo government¹ and the intimidating possibility of liberation movements masquerading as mine recruits who could incite political and racial unrest and even spearhead urban guerilla, these are serious stimulants to the awareness of mineworkers, who are becoming increasingly politically sophisticated and who, mixing with their brothers in South Africa, sense that they are part of the rising tide of black consciousness.²

1 The uncertainty is illustrated by the apparent contradiction of statements by Frelimo leaders, which have indicated both a desire not to become involved in any confrontation with South Africa and also an intention that Mozambique shall become a revolutionary base against imperialism and colonialism.

2 On the development of this theme from a 'black' point of view, see Khoapa, B.A.: The New Black, in: Biko, B.S.: Black Viewpoint, Spro-cas Black Community Programme, 1972; Mangyami, N. C.: A Note on Black Consciousness, in: Being - black - in - the - World, Spro-cas, 1973, especially chapter on 'Who are the Urban Africans?'; Lawrence, P.: Black Consciousness on the Increase in South Africa, in: The Star, 16 February 1972; Adam, H.: The Rise of Black Consciousness in South Africa, in: Race, Vol. 15, No. 2, October 1973, pp. 149 - 165.

(iv) Implications for Migratory Labour

Both policies on reform and increased capital investment with regard to labour migration need ventilation.

Given the flow of Malawian labour within such an economic framework, the community that has invested considerably in the upbringing of its valuable human resources is automatically bound to become part of the pattern of unequal development.

Economists sometimes speak of 'emigration as capital export' similar to the export of other factors of production. This being so, it is relevant to try to calculate the cost of a migrant for his country of origin: most workers migrate around the age of 21, just when they reach the peak of their working capacity. The costs we are concerned with are those of feeding, clothing, and housing the person and providing health and educational and other services, until he reaches working age. Such labour supply without previous investment expenditures for South Africa is certainly a real gain, particularly in view of the limited possibilities for capital formation given the generally low level of poverty wages and an obvious loss for Malawi. In the words of John Pike, a lack of real lasting gain for Malawi, despite short-term economic rewards (remittances, deferred payments, etc.) must be viewed against the fact that 'most of these men are absent from Malawi for a period of between fourteen months and two years. On returning they contribute little to the agricultural economy and once their savings are consumed, they tend to become migrant workers once again.'¹

¹ Pike, J.G., op. cit., p. 25

The efficacy of out-migration into areas of increased industrialization, therefore, is that of 'reducing' poverty only to re-inforce it through return migration.

The second, technological argument that useful urban skills, mining and industrial, accrue to migrant workers, is rendered difficult by a number of factors. First, the mining policies of the South African government and white unions often contribute to keeping migrant workers in lower occupational positions.¹ Second, restrictions on length of stay at the place of work are likely to prevent migrant workers from achieving lasting job acclimatization, let alone vertical mobility to key positions in the production process. 'Migrant labour and skilled work are not compatible', reports a team of experts in the Economics Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society.² In other words, the migratory system of labour discourages an economy from investing in labour force, and this lack of industrial training is a fundamental cause of poverty.³ Third, these restrictions go under the guise of protecting the domestic labour market: for many employers, the great value of employment of foreign workers lies in the fact that they have a mobile labour potential at their disposal. The idea is that foreign workers should be used as the regulators of the domestic market; in times of labour shortage they should be brought in; if there is recession, they should simply be dismissed

1 Horst, S.v.d.: Native Labour in South Africa, London 1971, pp. 185, 225 - 235, for provisions of the Mines and Work Act of 1911, pp. 241 - 269, for statements on 'civilized labour'.

2 Johannesburg 1972, p. 87

3 *ibid.*, p. 97

and expelled from the country. Fourth, current legislative developments, despite the pressures of an expanding economy, undermine further the acquisition of technological skills among migrant workers.¹

In view of the above combination of factors, Neal Ascherson advances explanatory links for the dialectics of black poverty, white prosperity, and supremacy in terms of the circulation of migratory labour. 'This system,' he asserts, 'continuously draws labour out of a primitive subsistence economy and prevents the formation of a settled urban working class, ensuring that labour is always cheap, that wages are always slower to rise than the rate of inflation. This pumping-flow and return- is the heart of white supremacy in South Africa, the circulation of its blood.'²

It is therefore hardly possible to speak meaningfully in terms of reform policies or the benefits that accrue from increased involvement of international capital for the economic betterment of domestic and foreign black labour. The basis of the South African economy are the gold and diamond mining industries. Both are massively penetrated

¹ For recent developments on the legislative control of the system of foreign migrant labour, paying special attention to problems of skill acquisition, see Pokrovsky, A.: African Labour in the Mines of South Africa, in: Unit on Apartheid Notes and Document Series, No. 20/73, UN Information Office, Washington D.C. 1973; Breytenbach, W.J.: Migratory Labour Arrangements in Southern Africa, Communications of the Africa Institute, No. 20, Pretoria 1972.

² Ascherson, N.: The Life Blood of Apartheid, in: The Observer, (UK), 20 April 1975, p. 23

by foreign capital;¹ in every major industry African labour forms the backbone, and yet in no other industry is the African worker so blatantly exploited as in the mining industry. As Walter Rodney put it 'foreign investment is the cause and not a solution to economic backwardness.'² This, in the South African economy, is re-inforced by a variety of methods: the institutionalization of racism that facilitates the efficient exploitation of the African is the principal technique.

Considering the methods of effecting fundamental changes in the adverse position of the African worker, the chamber of industry (the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut), the chamber of commerce (the Afrikaanse Sekekamer) as well as other entrenched economic and political groups, it is suggested, will have to voluntarily share privilege and power, to change their attitudes to differential payment of workers on the basis of colour, to the system of migrant labour, to job reservation, training of workers, the organization of trade unions and the implementation of a fundamentally racially egalitarian economic system.³

1 About 40 percent of South African industry is foreign controlled, and this is an important element in the considerable inflows and outflows of western capital. See South Africa: Open Economy, in: The Economist, 22 March 1975, p. 29.

2 Rodney, W.: How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London, Dar-es-Salaam 1972, p. 312

3 See Towards Social Change, Spro-cas Publication, No.6, Johannesburg 1971, chapter 1.

(v) South Africa's Economic and Political Expansion:
Dialogue and 'Common Market' Strategies

The ever-shifting nature of the political constellation in Southern Africa and South Africa's own needs, which extend beyond the simple maintenance of the status quo within the white bloc, are major pressures in the Republic's search for a regional *modus vivendi*. Economically it wants to increase its trade and investments in Africa and gain an economic hold over the black states.¹ Politically it is trying to promote some form of 'dialogue'. Both strategies are meant to bring South Africa out of isolation and into Africa's general political and economic traffic.

In the final analysis, it is through the achievement of political reconciliation and a practical plan to carve the region into several economic centres under the aegis of her economic hegemony, that South Africa hopes to achieve a number of important objectives:

¹ This economic objective, sometimes subsumed under the term 'regional co-prosperity', has been the subject of several, identical studies. Some (Cowen, D.V.: Towards a Common Market in Southern Africa, in: Optima, XVII, (2), 1967, pp. 43 - 51) focus on the need for a regional economic community. Other studies (for instance, Rupert, A.: International Business Partnership: The Multi-national Concept, in: South Africa International, Vol. 1, No. 2, Johannesburg, October 1970) highlight the ideal of economic development of Equatorial and Southern Africa under the auspices of international capital. Similar investigations, by 'verligte' Afrikaners, have addressed the economic issue of co-prosperity with special reference to multi-national interdependence in the region. See, in particular, Lombard, J.A. et al.: The Concept of Economic Co-operation in Southern Africa, Pretoria 1969; Rhoodie, E.M.: The Third Africa, Cape Town 1968.

- (1) To establish her position of dominance in the best way possible according to her own economic, political, and ideological needs, and from that position to co-operate with black countries to the maximum.¹
- (2) To create a web of neo-colonial economic interests which are imperative if sustained growth and new outlets for South Africa's expanding economy are to be assured.²
- (3) To propagate the idea of co-existence rather than liberation and thereby deflect Africa from its collision course with the white-ruled south.³

There is a measure of success discernible in these crucial areas. First, there is the rising level of expectation in neighbouring black states and the impression of at least tolerance even from those who were South Africa's

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- 1 'Vorster's Half of the Dialogue', in: The Economist, 15 May 1971, p. 50; Dialogue: The Great Debate, in: Africa Contemporary Record, 1971 - 1972, pp. A 66 ff.
 - 2 For a clever distinction between problems (facing especially black Southern Africa) of economic co-operation and economic integration involving the reduction of national control of economic policy, see David Kadzamira's 'Comments', in: Accelerated Development in Southern Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs, Pretoria 1974, p. 653; also Spicer, J.: South Africa's Sphere of Influence: The Whites discover Black Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland), in: Round Table, 58, 1968, pp. 306 - 310.
 - 3 See editorial report entitled 'Liberation or Reconciliation' in: Pro Veritate, Vol. 13, No. 3, 15 July 1974, pp. 1 - 2.

most vehement critics.¹ Second, the split is now noticeable in the OAU meeting between the 'hawks' (those governments which abhor the idea of any co-operation with South Africa, even implicit) and the 'doves' (those which co-operate);² by dividing black Africans over the one issue on which they have previously been able to unite, South Africa has been able to deal a fatal blow to the Organization of African Unity and possibly the guerillas it supports.³

1 Whilst the one camp views detente and dialogue as 'out', the other sees possibilities of contact and consultation under 'certain' circumstances. See Knipe, M.: Vorster still sees Chances for Talks despite OAU Militancy, in: The Times, UK, 19 April 1975, p. 5. Indeed, time and circumstances are changing, and consultation between black and white states is an inescapable fact, if, of course, change is meant to be peaceful. For statements to this effect, see speeches by Kaunda (Africa Digest, Vol. XXI, No. 6, December 1974, pp. 104 - 105) and Machel (RDM, 9 January 1975, p. 1).

2 It is perhaps not co-operation as more a matter of using John Vorster's now overwhelming self-interest of getting a measure of regional security, that black Africa hopes to achieve a Rhodesian majority rule settlement and possibly independence for Namibia to further long-term African interests. That present consultations are not a prelude to permanent detente but links with liberation objectives, is evident from Machel's own words: 'The contacts are not aimed at political links. The sole objective is to make South Africa withdraw from Rhodesia and respect the Namibians' right to independence'. Quoted in: Nagorski, A., Jaffe, A.: Diplomacy: Buying Time, in: Newsweek, 21 April 1975, p. 30. For statements on objectives pursued by South Africa, see Senate Debates, No. 9, Col. 3340, 23 October 1974; African Development, January 1975, p. 20.

3 On the issue of consensus and dissent within the organization, see Legum, C.: The Organization of African Unity: Success or Failure, in: International Affairs, Vol. 51, No.2, April 1975, pp. 208 - 219; 'OAU : Africa Tight - rope', in: The Guardian, 17 May 1973, p. 3.

The wider idea of detente, however, is inconceivable until the entire structure of white supremacy in South Africa itself is dismantled.¹ This is the ultimate issue of primary concern to the rest of Africa; and it is here that interests diverge: the one preparing for possible confrontation, the other tightening the laager and shortening the perimeter so that white supremacy can survive the onrush of armed black nationalism.

In the final analyses detente in Southern Africa must be supported by internal change if it is to be credible abroad.

¹ While the African strategy, inspired by the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto and its principles, seeks to concentrate on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa in that order, the 'Boer' government in the south, by contrast, intends to preserve the supremacy and political hegemony of its white electorate. As one source put it: 'The nationalists may abandon Rhodesia, they may launch a new outward - looking policy, they may even give up Namibia, but always because they think such moves to be necessary to achieve their fundamental objective: the maintenance of white supremacy in South Africa itself.' Quoted in: African Development, January 1975, p. 20.

(vi) Impact on Malawi's Economic Potential

A brief analysis of Malawi's economic participation during the Central African federation should facilitate an understanding of the possible problems awaiting this small state in the event of a similar association in the South African 'common Market'.

From an institutional point of view, the most important feature of the economics of Central African Federation lay in the division of responsibilities and measures affecting the economic development of the territories. In Malawi, the territorial administration was responsible for all agriculture, African and non-African, commerce, and industry, including responsibility for external trade and trade agreements; Higher education and health were in federal hands, as was currency and banking.¹

On the revenue side, fiscal power lay predominantly with the federal government. The two main sources of tax revenue in the area were income tax and customs and excise duties, of which the first was more important than the

¹ For further accounts on division of responsibilities in other federal territories, see Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Development of the Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia (The Phillips Report), Salisbury 1962; United Nations, Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Survey Development of Zambia, October 1964.

second.¹ The federal government was in a strategic position, through budgetary, monetary and exchange policies, to influence capital supply. But the major responsibility for implementing policies designed to overcome some of the more fundamental obstacles of development lay with the territorial government, and demanded for their solution institutional and political changes.

Important among the three member states are variations in natural resource endowments and the potential for development. Within the economic federation, it was particularly Southern Rhodesia which offered investment prospects in minerals, agriculture and significantly, in manufacturing industry which already had made striking progress.² Zambia's economy has been dominated by the copper mining located on the Copperbelt. Malawi, by contrast, is basically agricultural and more than 55 percent of GDP originated from this section whilst her manufacturing generated less than 5 percent of GDP, and this sector was concerned mainly with the processing of

1 On the federal structure of revenue, see table illustrations in 'National Accounts and Balance of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia 1954 - 1963', Central Statistical Office, Salisbury.

2 On this point, see Blankenmeimer, B.: Private Enterprise in Africa, in: Haines, C.: Africa Today, Baltimore 1955, p. 465; also Robson, R.: Growth in Southern Rhodesia, in: Productivity Measurement Review, No. 33, OECD, Paris, May 1963; Tow, L.: Manufacturing Industry in Southern Rhodesia, US National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1960.

agricultural production.¹

The territorial distribution of industrial growth over the period in terms of size and character is of considerable interest. As regards contribution to GDP, the manufacturing industry expanded in Zambia between 1954 and 1963 from 4.6 m to 12. m British monetary pounds. In Rhodesia, over the same period, the increase was from 20.7 m to 50.2 m. Malawi's industrial output, because of the limitations of her integrating economy, was very much smaller. Over the period, it increased from 1.4 m to 2.5 m. Thus, in terms of rates of growth, Zambia's manufacturing industry developed fastest, but in absolute terms industrial expansion in Rhodesia was much greater. Malawi's industry lagged behind both.

These territorial differences cannot be explained entirely by differences in the increases measured in terms of purchasing power of the respective territorial markets over the period. In Rhodesia, expansion was on the basis of its own market. The already established industrial base of Rhodesia could afford new industries set up to serve the area as a whole. There was also the matter of a marked difference in the character of the industries which developed, Rhodesia having a more diverse pattern of industrial development in which the engineering and allied industries played a major role.

¹ For this and statistical information that follows, see Taylor, W.L.: The Economy of Central Africa, in: Robson, P., Lury, D. A.: The Economies of Africa, Evanston 1969, pp. 384 - 345; Taylor, W.L.: Problems of Economic Development of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, London 1964, pp. 228 - 229; Supplementary Statistics on Merchandise Trade of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Central Statistical Office, Salisbury 1963.

This pattern of industrial development confirms that industry tends to become centralized within a market area, and that the forces working to this end may be particularly strong as technology becomes more complex.

In view of the set of economic circumstances above, for a poor country such as Malawi to join South Africa's 'common market' will therefore spell perpetual poverty, since a union is economically justifiable only among states whose productive patterns are fairly competitive before union and which have possibilities of becoming complementary after integration. Neither of these crucial pre-conditions exist in Malawi. In fact, almost the exact opposite prevails; co-operation with South Africa to which a modicum of the latter's aid has been extended, suggests that the promoters of the 'grand apartheid' are mainly interested in development which is directed to the infrastructure (roads, railroads, etc.) or development of a non-economic nature (prestige capital construction).¹ The emphasis on the improvement of the infrastructure is, from the South African perspective, quite obvious: it fits neatly into the concept of economic expansion in that it will facilitate the export of human resources and raw materials from that country to fuel the latter's growing secondary industrial sector. It is noteworthy that during the short-lived economic federation, Malawi suffered a lack of industrialization until the termination of that association; and, until recently the basic economic structure remained substantially unchanged with fundamental economic problems which faced the former federation having been inherited by present-day Malawi.

¹ For elucidation of these points, and related problems of 'development aid', see Utete, M.C.: Crisis in the Organization of African Unity, in: Black World, October 1971, p. 30 ff.

For some foreseeable future, black-ruled states in southern Africa will remain nations of farmers and possibly of industrial migrant workers.¹ An Assessment of manpower trends in these territories shows that of the 281,000 employed citizens in Botswana, 200,000 were dependent upon traditional agricultural activities while a registered total of 46,000 Tswana absentees was reported abroad, mostly working in South Africa. Similar estimates of migrants in the Republic including their dependants were placed at 156,000 in 1968 for Mozambique, 90,000 in 1971 in the case of Malawi and 5,000 for Zambia. In Lesotho and Swaziland, where similar patterns of out-migration develop according to the needs and employment opportunities available in the South African mining economy, it is estimated that over 100,000 and 19,000 mineworkers respectively are employed in the Republic's gold and coal mines.²

1 It may be said, in passing, that in terms of regional numbers, there are, according to the Africa Institute (Pretoria) 562,000 foreign African workers in South Africa, and 220,000 in Rhodesia. In Southern Africa as a whole, there are 1,500,000 workers (mostly Africans) outside their national boundaries at any given time. The migratory labour system thus affects (when families are taken into account) about 6,000,000 people in Southern Africa. See Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, August 1971, p. 315.

2 See 'Foreign Influx in South Africa', in: The South African Digest, 22 June 1973, p. 3; 'Foreign Africans on the Gold Mines', in: Financial Times, (SA), 13 September 1974; 'Swaziland: Employment in South Africa', in: Africa Digest, Vol. XXI, No. 5, October 1974.

The importance of such an inter-territorial labour exchange for the smaller states lies not only in securing annual subsidies for development, but also external transfers in the forms of aid and remittances to cover new investment expenditures and trade deficit.

Because economic ties with the mining industries have extended over so many years and over such a significant proportion of their manpower resources, with negative modification of the entire structure of domestic labour force, African government will increasingly be forced to seek important economic and political changes in the migratory labour sector itself.

The significance of recent strikes,¹ withdrawal of recruitment permits and harsh demands for better employment conditions, lies in the fact that, through them, mineworkers have successfully exercised political and economic power. Only through a common front can labour exporting countries bring about radical improvements in wages and conditions of employment for the thousands of migratory citizens who have no representation or

¹ See Steward, J.: Divergent Reactions to Black Strike law, in: The Financial Times, (UK), 24 May 1973, p. 8; Thebehali, D.: The Labour Structure that caused the Strikes, in: Africa Report, March/April 1973, p. 27; Uys, S.: African Miners on Strike after Death, in: The Guardian, 24 October 1974, p. 3; UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. X, No. 3, March 1973, p. 16; 'Bantustan Labour Drives by Mines', in: The Times, (UK), 14 October 1974.

channels of communication ¹; and this may well prove a more important power base in future relations with South Africa.

The role of migratory labour in bringing about, effective change is crucial; that is clear from the following quotation : 'Problems with African labour on the mines - whether immigrant or locally recruited - could well turn out to be one of the main threats to South African economic and political stability. Depending on how, they play their cards, African mineworkers may well make themselves the key to: first, general labour conditions throughout the country; and second, political conditions that could force the Pretoria regime either to make concession that will erode white power or alternatively produce a revolution. The importance of the mineworkers has grown because rising inflation has made gold an intensely desirable commodity. Major stoppages in the gold mines could cripple South Africa.'²

¹ A development conference held in Swaziland considered a proposal that Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Malawi should employ a 'co-ordinated manpower strategy' with regard to their workers in South Africa. Such a move would be a logical counterpart to the mine's own policy. Each peripheral country by itself has no power to bargain with South Africa for better wages and terms. See 'Migrant Labour,' in: ARB, Vol. 11, No. 5, May/June 1974, p. 3131.

² South Africa: Miners' Power, in: Africa Confidential, 22 November 1974, p. 5

The thought that mine labour is the Achilles' heel of the South African political system and economy is an interesting one and if purely political considerations dominate the actions of neighbouring states the implicit dangers cannot be ruled out. The low-gearred economies of Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique, which together supply in normal times over 60 percent of mine labour, would be damaged by a recruiting ban, but they can survive as Malawi has for the past year.¹ With regard to the high-gearred economy of South Africa with its stress on mining production and imported labour, a reduction in mining recruits is likely to have adverse effects on the country's economic stability and similar pressures upon the labour supply of the South African mining industry and upon the morale of mine workers could produce radical changes in the labour practices of the industry, and of South Africa as a whole.²

¹ See 'Malawi - South Africa: Labour Recruitment Problem', in: ARB, Vol. II, No. 9, September/October 1974, p. 3253.

² See 'The Labour Crisis in South Africa's Mines', in: Current Affairs in Southern Africa, Vol. 5, No. 2, January/February 1975, pp. 1 - 2 .

(vii) The 'Uhuru' Railway and Decolonization of
Zambia and Tanzania

Here it is important to underline some of the broad implications of the Tanzam rail, and to seek an understanding of the economic and political calculations that lie behind it. Whatever the differences of viewpoint on the controversial project, for this study, the central theme is that such a development scheme is of strategic importance for the African countries involved, especially in view of their previous colonial dependence on communication, trade, and other links to the south.

The relevance of the 'Great Uhuru' - Tanzam - rail, therefore, depends on where observers view it from; and any serious analysis must take into cognizance the political attitudes and idiosyncracies of the parties involved. In summary, the fundamental arguments advanced are as follows:

- (1) For South Africa and the Rhodesians, 'it will be the ferry for communication to attack their white bastions, which they see as the last footing of christianity in the struggle for survival against what they regard as communist - inspired independent black states like Zambia and Tanzania who support the liberation wars'.¹

¹ The Observer, 26 August 1973, p. 7; see also 'The Tanzam Railway: Politics overrides Economics', in: Africa Institute Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 9, Pretoria, September 1965, pp. 225 - 26.

It is probably the economic and political independence, which the rail communication will bring, that white-ruled regimes in the south fear most; and that Kaunda and Nyerere constitute a potential threat to their interests because the latter are leaders of a different political substance, is clear from the following extract: 'It is in the interests of the white-ruled countries that Tanzania and Zambia should do as badly as possible. Their object will be to cause the downfall of Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, who, more than anything else, make their countries what they are. Without these two men, it would probably not be long before Tanzania and Zambia, like Malawi, would be welcomed into South Africa's area of co-prosperity'¹

The Uhuru railway will render these African states independent of traditional routes to the sea which were vulnerable to political blackmail and which would have entrenched Central Africa's economic subservience to its powerful adversaries to the south.² It is against this background that the 'detente' policies now being pursued, must be viewed; more so at a time when Pretoria is particularly anxious to maintain its economic foothold across the Zambesi now that the outward-looking policy is looking tattered.³

¹ The Economist, 3 January 1970, p. 25

² For a general statement, that economic problems in Southern Africa also provided an important impetus for embarking upon the controversial Tanzam railway project carried out by China, see Bottelier, P.P.C.: China and the Zambia - Tanzania Railway Project, in: Internationale Spectator, 21, 8 December 1967, p. 1764 et seq.

³ See Africa Confidential, Vol 14, No. 2, 19 January 1973, p. 1.

Both South Africa and Rhodesia count on the hopes that there will come a day when the 'cold logic' of the economics of a market of 250,000,000 north of the Zambesi and some 20,000,000 south of it may direct present political thinking.¹ For the moment, however, economic co-operation along present terms seems, for the trans-zambesian states, not to be the predominant factor until political solutions to the region are found.²

- (2) For the Soviet Union and western states, in particular the USA, Canada and Britain, the project has always been turned down as 'uneconomic, non-viable venture',³ that is, until the arrival of the Chinese.

1 See speech by Jan Haak, South Africa's minister of economic affairs, on 'Common Market in Africa', in: RDM, 28 May 1971.

2 It may be noted, in passing, that economic co-operation under present terms has been rejected by OAU States. While the latter avoid any form of relations that come under the general rubric of 'detente' (the term means accepting the internal structure in South Africa as given), South Africa sees in these relations immense commercial possibilities. For a full discussion of the different policy positions, see 'OAU and South Africa' in: West Africa, 17 March 1975, p. 311; 'The View from Pretoria', in: West Africa, 17 February 1975, p. 210.

3 President Nyerere and Kaunda, for three fruitless years of petition and negotiation, made repeated efforts in political circles to promote western investment in the Tanzam rail construction. Tentative approaches to Britain, United States, Canada, West Germany and even the Soviet Union, drew chilly responses that poured cold water on the project. For notes on the canvassing of western financial support, see Christie, I.: Iron Road to Independence, in: The Guardian, 15 August 1973; also Zambian News, 3 January 1965.

The Anglo-Canadian financed study carried out in 1966, whose report is still secret but parts of which are known, indicates that the economic argument is false.¹ Indeed the idea of a railway is not new: it was Cecil Rhodes who first proposed a Cape-to-Cairo railway. Even British administrators, who took over the mandated territory, related meaningful development of the region with the need for adequate communications.²

It is the acceptance of Chinese aid to build the railroad, that is probably regarded as more significant, since this not only gives the Chinese their first major aid project in Africa but also gives them access to Zambia as well as Tanzania. It appears, therefore, that the major concern facing those watching developments carefully is the magnitude of the part the Red Chinese might play in the event of a new confrontation in the so-called 'Chinese areas of revolutionary endeavour' viz. white-ruled Southern Africa.³ So far, Chinese activities in the 'Tanzam area' have tended to stress short-term, pragmatic, and non-disruptive aims rather than long-range revolutionary goals. The training of Tanzanian and Zambian workers as railway engineers seems to be a policy of concentrating on building friendly relations and propagating chinese ideas of economic

1 The Observer, 26 August 1973, p. 7; The Economist, 22 November 1969, p. 38

2 See 'Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika for the Year 1925', London 1926, p. 75.

3 Newscheck, (SA), 30 May 1969

development.¹

- (3) Post-independence states are, quite naturally, more eager than the colonial regimes to force the pace of development: so that with respect to Zambia and Tanzania, both former 'colonies' of the Rhodesian and South African farm and mining industries,² the importance of the rail communication lies in several directions:

(a) It will provide an infrastructure that is everywhere vital to economic development.

(b) It will redirect the flow of goods and people from areas of impediment, in the sense of economic and political vulnerability, to areas of opportunity.³

¹ For a full discussion of the alternating strategies of China's evolutionary and revolutionary activities in Africa, see Larkin, B.D.: China and Africa 1949-1970 : The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China, Berkeley 1971, chapters 2-4 and 8; 'Two China's in Africa', in: West Africa, 16 July 1973, p. 957; 'Peking in Africa', in: Problems of Communism, Vol. XXII, No. 2, March/April 1973, p. 77; Ansprenger, F.: Die Politik der Volksrepublik China in Afrika, in: Ansprenger, F. et al.: Die Aussenpolitik Chinas, Munich/Vienna 1975, pp. 317-333.

² For a competent description of Tanzanian migrant workers in the Rhodesias and South Africa, see Gulliver, P.H.: Labour Migration in a Rural Economy: A Study of the Angoni and Ndemdeuli of southern Tanganyika, East Africa Studies, No. 6, Kampala 1955

³ For an indication of the volume of Zambia's trade with South Africa and Rhodesia, and the trends which have been emerging, see Economist Intelligence Unit: Quarterly Review - Tanzania and Zambia Annual Supplements 1970 and 1972; also Zambia Monthly Digest of Statistics, August 1972; Statistical Year Book 1970, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, table 14.8; Haak, J.: Common Market in Africa, in: RDM, 28 May 1971.

(c) It will have a multiplier effect in that it will increase Zambia's closeness to Tanzania and aid Malawi's move to repair her links with Zambia and the rest of Africa. In this regard, the railway has assumed even greater significance for land-locked Zambia than when it was conceived, because of the closure of her border with Rhodesia and the diversification of territorial outlets through neighbouring black states, including Malawi.¹

Given the latter's inherited patterns of trading links built up in the colonial era, traffic flow through its agricultural middle region will bring about undoubted economic benefit. It is, thus, quite possible that Malawi would like to have outlets to the sea other than those going through Mozambique with the result that it may be plugged in to the Tanzam railway, which is now approaching completion.²

(d) Furthermore, for both countries, the importance of the labour-intensive construction method, viz. the employment of some 30,000 Zambians and Tanzanians,³ in replacing out-migration, can hardly be underestimated.

1 Monthly Development Digest, Cambridge, June 1973, p. 29; Africa Confidential, Vol. 13, No. 19, 1972; 'Rhodesia - Zambia Border Closure', International Defence and Aid Fund Special Report, No. 1, London, May 1973

2 Malawi/Zambia Relations, in: Africa Confidential, Vol. 15, No. 10, 17 May 1974, p. 8; Daily Telegraph, (UK), 27 November 1972

3 The East African Standard, 27 March 1968

In the case of Zambia, whose anti-migration policies took effect following decolonization from British rule, the Tanzam railway has always been viewed as a necessary, and in some ways bold step, that would bring land-locked Zambia's exports to Tanzanian ports, leading her out of white South Africa's sphere of influence and into the mainstream of black Africa.¹

¹ Mutukwa, S.K.: Imperial Dream becomes Pan-African Reality, in: Africa Report, January 1972, pp. 10 - 15; see also report under headline 'Zambia and China', in: Africa Digest, Vol. XXI, No. 3, May/June 1974, p. 54.

(b) Regional Migration in Southern Africa: A Framework for the Analysis of Political - Economic Patterns

1. Introductory Note

In the preceding section so far, the attempt has been to examine the extent to which liberal and reformist intentions of foreign investment have had their impact upon South Africa. The study advances several observations. First, foreign investment has saved South Africa from severe balance - of - payments problems and serves the fulfillment of key political and economic objectives for apartheid. Second, it has permitted South Africa to draw upon the technological advances of western capitalism. Third, heavy foreign investment has shielded South Africa from international isolation; this has meant the close integration of the foreign investor into the South African system, serving its interests and in no way challenging it. Indeed these investors continue to be very effective defenders and allies of the South African regime, and this is evidenced by their involvement in highly sophisticated arms industry. In ideological terms, foreign corporations have co-operated with the whole range of apartheid policies, in some cases co-operating in the implementation of crucial aspects of the apartheid policy by locating major factories in border areas, thus permitting these factories to remain in the white areas while the labour force and all the accompanying social costs remain in the African reserves.

In recent times, foreign firms have begun to locate branches in South Africa that they hope will be able to export to the independent States of Africa, thus aiding an important South African strategy of economic expansion, which, to the extent that it will succeed, will stultify the development potential of these states.

The conclusion seems unavoidable. Foreign investments, evidently, do not provide significant reforming or liberalizing 'input' into South Africa's public or economic life, and certainly none that would be sufficiently significant to counterbalance the reinforcement to the regime that investment entails. As for the theory of reform with regard to the process of involving indigenous blacks and foreign migrants into jobs previously reserved for whites, this in no way involves an undermining of apartheid, of job reservation or of the race-class domination. What has occurred is an upper adjustment of the line separating the races. Far from representing a significant crack in apartheid, it merely illustrates the government's ability to adjust apartheid to the realities of present-day supplies of scarce labour.

In the light of the above set of circumstances, the analysis that follows, seeks to examine the economic and political shifts in neighbouring Southern African states and the underlying structure of forces such as political consciousness and the search for economic independence. In evaluating the decolonization process, attention will be focussed on several important short and long-term general strategies, including mining production, industrial development, and labour intensive agriculture as measures to bring domestic manpower and resources into the orbit of the national economy. Links elsewhere to the north and in the international system are examined as key factors in the regional disengagement.

2. Migration and Economic Problems in the short and Long-term Perspective

Whatever the relations with South Africa, the former High Commission Territories share similar problems with other ex-colonies in the region over economic pressures which hinder serious plans for industrial and agricultural development. Their independence as developing countries is by no means immune from the effects of economic penetration. The economic, functional and infrastructural ties¹ are so close that whatever these countries may undertake in development terms, they cannot be insulated from the influence of South Africa's political economy.

A prohibiting factor in the consolidation of control over economic development is the serious economic pressure of a joint monetary policy. The client states, viz. the former High Commission Territories, have no freedom of choice when it comes to financial policy. This renders inevitable the impotency of those commanding the ruling party and government structures to implement policy objectives. Within the rand zone, capital flow from one country to another is a lucrative arrangement for the fortunate country on the receiving end but a serious impoverishment for the countries losing funds. The Lesotho government put its finger on the problem in its development plan: 'The total level of personal savings is not known, but is probably not far short of R10 million. Of this total only a fraction, possibly one-third, is invested in Lesotho; the rest is exported to South Africa. Thus, the financial institutions act in practice as a channel by which funds are

¹ Shaw, T.M.: Southern Africa: Co-operation and Conflict in an International Sub-System, in: JMAS, Vol. 12, No. 4, December 1974, p. 655 et seq.

transferred from Lesotho to South Africa. Lesotho is, therefore, in the difficult and undesirable position of being both an exporter of capital and heavily dependent on foreign aid for development.¹

The major obstacle in such an asymmetrical economic relationship is the temptation to assert unequal political relationships which hamper the foreign and sometimes internal policies of the countries concerned;² so that in

¹ See 'South Africa's Good Neighbour Relations with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland', in: Africa Bureau Fact Sheet 31, October 1973. The question of stemming the flow of capital out of the ex-protectorates into South Africa will probably have to be solved by the three African states themselves, by introducing their own financial legislation. The recent policy decision on the part of Botswana to launch an independent currency to replace South African rand may well set the example in the right direction. Botswana's announcement that it intends to withdraw from the South African rand zone is a move designed to increase the country's autonomy. Unlike a similar announcement from Swaziland, Botswana's decision was accompanied by disclosure of a plan to establish a central bank (see 'Botswana', in: Africa Report, March/April 1975, p. 32). In withdrawing from the rand zone, Botswana loses the benefits of a historically strong currency, according to the South African business weekly Financial Mail, but will be able to adopt independent monetary and exchange-rate policies designed to influence its own economy (Financial Mail, 20 September 1974).

² For a development of this theme, see Grundy, K.W.: Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence, Berkeley 1973, p. 293 ff.

respect of Africa and the international community, the relations with South Africa are the first priority determining their attitudes and policies; and although there is unity regarding a core of general principles they cannot compromise, they are compelled by inherited colonial history, geo-political relations and the functional ties that issue from these relations, to co-operate in the interests of economic survival. In the words of Botswana's Seretse Khama : 'We fully appreciate that it is wholly in our interest to preserve as friendly and neighbourly relations with the Republic of South Africa as possible. Our economic links with the Republic are virtually indissoluble. Economically we are tied to the Republic for communication, for markets, for our beef exports, for labour on the mines, and in many other respects.'¹

Kamuzu Banda stressed a similar dilemma in relation to South Africa as a 'permanent' feature of his country's economy when he said: 'Being a good African does not mean cutting your economic throat. I have to be realistic. Colonial geography and history are against us. We cannot boycott South Africa; that would mean the breakdown of Malawi's economy. My first duty is towards my own people. If I have to deal with the devil, I will do so.'²

¹ See Molteno, R.: Africa and South Africa, The African Bureau, London, February 1971, p. 6. For a similar policy statement, see Khama, S.: Kagisano: A Policy for Harmony, an address delivered at the Eleventh Annual Conference of the Botswana Democratic Party at Francistown, 1 April, 1972.

² Quoted in: Wossidlo, G.: Die Aussenpolitik der Republik Südafrika, seit dem Amtsantritt Premierminister Vorsters, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Afrikapolitik, MA Thesis, Otto-Suhr-Institute, Berlin, Spring 1972, p. 55.

The political uncertainty connected with colonial geography brought Malawi a further setback: her two important urban centres of any consequence, Blantyre - Limbe (the country's industrial base) and Zomba (the changing administrative capital), situated some 40 miles apart, were flanked by colonial Mozambique and therefore constituted an area of great vulnerability; that explains the previous extremely strong political ties between Malawi's government and the Portuguese. It is probably because Malawi had strategic interests closely tied to these southern parts of Africa, that observers allowed for the fact that the most militant of leaders could change after independence.¹

Recent events in former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, strategic buffer zones for minority regimes,² and the current squeeze on Rhodesia³ have encouraged the

¹ Abshire, D., Samuels, A.: Portuguese Africa, London 1969, p. 457. For a discussion of Malawi's land-locked problems, necessitating a *modus vivendi* with Portuguese East Africa, see McMaster, C.: Malawi Foreign Policy and Development, London 1974, especially the final chapter, which provides a fair and balanced appraisal of Malawi/Mozambique relations prior to the recent coup d'etat in Portugal.

² With Mozambique taken over by Frelimo, South Africa will have to defend a 2,000 mile border with black Africa. But more than that, it seems probable that both South Africa and Rhodesia will soon have to face a serious upsurge of domestic racial violence.

³ Pressures building up against the Rhodesian ruling party appear to be threefold. First, the withdrawal of South African military support. Secondly, the tightening of sanctions against the Rhodesian economy; and third, the prospect of an intensified guerilla struggle if all other attempts at peaceful negotiations fail. See Legum, C.: Next Six Month will seal Rhodesia's Fate, in: The Observer, (UK), 11 May 1975, p. 6.

Southern African territories to re-examine their economic and political priorities. Once seen as being trapped geographically and economically into permanent close association with South Africa, they are now shifting positions, from an uncritical and conservative stand on apartheid towards a more militant and pan-African attitude.

(1) Swaziland

Data on Swaziland's economic development has been, until recently, meagre so that a full account of socio-economic trends must await future in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, an outline of quantitative aspects of the political economy is possible in relation to migratory labour patterns. Swaziland, with a population of 77,000 principally Swazi, has an abundance of natural resources, including perennial rivers with high hydroelectric potential. The economy has a substantial modern sector, comprising mining, manufacturing and commercial farming, which provides over 80 percent of the GNP. About 60 to 70 percent of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture in small plots; of the 60,000 Swazis in wage employment, 40 percent work in agriculture; emigrant workers to South Africa number 25,000 annually of which 7,000 Swazis are employed in the coal and gold mines. The crucial aspect of Swaziland's socio-economic development is the realization of its Five Year plans. Whereas the first Five Year Development plan gave priority to developing agro-industries and expanding internal capital resources, the second plan (1973 - 77), which is far more realistically conceived for meaningful domestic development, places the main emphasis on the transformation of traditional agriculture from subsistence to commercial farming coupled with the state purchase of

privately-held land for Swazi farmers.

The independence of Mozambique could enable Swaziland to be the first of the three enclave territories to establish an economic structure and pattern of trade outside South Africa's immediate control.¹ The country, with its hitherto cautious attitude to South Africa, looks forward to an era of 'general economic co-operation with a free Mozambique'² whose independence and common border could enable Swaziland to lessen its dependence on its powerful neighbour to the south and thereby enhance its current status of relative independence.³ On the other hand, the latter state, lying as it does between South Africa and Mozambique, would potentially be one of the first victims of any serious confrontation along the

1 The main priority, if Swaziland is to embark on a meaningful path of economic development, is initially to check the new economic forces that have appeared on the scene - the foreign mining and industrial interests as well as the newly commercialized rural segment - all of which are potential national resources exploited with the help of the urbanizing Swazi people providing the bulk of black labour. See Potholm, C.P.: Swaziland, The Dynamics of Political Modernization, Berkeley 1972, especially the chapter on 'The Thrust of Modernity' in which the economic scene is described.

2 Murray, R.: Mozambique frees Swazi Attitudes, in: African Development, February 1975, p. 51

3 For a fuller account on this, and the Frelimo assurances of Swazi exports having preference 'at all times' in Lourenco Marques port, see Star Weekly, (SA), 10 May 1974.

South African borders.¹

(ii) Botswana

The enduring key to Botswana's rising influence in the region is the newly-discovered economic base: her economy now rests on mineral productions:² and the recent measures to convert the country from an impoverished pastoral economy to a mining and industrial state with diamond, copper, nickel and coal-mining projects are already revolutionising the country's economy; and most important, bringing foreign exchange earnings and revenues to accelerate development.³ The extent to which Botswana succeeds in achieving economic independence and thereby advance a strategy to reduce dependence on the region, rests on the level of consciousness of the political leadership regarding the implications of entertaining multi-national corporations. Depending on

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- 1 This is, for instance, the opinion of John Barratt in his concise study entitled: *Detente in Southern Africa*, in: *The World Today*, March 1975, p. 129. See also Nkosi, Z.: *The South African Threat to Mozambique*, in: *The African Communist*, No. 60, 1975, pp. 40 - 50; Uys, S.: *Vorster Warning to Mozambique amid Boycott Speculation*, in: *The Guardian*, 21 August 1974, p. 2.
 - 2 See Smit, P.: *Mining Development in Botswana*, in: *Africa Institute Bulletin*, 13, 1973, pp. 99 - 100 and 105 - 108; also 'Botswana diamond take-over', in: *The Financial Times*, (UK), 14 October 1974, p. 46.
 - 3 On the issue of accelerating development towards the national goal of 'economic independence', the President of Botswana, Seretse Khama, is reported as saying: 'Mining development and balancing our own budget do not add up to economic independence. It is the use to which we put mining revenues, together with the considerable amounts of foreign aid which we have succeeded in attracting from a wide range of sources, which will determine whether we are successful in our major objective: the creation of a truly independent economy'. See Khama, S.: *Next Goal: Economic Independence*, in: *Third World*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1973, p. 5; also Macartney, A.: *The Success of Seretse Khama*, in: *Africa Report*, November/December 1974, p. 13, for a chronicle of achievements in the field of economic development.

national policy, Botswana's mines are likely to develop in two directions: (a) as dominant sphere of regional multinational corporations in which foreign technology and labour create inequalities as well as wealth¹ or (b) as centres of gravity for the country's economic development leading to eventual withdrawal from South Africa's sphere of economic influence.

It must be simultaneously stressed that Botswana has tried within the limits of economic necessity to pursue a more 'Zambian line'. Despite her geographical position in this white minority regime dominated region, where she shares long borders with Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia, Botswana has sought aid and foreign

1 In recent studies, the power of multi-national companies has been likened to that of a new imperialism. Their impact on the control of key industries, employment and national economies in the host countries generally as well as the possibilities of exploiting the local peasantry through low wage rates and low environmental standards, render necessary close vigilance and co-operation with the host countries to establish the necessary checks and balances until developing countries are able to advance national strategies of economic development. On the role of multi-national corporations in the region, see Shamuyarira, N.M.: Inter-Penetration of the Southern African State System, Ninth Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, August 1973; also Selwyn, P.: Core and Periphery: A Study of Industrial Development in the Small Countries of Southern Africa, IDS, University of Sussex, Brighton, Discussion Paper No. 36, November 1973. For an exposition of the role of 'multinationals' on a continental level, see Chudson, W.: Africa and Multinational Enterprise, in: Hahlo, H.R. et al.: Nationalism and the Multinational Enterprise, Leiden 1973; Curry, R.L., Rothchild, D.: On Economic Bargaining between African Governments and Multinational Companies. Paper presented at the sixteenth annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Syracuse, October 31-November 3, 1973; Kreye, O.: Multinationale Konzerne, Munich 1974.

investment from non-South African sources; it has complied with sanctions against Rhodesia in the face of strong and harsh economic realities following independence from British colonial rule. It has incurred the wrath of Pretoria by establishing relations, though no more, with Moscow and Prague; Botswana has also refused South African government aid, though accepting private companies, and has refused to recruit technical assistance through Pretoria. In terms of regional foreign policy, it has opposed dialogue on present terms supporting the Lusaka manifesto.¹

Co-operation with black Africa is also adding strength to Botswana's independent line. The new Botswana/Zambia highway, like the Tanzam railway, will enable the former enclave to reduce its heavy dependence on its powerful neighbour. The road has economic as well as political significance.

- (a) Economically, it is a recognition that socio-economic progress in isolation is not necessarily a desirable goal, particularly if it is achieved at the expense of political independence. The latter consideration weighs heavily on the minds of leaders in neighbouring states that South Africa would

¹ See, in particular, African Digest, Vol. XIX, No. 57, October 1972, p. 104; also Henderson, W.: Independent Botswana: A Reappraisal for Foreign Policy Options, in: African Affairs, LXII, 290, January 1974, pp. 37 - 49; Hill, C.: Independent Botswana: Myth or Reality, in: Round Table, 245, 1972, pp. 55 - 62.

like to welcome into its area of co-prosperity.¹ To the extent that the South African economic strategy succeeds, it will stultify the growth potential within these states.

- (b) Politically, the road construction has been rationalised by South African politicians as a fearful move to be used by liberation movements as a type of conveyor belt for ferrying guerillas from black Africa into white-ruled territory - this, despite the pronounced assurances by the president, Seretse Khama, that Botswana is no military base for national liberation movements, except for refugees fleeing the harsher forms of political repression. However, other political forces in Botswana, less optimistic about the prospects for changing white attitudes in the Republic, would make maximum use of Botswana's strategic military position as a corridor between independent Africa and the heartland of apartheid. In this respect, Henri Colere writes: 'In Südafrika ist man sich bewusst, dass bei einem wachsenden Einfluss der radikalen Nationalisten aus anderen Gebieten Afrikas Botswana zu einem Brückenkopf des militanten Kampfes gegen die weisse Regierung werden könnte. Die Bedeutung eines solchen Kampfes unterstreichen die Afrikaner immer wieder. Aus diesem Grund versucht Pretoria auch weiter, seinen Einfluss im ehemaligen Betschuanaland zu behalten durch das Zukunftsziel eines wirtschaftlichen Wohlstandes.'²

¹ As South Africa extends her influence by the injection of capital, loans, and know-how, there is the 'danger' that economic necessity could precede political priorities as a lasting policy. For a fuller account of this issue, see Smit, P.: South Africa assists Africa, in: Africa Institute Bulletin, 13, 1973, pp. 127-138.

² Quoted in: Esslinger Zeitung, 22 October 1971; see also two related articles entitled 'Botswana supports Liberation', in: Africa Digest, Vol. XX, No. 5, October 1973, p. 109; and 'Botswana wendet sich von Südafrika ab, stärkere Anlehnung an Sambia und Tanzania/Besorgnis in Pretoria', in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, 4 January 1972.

It is particularly the pan-African and international economic co-operation that are crucial in Botswana's strategy of economic independence.¹ In recent years, Botswana has joined the African Development Bank and now receives some assistance from countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia, 'who are all anxious to show solidarity with their brother, landlocked between racist government in South Africa and Rhodesia.'²

If Botswana succeeds in the use of the potentials outside the sub-system based on South Africa, and becomes the first multi-racial state on her neighbours' borders, it is likely to play a role in the unfolding history of the sub-continent out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance.

¹ As a developing country, Botswana faces both the need for foreign technical and financial resources, and the desire to avoid the exploitative tendencies of the foreign agencies that provide these resources. Long-term loans have been provided by Americans, British, and Canadian aid agencies, the International Development Agency (IDA) and the World Bank. See 'Botswana : Rags to Riches', in: Africa Confidential, Vol. 14, No. 8, April 1973, p. 6.

² *ibid.*, p. 6

(iii) Lesotho

In 1971 the United Nations identified Lesotho as one of the six 'hard core' least developed countries in the world. Most of the ingredients for development, such as financial resources, natural resources, employment opportunities and low density of population, are lacking. The country also suffers from problems associated with its geography. In these circumstances the government is committed to economic growth and in particular to increasing local employment opportunities and to raising living standards.

To accomplish this, the Lesotho government is mobilising the three principal resources of the country - land, the labour and skills of the people, and money - to the best advantage.

On the financial side, most domestic revenues are committed to recurrent expenditure so that capital expenditure is mainly financed by means of foreign loans and grants mainly from the UK, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Development Association (IDA) and the African Development Bank (ADB).¹ Beside external government sources of assistance, Lesotho is also trying to mobilise private capital investment, mostly from South Africa. Through the Lesotho Bank and the Lesotho National Development

¹ Lesotho's main sources of support are, therefore, external. However as former protectorate of the British empire and now a black enclave totally surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho is fully aware of its inescapable dependence on the two countries, especially on the Republic. Portions of the British and South African development aid have played an important role in propping up Lesotho's political System and low-g geared economy. See 'Lesotho', in: ARB, Vol. II, No. 6, June/July 1974, p. 3170.

Corporation, the government has stimulated and secured participation in a large range of private sector enterprises. This, in recent years, has been accompanied by the acceptance of technological assistance¹ and of senior South African administrators and 'development experts' in key posts throughout the major national economic institutions - a situation which enhances South Africa's chances of extending its economic hegemony over the territorial enclave.

Thus, in the field of private investment, Lesotho, and to a lesser extent Swaziland, have been virtually other 'bantustans' attached to South Africa. Pretoria is ploughing aid, with obvious conditions, in these surrounding black client-states.² Their relationship to South Africa is, of course, one of the key geo-political facts of Southern African history. But the dangers of disintegrative tendencies arising from such a relationship are by no means small should hostile relations replace the goodwill and friendly attitudes on which the close interdependence of their domestic economies depend.

1 A diamond mine, the biggest single project yet in Lesotho, will be brought into production by De Beers, the South African mining company. Initially employing expatriates - presumably from South Africa - the company pledges to train local personnel for senior positions. See RDM, 2 March 1974.

2 In Swaziland, the Havelock asbestos mines, the fifth largest asbestos mine in the world, which is run by the Anglo-American Corporation and the Lesotho National Development Corporation, which attracts South African capital, are two examples of economic dependence on aid from their powerful neighbour. See Randall, P.: To Engage or not to Engage, in: Pro Veritate, (SA), May 1971.

In order to increase domestic investment, there will be a 10 percent reduction in the salaries of ministers and a 10 percent compulsory saving levy on the salaries of civil servants earning more than R 600 per annum. The latter measure of trimming the salaries of upper and middle echelons of the civil service coupled with an increased volume of repatriated savings - up to 60 percent - of migratory workers, will not only improve financial viability for domestic improvements, but also assist in providing internal capital for the creation of new employment opportunities for returning migrants.

Despite the fact that Lesotho's geography diminishes her potential for independent action in that her strategy of domestic development cannot be insulated from the influence of her powerful neighbour, there are nevertheless several resources for alternative development.¹ The small

¹ Lesotho has, in recent years, sought to balance geographic and economic handicaps issuing from its enclosed position with expressions of militant political attitudes towards its powerful neighbour and good relations with OAU states including Zambia and Tanzania (see 'Lesotho: Links with the North', in: Africa Confidential, Vol. 12, No. 12, 14 June 1974, p. 7); following almost a decade of political differences in which Maseru/Pretoria 'relations have gone from bad to worse' (Potholm, C.P.: South Africa: The White Laager, in: Current History, March 1973, p. 130) Lesotho government policy seems no longer to be dictated by her 'geographical, economic and political realities in Southern Africa.' Premier Jonathan Leabua now supports national liberation movements (See 'Setbacks for South African Dialogue Policy', in: Rhodesia Herald, 24 November 1972). Recent relations with South Africa have been furthermore strained by Lesotho's territorial demands of 'conquered territory' in the neighbouring Free State Province. Basing her Territorial claims on the early history of the 'Boer-trekkers' culminating in 'Afrikaner' expansionism and colonization of parts of the Basuto Kingdom in 1869, Lesotho hopes to appeal to the UN for international support. See 'Gebietsansprüche Lesotho's gegenüber Südafrika', in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 May 1973, p. 6; also Zambia Daily Mail, 20 December 1974.

but valuable diamond deposits which have recently been discovered and which are now being marketed through De Beers, the South African diamond mining corporation, are important assets. But the key to Lesotho's industrialization and agricultural expansion, on which to pin long-range hopes, is the Malibamatso Water Project - the former Oxbow project. The possible sources of development capital from a rational utilization of such an economic asset are enormous: Lesotho will be able to export not only water, which it calls its 'white gold', but hydro-electric power as well. This would give the economy cheap power for its own domestic use as well as additional export revenue.

In terms of labour utilisation, according to available figures for 1969, male workers were employed as follows:

Economic Activity	Numbers	Percentage
Agriculture	100,000	48
Private		
Industry	15,000	7
Mining (mainly in		
South Africa)	95,000	45

Source: UNDP Programming, Working Paper, August 1971

In a country like Lesotho, with a population of over 800,000, emigration evidently has highly unfavourable consequences. The absence of 45 percent of the active male population has, in some areas, led to manpower shortages. Such labour exodus meant that agricultural operations could not be done in time or under optimum conditions, causing 'agricultural lag' and serious shortages in the country's food-crop production.¹

¹ The ILO Report II (Employment, Status and Conditions of Non-National Workers in Africa, Geneva 1973, p. 11) holds the view that 'for countries of immigration, such as the mining countries of Southern Africa which have manpower supply problems, there seems no doubt that the movements have a ...

The loss in manpower resources has, however, been somewhat compensated by the inflow of migrant savings and remittances from the mines. The figures below, provided by the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce, show the amount of money that flows into Lesotho from her workers on the mines and how it has increased over the years:

Continuation of footnote from page 119

... positive effect'. However, to appreciate the economic and social consequences of emigration for the countries of departure, regard must be had to several factors, especially (a) the duration of absence, (b) periods of absence and relationship to agricultural cycle of cultivation and (c) alternative replacements of migrating workers. With knowledge at its present level, it is difficult to express with any measure of adequacy the results, positive or negative, of emigration. For further statements on this issue, see Walhman, S.: Conditions of non-development: The case of Lesotho, in: JDS, (4), 8, (21), January 1972, p. 252 ff.

Migrant Remittances for Lesotho

	1967	1973	1974
Deferred Pay	R 2,250,000	R 8,000,000	R 11,500,000
and			
Remittances			
Overall total paid	R 9,000,000	R20,000,000	R 40,000,000
to Lesotho employees			
on all mines			
Number of Lesotho	65,000	80,000	85,000
citizens on the mines			
(monthly average)			
Average per capita:	R 45	R 102	R 107
deferred pay			
Average per capita:	R 25	R 33	R 51
Remittances to dependants			

Source: Standard Bank Review, December 1974

The export of surplus labour population being inevitable in the near future, i.e. until domestic development has made possible the accommodation of emigrating workers, Lesotho government will have to seek major improvements in the recruitment and working conditions of its migrant citizens. In this respect, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has called for several important reforms; these include the implementation of measures for the transfer of more migrant savings into the country; the demand for improvements in wages, work conditions and fringe benefits; changes in the present migrant labour system to enable Basuto mine-workers in South Africa to live with their families on the mine compounds; and the centralization of labour recruiting in the country into a labour exchange bureau to permit closer scrutiny of labour conditions.¹

¹ See report under the headline 'Lesotho' in: Standard Bank Review, December 1974, p. 14.

(iv) Malawi

The links on trade and labour matters between Malawi and South Africa, which go back to colonial times when the task of economic development had a relatively low place in the priority of things, have offered the Republic of South Africa the opportunity to exercise an important influence over the economic and even political developments in Malawi: if the latter opposed its policies, it could threaten to expel or bar Malawi's migratory workers¹; and with Malawi's precarious 'surplus labour' economy, such a measure could both cut off a source of foreign currency and swell the ranks of the unemployed back in the workers' country. A sudden return of a large proportion of the emigrants all at once would have resulted in economic, social, and political disruption; and the problem of re-integration of the potentially dynamic population group with a broadened outlook and social ambitions stimulated by their host country and unable to contribute to domestic development, would have been a possible source of friction with the home environment.

It was such a growing awareness of the economic and political vulnerability that provided the turning-point in Malawi's earlier pan-African policies of revolutionary confrontation to narrower ones of national interest and

¹ On the ties between Malawi and South Africa, and the issue of economic as well as political vulnerability, see Leistner, G. M.E.: Malawi, South Africa and the Issue of Closer Economic Co-operation, in: Occasional Paper, No. 13, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria 1970; see also a report under the headline 'Malawi : Hostage of the South', in: Africa 1971, p. 308.

peaceful co-existence. In Banda's own words: 'the first consideration of myself and the government continues to be the peaceful and prosperous development of Malawi and the good of her 4,000,000 people; and I wish to re-iterate once again that it shall always be my resolve to avoid the temptation to seek popularity in the field of world affairs at the expense of the practical well-being of my people.'¹

In the Southern African region, commercial farms and mines have been centres of African peasant livelihood. This holds especially true since the late 1890's when black miners were recruited by the Chamber of Mines on the gold and coal mines. In 1936, Tropical labour, as workers from Malawi and the neighbouring territories were oftentimes collectively called, accounted for one percent of the total labour force. Today Tropicals provide up to one-quarter of the total.² This is evident from the figures provided by the Witwatersrand Labour Organization:

¹ Quoted in: 'This is Malawi', Ministry of Information, Vol. 3, No. 11, Blantyre, November 1967, p. 21.

² Another source has it that largely because of its relatively low wages, the mining industry has become more and more dependent on across-the-border labour. Thus, in terms of domestic recruitment in 1936, 60 percent of the black labour on the mines was reported as South African. By 1948 the figure had dropped to 40 percent and by 1969 to 30 percent. Presently it is estimated as just over 20 percent. See 'Migrant Labour', in: ARB, Vol. 11, No. 5, May/June 1974, p. 3131.

Geographical Sources of Black Labour Employed by
Chamber of Mines, 1970

	Percent
Transvaal	3.1
Natal and Zululand	1.5
Swaziland	1.3
Cape	17.9
Lesotho	17.7
O.F.S.	1.7
Botswana	4.1
Mozambique	28.2
North of latitude 22 south	24.5
Total	100 - 401,000

Source: W.N.L.A. Annual Report, 1970

A break-down of statistics as well as a critical assessment of migrant labour trends in respect of the geographic distribution, economic participation and aggregate numbers in the Republic of South Africa is rendered difficult owing to the paucity of factual information and a lack of perfection in the statistical data. However, of the 90,000 estimate in the Republic, 50,000 constitute male contractees in the employ of the Witwatersrand Mine Labour Organization, leaving 40,000 first generation of 'free-flow' migrants with permanent familial attachments among the South African black communities. Their economic classification is reported as follows:

Economic Activity	Estimated Numbers
Agriculture	10,000
Private Domestic Services	15,000
Forestry	5,000
Unscheduled Mines	5,000
'Other' services	5,000

Source: The 1970 statistical attestations of the Malawi Government Labour Representative (MGLR), Johannesburg; Compendium of Statistics, National Statistical Office, Zomba 1970

Geographically, Malawians resident in South Africa are distributed in the following provinces:

Transvaal	25,000
Natal	10,000
Cape	2,500
O.F.S.	2,500

Comparison of areas and migrant residents indicates that migrant concentrations correlate with mining localities and industrialized belts, though their future distributive patterns will strongly be affected and, to some extent, distorted by the present emigration strictures and repatriations, as well as by urban legislation and the dynamics of South African homeland policies.

No concrete and reliable data are available concerning agricultural employment of Malawian workers. Part of the explanation is to be found in the fact that South Africa is a predominantly mining state in which agriculture assumes a secondary role. The lack of strong waves of migrants in the farming sector must also be viewed against a background of several sociological factors including the system of white-black relations, the strict pattern of dominance and submission,¹ absolute dependence of labour-tenants on their employers bound on the one hand by punitive legislation which makes it virtually impossible for labour tenants to refuse to perform stipulated tasks² and, on the other, by the need to

1 The pattern of dominance and submission has recently been documented in: Ainslie, R.: *Masters and Serfs : Farm Labour in South Africa*, Institute for Defence and Aid, London 1973.

2 This legislative measure, referred to as the Masters and Servants Act (1970), which lays down criminal sanctions for agricultural and other workers accused of breaking contracts or leaving their employment, has now been rendered invalid. See SAIRR : *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* 1971, p. 249 ff.

have access to land to support their families, given the low wages, the legal and political barriers to other wage employment and the impossibility of occupational mobility, vertical or horizontal.

The possibilities of capital formation by both domestic and foreign migrant workers are meagre, in view of the generally low wages. Nevertheless the amounts of remittances sent home to Malawi by migrant workers abroad represent a substantial contribution to the purchasing power of the African in the country. The cash value of deferred payments, that is, the total net capital inflows in the years 1960 - 1972, sent by workers from abroad indicates upward mobility:

Net Capital Inflow derived from Labour Emigration : 1960 - 1972

Year	Financial Amounts (Malawian pounds)
1960	1,500,000
1965 - 67	2,400,000
1968 - 69	2,900,000
1970	5,000,000
1972	11,500,000

Source: Annual Report for 1960, Government Printer, Zomba 1961, p. 15; National Accounts of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1954 - 60, Supplement: Territorial Tables, p. 45; Munger, E.S.: Trading with the Devil, American Universities Field Staff Report, Vol. XIII, No. 2, Malawi 1969/70, p. 8; Malawi 1972 : An Official Handbook, Ministry of Information, Blantyre, p. 122; Balance of Payments Report: 1967, National Statistical Office, Zomba; Coleman, J.: Some Implications of International Labour Migration from Malawi, Chancellor College, University of Malawi, Department of Geography, unpublished MS thesis

These progressively increasing foreign currency earnings in Malawian pounds¹, represent some 11 percent of the total exports both visible and invisible, making migratory labour Malawi's third 'biggest item' of export after tea and tobacco. This excludes the value of personal effects and other properties brought back by returning migrants.

In general, the total net capital inflow during these years derive (a) from the intensive recruitment activities of the Witwatersrand Mine Labour Organization,² and (b) from the foreign exchange rates resulting from devaluation. But a major part would be a real value increase and should be attributed to the large numbers once employed by the mining houses following the labour agreement with South Africa.

With the whole future of Southern Africa in the balance, and the pressures on domestic and foreign policies which may result from the possibility of being surrounded by black states hostile to white-minority regimes to the south, Malawi is likely to re-think its 'southward-looking' policies. A back-peddalling in her relations is already visible in the suspension of Malawians for South African and Rhodesian mines and the withdrawal of the Malawian ambassador to

1 Malawian 'pound' currency before 1971 is equivalent to British monetary pound. On February 15, 1971 the Kwaca currency replaced the Malawian pound at the rate of 2 Malawi Kwaca per pound.

2 See specific estimates of traffic movements through Chileka (Blantyre) and Lilongwe airports (1964 - 72) as well as general statistics on Malawians recruited for mines of South Africa under contract with Mines Labour Organization, in: Malawi Statistical Yearbook 1973, Zomba, p. 48, and 124.

Pretoria¹ - indicators of a policy departure from close co-operation with the self-defined civilization-preserving mission² of the South African Republic towards friendly relations with OAU states³. This injects a new element in the inter-state relationship in Southern Africa and may suggest two things:

(a) The political awareness of changes in neighbouring Mozambique and possibly in Rhodesia.

1 Following the death of 77 Malawians in an air crash in Botswana when on their way home from the mines in April 1974, President Banda suspended all further recruiting of mine labour pending the results of an inquiry. In September 1974, at the annual congress of the ruling Malawi Congress Party in Lilongwe, Banda was unanimously asked to make the suspension permanent. See article on Malawi in the 'Africa Update' section of Africa Report, September/October 1974, p. 35; also report under the headline 'Chamber in Talks with Malawi', in: The Times, (UK). 21 September 1974, p. 22, for unsuccessful labour negotiations between President Banda of Malawi and Schumann of the chamber of mines.

2 White South Africa sees it as its ordained mission to come to the rescue of black Africa. Thus, the prime minister of the Republic, John Vorster, is reported as having said that 'we as whites in South Africa have a special duty towards the whole continent of Africa; and we affirm that it is not plain common sense to enter into amicable relations with African states wherever it may be necessary, but it is also expected of us.' (See Vorster, B.J.: South Africa's Outward-looking Policy, lecture delivered at the general meeting of the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, July 1969 in Pretoria.) On the meaning of the concept of 'civilization-preserving mission' as interpreted by black states in the Southern African region, see, for example, comments contained in the article on 'Botswana and South Africa' by Thebe Mogami, Botswana's permanent representative at the United Nations, in: Africa Report, November/December 1974, p. 52; also Africa Digest, Vol. XIX, No. 57, October 1972, p. 104.

3 For comparative notes on policies in the period prior to and after recent events, paying special attention to Mozambique as an essential factor in the equation, see Shamuyarira, N.M.: Dr. Banda's lonely Road, in IRR Newsletter, 1, 10, October/November 1967, pp. 402 - 404; Hodder-Williams, R.: Malawi's Decade under Dr. Banda: The Revival of Politics, in: Round Table, 252, London, October 1973, pp. 463 - 470; Gupta, A.: Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the Dialectics of Liberation of Southern Africa, in: International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, Delhi, India, January-March 1975.

(b) An expanding agricultural sector at home that makes it favourable, politically and economically, for Malawians to work on domestic development.

(v) Mozambique

In the short term, South Africa's relations with the new transition government are likely to be very much on a par with those in Botswana: political cleavage, but with economics taking over-riding precedence over politics. The territory's economy is dangerously vulnerable¹; and unlike other African nations gaining independence, the 'Frelimos' are not backed by a wealthy mother nation²; and above all any interruptions in normal economic relations with South Africa, at this stage, would result in still further serious economic crises.³ The supply of mine labour will have to be maintained at least till the local economy can absorb 100,000 or more

1 There are some indications that Mozambique's short-term economic outlook is poor. Major difficulties are: rising inflationary pressures, an exodus of Portuguese and foreign skilled technicians and professionals further depleting scarce human resources, a deteriorating balance of payments, and general labour unrest of workers striking for high wages. See 'Mozambique', in: Foreign Economic Trends, US Department of Commerce, August 1974, pp. 1-8; Africa News, 3 March 1975; 'Mozambique', in: Africa Report, March/April 1975, p. 32.

2 See 'Portugal and Overseas Provinces', in: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 1970.

3 For details on Mozambique's foreign trade with South Africa, see 'Africa South of the Sahara 1974', Europa Publications.

workers.¹

If, however, the migration flow is to continue, Frelimo will demand revised contracts with the South African government and the Chamber of Mines² with radical reforms in employment conditions, notably health services, education, recreation, workmen's compensation, and dependants compensation:³ this in view of the disappearance of documents relating to the bilateral agreements on mine labour on April 25, 1974, which would have enabled Frelimo to establish the precise terms of an agreement known to have been excessively favourable to Lisbon at the expense of Mozambique.

The additional manpower problem relating to repatriation of returning refugees from neighbouring countries faces an independent Mozambique:

1 According to a Rand Daily Mail report (23 May 1974), the number of Mozambican Africans working on gold and coal mines belonging to the Chamber of Mines at the end of 1973 was 100,000. Between 1969 and 1972, the number varied between 120,000 and 133,000. In terms of the Mozambique Convention, on registration of each Mozambique employee, R 4 was paid by the mines to Mozambique, making a total of 400,000 a year.

2 Responsible for the working conditions of black mineworkers is the Chamber of Mines of South Africa - an employers' federation placed on a monopsonistic footing and representing the various mining groups. The chamber lays down wage rates and conditions of service, which include the value of payments in kind.

3 Financial Gazette, (SA), 8 September 1974

Mozambique's Returning Refugees

Country	Number of Returning Refugees
Tanzania	60,000
Zambia	6,000
Zimbabwe	6,000
South Africa	10,000

Source: Daily News (Tanzania) 4 January 1975;
Facts and Reports, Vol. 5, No. 1, 11 January
1975; Financial Mail, (SA), 27 September 1974

It is too early to attempt a structural analysis of the occupational characteristics and skills available of those returning citizens likely to contribute both to the social and economic development; more so because to a large extent colonial repression and political consciousness preceded economic opportunity. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to suggest that a substantial number of returning refugees are peasant farmers who can, within a reasonable period of domestic development, be 'recovered' by Frelimo's future socialist economy.

Mozambique is also undergoing a change of political coordinates with respect to its historical past. Despite the nature of the transitory government¹ characterised by such factors as the absence of crucial ministries - defence, foreign affairs, finance, trade - a multi-racial government headed by a third-ranking leader and a de facto white

¹ The transition government, a product of the 'Dar-es Salaam Agreement' between Portugal and Frelimo, is in part based on the British decolonization model with a period of internal self-government in which coalition is dominated by the main nationalist movement before independence. For a brief assessment of the calibre of the nationalist representation in the transitory government, see report entitled 'Mozambique's new Government', in: Africa Digest, Vol. XXI, No. 6, December 1974, p. 111.

majority cabinet designed to assure Mozambique's 200,000 whites, Frelimo, whose broad principles are already known, is expected to follow socialist and non-aligned policies, ultimately bringing under state control the major means of production.

With regard to the dicey question of migratory labour, it appears unlikely that the South African government or the mining houses will receive the sort of stable assurances from Frelimo necessary for the continued recruitment of Mozambican mine workers. It is even too early for neighbouring South Africa to take solace in the experience that black-ruled Mozambique will in the long run develop into a dependency similar to the black states of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland or Malawi, which though expressing their distaste for apartheid, maintain close economic links with white South Africa. The possibility exists that a Frelimo government would balk at the 'realpolitik' involved in such a politically distasteful exercise and attempt principally through a 'return to the land' and the operation of a closed economy, to revolutionise their entire economic inheritance.¹ A policy of increased trading and economic co-operation - is likely to endanger its political and ideological conscience.² Such a move would be tantamount to coalescing with a colonial force against neighbouring liberation movements. A

¹ See Bloom, B.: Mozambique: First an economic, now a political Backlash, in: The Financial Times (UK), 10 September, 1974, p. 18.

² With regard to the issue of ideological purity, already in 1971, the Frelimo is reported as having said that 'unquestionably we are stronger than ever and this is a strength which derives from many factors: we are determined; we are united by conscious adherence to our revolutionary ideology; we are obtaining every day greater understanding and greater support from the progressive forces throughout the world.' See Mozambique Revolution, January-April 1971.

Frelimo government realizes Mozambique's key role to the survival or overthrow of the white-ruled south. The extent to which it has developed into a territory wherein the gravest threat to - and also the greatest hope for - future stability in Southern Africa lies, will be evident in the event it provides for or hinders the safe passage for black nationalist guerillas to infiltrate the Transvaal¹. In this Frelimo is well aware of South Africa's sensitivity to the proximity of Mozambique to the Transvaal, South Africa's industrial heartland and the stronghold of 'afrikaner' nationalism.

The economic development and political future of the 400,000 whites in Angola and 150,000 in Mozambique are likely to be crucial problems in the post-independence governments of these territories. Nationalist pressure on some of the economically privileged interest groups may mean retirement in Portugal. There is the further possibility of conflict for the significant strata of plantation settlers and a hard-core of working class immigrants in a wide range of urban jobs. Protected in the past from black economic competition, these now represent a potential hindrance to africanisation. It is particularly the groups of small-scale farmers and plantation owners whose staunch opposition dates back to the armed confrontation in the original black rebellions of the early sixties, who may seek a violent entrenchment of

¹ For an elaboration of this theme, see Nussey, W.: Mozambique holds Key, in: The Star, (SA), 20 July 1974, p. 14.

their economic position.¹ Lack of reliable labour statistics renders difficult the assessment of manpower requirements for the future; but given the settlers' modern farming techniques and the enormous agricultural potential - the economies of Angola and Mozambique, with the exception of mining predominance in the former territory², rest on agriculture - there exists at least the theory of minimal co-operation in which white farmers could act as extension workers in any campaign for agricultural improvement of the widespread farming ignorance and the subsistence methods of the large majority of the local peasantry.

The more lucrative commodities, the mineral wealth, are resources of development which are likely to remain unresolved until the future political orientation becomes clear.³ Both

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- 1 For a brief statement, with particular reference to Angola, on future domestic problems resulting from disparities between white and black economic and educational levels, political rivalries and independence, see 'Decolonizing Angola', in: Africa Digest, Vol. XXI, No. 6, December 1974, pp. 111 - 112; for a detailed study on Angola as an open and inviting area for outside influences, see Adelman, K.L.: Report from Angola, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, April 1975, pp. 558 - 574.
- 2 See Angola: Economic and Financial Survey 1972, Bank of Angola, p. 43 ff; also Annual Reports of the Angola Diamond Company, Luanda.
- 3 Both economies of Mozambique and Angola are in a fluid state, released from Portugal's mercantilism but caught in the present political uncertainty and unsure of their future form. This problematic holds especially true for Angola; For a brief statement on changes in the latter Portuguese colony immediately before and since the 'April coup', see Pelissier, R.: Angola: Economic Dynamics to the Policy of deliberate Change, in: Optima, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1973, pp. 114 - 133; Burgess, J.: Angola's Economy: Foisted before the Future, in: African Development, March 1975, pp. 27 - 29. A more detailed study which provides background data on the impact of foreign economic penetration of both Angola and Mozambique with special reference to the Federal Republic of West Germany is to be found in: Ferreira, E. (ed.): Strukturen der Abhängigkeit: Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Angola und Mozambique, Frankfurt/Main 1975, especially pp. 11 - 17, and 33 - 56.

countries, however, need industrial and mining investment to boost infrastructure, employment, and export. The decolonisation of Mozambique under a popular front, Frelimo, as it seeks to create conditions under which popular democratic power can be extended to the rest of the country, is committed to the dismantlement of the old colonial system. Much of the contents of the transition to political permanence will expressedly be socialist; already some evidence suggests that 'the brand will not be Soviet or Chinese but Tanzanian:² the stress on the need for austerity and hard-work, rural development and self-reliance - all of these are cardinal points in Nyerere's domestic strategy.'

1 Frelimo's policy position with regard to future foreign investments in Mozambique is likely to find radical implementation after succession to power. Marcelino dos Santos, vice-president of Frelimo has criticised western investments as having impeded progress to independence pointing to the eventual revamping of trade agreements signed by the previous administering powers. (Cf. Southern Africa, Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1973). Indeed, with respect to the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric project, one of the largest privately financed schemes on the African continent, it was clearly not designed to contribute to the restructuring and development of independent Mozambique. On the contrary, as one conservative observer has remarked, it was part of a Portuguese programme to 'stifle left-wing inspired rebel activities' to liberate Mozambique. See Barnes, R.W.J.: Dawning of a New Era in African Development, in: Contemporary Review, 214, February 1969, p. 85. The German discussion can be found in: Grohs, G. (ed.): Der umstrittene Damm. Zur Diskussion um den Cabora Bassa Damm in Mozambique, Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler, Hamburg 1974.

2 The Economist, 25 September 1974, p. 42

Chapter VII

MIGRATION INTO MALAWI

(a) African Immigration

In speaking of intra-African migration, a distinction must be made between movements for political reasons, i.e. migration of refugees escaping from one country to another, and movements for economic purposes, i.e. migration for employment.¹

The first are exceptional movements, caused by political upheavals or the establishment of frontiers which do not correspond to ethnic units or are artificially imposed. The second type of migration, the economic movements, is a regular one resulting from normal economic circumstances, i.e. the desire to find work; but there is another type of economic migration in Africa: family emigration, when local conditions, such as aridity of the soil, oblige whole families to emigrate to more fertile regions.²

Since the turn of the century, Malawi has served as host country to many immigrants of various ethnic origins; as a result Malawi today represents one of the most heterogeneous of African states. Immigrant movements, originating from neighbouring territories, assume two major classifications as follows:

(1) Ethno-Social Movements

These are based on tribal affiliations that in many areas lie across physical features and artificial divisions. Especially in the southern region where ethnic and social ties do not co-incide with territorial units based on colonial geography or administrative demarcations, migrant mobility into Malawi has been high: extended family system

1 Migration Facts and Figures, No. 61, 1968

2 Migration Facts and Figures, No. 71, November/December 1969

and tribal solidarity being stimulants to such mobility. It is difficult to give precise figures as the patterns of these movements change often and no strict border control has been established. It appears, however, that the size of this immigration is even larger than of emigration, free and unrecorded movements across frontiers between the homes of kinsmen being part of African tradition. This is evidenced by the increase in size of certain tribes in the last few decades and by the size of the total intercensal population growth which could not result merely from the natural increase.

A measure of their significance can be gained from the fact that the Lomwe-speaking tribes which predominate in the southern border areas are not reported as being present at all in 1896 but several thousands in subsequent years; the trend is as follows:

African Immigrants	Year
120,000	1921
136,000	1931
380,000	1945
Source: Malawi Census Report, Zomba 1966	

Similar movements of the Sena of the Lower Shire presently constitute a significant proportion of the population of Nsanje and Chikwawa districts of southern Malawi.

(2) Political and Economic Movements

Some sources see the largely unrecorded emigration from Mozambique to the southern part of Malawi as related to the development of the tea plantations there¹: these are economic centres attracting intensive political and economic movements

¹ UNESCO Bulletin, 20 July 1965, p. 3

from the neighbouring Portuguese 'overseas province' where the pattern of African economic life has been disrupted and Africans subjected to regulations regarding forced labour and cultivation.

Economically important to South African and Rhodesian territories are the farm and mineworkers contracted from Mozambique under RALSC and the South African - Portuguese Agreement.¹ This and related trade exchanges constitute a structure of interlocking interests that is crucial as part of a developing Southern African bloc. The sociological dimensions of labour emigration in the South African direction, particularly its impact on the Mozambican traditional family structure, are enormous; censal reports reveal that the southern districts of Mozambique, notably Lourenco Marques, Gaza and Inhambane have a high proportion of widows. The sex ratio above 45 is 47 males per 100 females, a most unusual ratio, and the proportion of widows exceeds by far that reported for other regions in Africa.² Because of differences in the nature of the political economy, the official norm governing the emigration of workers into gold mines is that of regarding foreign labourers as 'Gastarbeiter'.³ In effect, this aids migratory workers in the maintenance of closer ties to the home country; but the drives that characterise such mobile groups, their need to be

1 Other studies relate such movements to non-economic factors. See Harris, M.: Labour Migration among the Mozambique Thonga: Cultural and Political Factors, in: Africa, January 1959; Ferreira, A. R.: Labour Migration among the Mozambique Thonga, in: Africa, April 1960, is a reply to Harris.

2 Walle, E.v.: Marriage in African Censuses and Inquiries, in: Brass, W. and Coale, A.: The Demography of Tropical Africa, Princeton 1968, p. 197

3 The German term for migrant labourers

re-integrated into the economic and social life of the host country, the social, cultural and vocational factors, and the meagre savings brought back from the mines, are all potential sources of friction with both the host and home environment.

This phenomenon may somehow be contrasted with migration into Malawi. In the case of Mozambique, movements of Africans started out with the best *ex ante* intentions of returning but most migrants have found themselves settling in Malawi for good, *ex post*. It is hardly necessary to point that African migration, even though political and economic in character, is also 'family' migration; accompanied by considerations of kinship networks and solidarity; such movements assure not only economic sustenance but also social and cultural integration.

(b) Non-African Immigration

(1) Indian Immigration

(i) Historical Background and Immigration Aims

The course of Indian migration into Malawi closely followed the course of British colonial presence in the late nineteenth century¹. Such a movement was not 'free-flow' and spontaneous but rather politically encouraged by European settlers and brought about to a considerable extent by the persuasions of the pioneer administration.

¹ For notes on the early history of the Indian community in Malawi, see Dotson, F. and Dotson, L.: *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi*, New Haven 1968; also Karolia, M.A.: *A Brief Historical Survey of the Indian Community in Malawi*, University of Malawi, Limbe 1969; Buttawo, F.J.: *Islam in Malawi with special Emphasis on its Success in Nkhota-Kota*, Chancellor College, Malawi 1969.

The initial recruitment of Indians was intended to fulfill two major imperial aims: (a) military defense against Arab-slave traders and rival colonial powers, and (b) co-operation in the economic development of the colony. Following the Nyasaland era of British imperial consolidation (1891-1907)¹ in which the Indian interests were subordinated to the needs of the colonising power, Indian economic preoccupation facilitated the transformation of their status as a military community into a commercial and entrepreneurial class with value systems centering on monetary aspirations, business accumen, etc. - goals consonant with the protestant ethic.

Because the colonial edifice was built on one single ethical foundation, that of racial superiority, this meant that with the British policy of compartmentalising the entire colonial society, the Asians constituted a single ethnic category with a strong Sikh community, followed by Hindus, Muslims, Goans and Ismailis. In their middle position of the pyramid, with the apex and base occupied by European settlers and Africans respectively, their status carried with it a built-in instability in times of independence and post-independence struggle.²

¹ Hanna, A.J.: The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia 1859 - 1895, Oxford 1956, pp. 226 - 27; Johnston, H.H.: British Central Africa, New York 1897

² A striking feature of Asian political activity in colonial Nyasaland was its ambivalence, preoccupied as they were with the question of security. Such a preoccupation with security meant political stagnation. See Mamdani, M.: Asians in East Africa: Their Origin and Sociological Composition, in: Pan-African Journal, 2, 1969, p. 383; also Rothermund, I.: The Political and Economic Role of Asian Minorities, Berlin 1965; Mangat, J.S.: A History of the Asians in East Africa c.1886 to 1945, Oxford 1969.

To understand the changing fortunes of the Indian immigrants and the pressure upon the Asians generally, it is essential to consider the shaping of attitudes and motivations in historical perspective. The African had been doubly colonised: by the settler community which issued the orders and by the Asians who largely manned the structure that acted out these orders. The economic colonization meant that under the aegis of British rule, Asians went inland as merchants and traders. Within the general framework of colonial development, people of Pakistan and India provided the skilled labour for building the railway system, the trading networks and the colonial bureaucracy, while their mentors operated the key levers of power and authority. Because of their favourable status in the colonial society, many of the sturdier Indians served British interests in the armed and police services. The lower and intermediate standards of literacy rendered a few competent for administrative and clerical chores, whilst the rest, protected from the pressures of settler capitalist economy - compulsory contract labour, subsistence wages, payment according to race, etc. - took to lucrative private enterprise.

(ii) Asian Migration and the Changing Political and Economic Conditions

The Asians' relatively privileged status in the three-tier system, the rivalries and poor African prospects that drove African clerks towards national politics, and the economic dominance that blocked the Africa's path of vertical mobility, making wider friction inevitable, all these are crucial factors in the interpretation of the changing attitudes of independent governments. Much is reflected in the africanization of the economy (Kenya, Uganda) and in some cases socialization (Tanzania)

curbing traditional Asian activities.¹ In Malawi, where the commercial economy, in which the local African is still an alienated figure, is dominated by European import - export houses, and Asian wholesale and retail shops, there is currently a conspicuous lack of rhetoric and inflammatory attitude typical of policies that blatantly discriminate against Asians elsewhere.² Critical shortages of capital and 'know-how' seem to favour such a development.³ But the high degree of Asian urbanization in Malawi's large towns and the increased movement of Africans to the urban centres, may prove decisive. As recent studies

1 Ghai, P.: *Economic Independence in Africa*, Nairobi 1973; Dinwiddie, B.: *Promoting African Enterprise*, London 1974; Ghai, Y. and Ghai, D.P.: *The Asian Minorities of East and Central Africa*, London 1971

2 Although the acceleration of the pace of Africanization of the economy has meant a variety of restrictions on Indian and foreign businesses. Business for Europeans, Asians, and other commercializing groups are now only allowed when no suitable African businessman is available. The main focus has been on the commercial sector, reliance being placed on legislation to restrict the right of non-national businesses to trade in certain localities and/or commodities. Limitation on land-ownership by non-citizens assures that Asians do not acquire a foothold in agriculture; 'commercial laws' require the obtainment of trading licences, and thereby render it difficult to engage in business in other sectors of the national economy. It remains to be seen whether the economic interests of the Asian community within the wider priorities of societal development can continue to be reconciled in Malawi. For comparative notes on the 'Asian problem' paying special attention to economic issues, see Saberwal, S.: *On the Asians in East Africa*, in: *Economic and Political Weekly*, Sameeksha Trust Publication, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 13 January 1972, p. 60; Malindi, J.: *Uganda's Asian Problem*, in: *The African Communist*, No. 53, Second Quarter, 1973, p. 71; 'Uganda: The Asian Affair', in: *Race Relations News*, Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1972, p. 4.

3 Marris, P.: *The Social Barriers to African Entrepreneurship*, in: *JDS*, Vol. V, No. 1, October 1968, p. 30

elsewhere show¹, they do not necessarily loose their ethnicity. On the contrary, their identifications are strengthened when faced with the perceived threats of other groups. In such an African milieu, economic polarization and the defensive resurgence of ethnicity mutually reinforce one another.

The Malawian dilemma lies in the contradiction between a growth strategy based on foreign investment and the promise to increase African ownership of the economy. The exclusion of all Asian traders is at present prevented by the strong position of the septuagenarian president, Kamuzu Banda, who is well aware of the implications of a radical Asian policy on the international investor, who plays a crucial role in Malawi's agricultural and industrial development. In the short term, however, the future of Asians in Malawi lies between the alternatives of pluralism and assimilation, but the crucial question is whether the direction of the future leadership and the policies (ideologies) will act in conformity with these forces or in opposition to them.

The latter consideration is of crucial importance. There is now an evident correlation between the Malawianization of the economy and the changing fortunes of the Asian immigrants. Previously blocked economic opportunities within a former colonial framework which caused a shift from an interest in trade to a passion for education as a means of economic mobility is presently being superseded by Africanised opportunities for indigenous self - betterment through entrepreneurial activity so that with material

¹ See Anderson, C.W. et al: Issues of Political Development, New Jersey 1967, pp. 26 - 59.

interests to preserve in a changing economic and political context and the nationalist dismantlement of the sympathetic milieu of British protectionism, the Asian minorities have become disadvantaged with respect to the power it had to control its own destiny; indeed, gradually visible is an attitude of accommodation to the present and future politics of the native society which presumes this power.

By identifying themselves Asian immigrants thereby set a course which, as they make the interminable series of choices and decisions which constitute living, moves them inevitably in the nationalist direction politically; these identities and modes of political behaviour compatible with their status at least in the interests of economic survival while remaining socially separate and powerless, are, of course, sociologically explicable on the basis of the alignment of power within the country as a whole. Sociologists have long been aware that disadvantaged minorities, unless in active and open conflict with the dominant group, tend to hold evaluations of the dominant group, of other minorities, and of themselves, which reflect closely, or are in harmony with, evaluations of the dominant power structure.

(2) European Immigration

(1) Economic and Technological Determinants of European Immigration

In the sixties, particularly after independence, economic immigration into Malawi was a powerful factor in the total process of modernization, resulting from a conscious effort on the part of the Malawian government to complement the old plantation economy inherited from the colonial administration with a structure geared towards the country's agrarian realities; and as a predominantly agricultural country that is struggling hard

to build an industrial base for rapid development, Malawi, in such a transitory stage, needs economic migration from other countries with relevant technological assistance.

Based on two principal assumptions, development policy attempted to achieve (a) selective immigration of high-level manpower and technicians, and (b) the import of capital for the development of modern forms of agriculture and industry. The role of technological immigration in the development of Malawi can hardly be over-emphasised.¹ It supplied the manpower to build public works, to expand the commercial activities and the entrepreneurship in the beginnings of industrial development. Among the immigrants from overseas have also been a smattering of African graduates who, following independence, carried on further studies abroad. These, though numerically negligible when compared to foreign immigrants, have provided the country with a class of professionals, administrators, technicians, engineers and other skilled manpower, capable of providing part of the specialised personnel for many new roles and activities required by national development in all fields.

(ii) Implications for the African Social Structure

No less important is the contribution of foreign immigration to the modification of the traditional social structure. There are some indications that a three-dimensional stratification system is emerging. First, there is the predominantly urban and foreign

¹ According to Judith Hanna, the basic spontaneous aspect of immigration in contemporary Africa has been the 'revolution of values' brought about by technological immigration, which introduces a new set of values and established infrastructures providing Africans with opportunities to obtain what was newly valued, namely, wage-earning employment. See Hanna, J.: *Urban Dynamics in Black Africa*, New York, 1971, pp. 32 - 33.

bourgeoisie ecologically concentrated in modern suburbs of the major towns; second, a 'middle-classing' civil service segment in the administrative, professional and 'superscale' grades, gradually diminishing the ecological segregation of the expatriate class through the processes of professional invasion and succession; and third, an emerging African working class, detached from subsistence farming and residing in the expanding peri-urban areas.

The former group is culturally homogeneous with varying degrees of identification with the country. Their role as carriers of technological skills and new attitudes towards economic activities and thus as bearers of 'modernization', has assured them of a higher social and economic position; and although they remain practically dominant in positions of economic power, they are, however, excluded from the political processes which remain firmly entrenched in the hands of the African elite.

To what extent are European immigrants integrated into the Malawian society? Systematic or adequate research in this subject is not yet available. The following preliminary observations are highly speculative; the basis of the tentative analysis¹ is the provisional distinction between acculturation, participation and identification.

In terms of participation - treating assimilation from the standpoint of Malawian society - distinction

¹ The following lines draw on the theoretical insights from Gino Germani's 'Assimilation of Immigrants into Urban Setting,' in: Hauser, P.: Handbook of Urban Studies, Paris 1967 and theoretical views of S.N. Eisenstadt in his 'Absorption of Immigrants', London 1955, chapter 1.

can be made between two dimensions: (a) the extent of participation: what roles is the immigrant performing within the social institutions and sectors of the host society: what roles is he playing in the social institutions and sectors of the Malawian society, but socially segregated from it; and (b) the reception given by the country to the immigrant. It is important to emphasize that participation may be granted in certain spheres of activity but not in others: this indeed is already the case.

The participation of immigrants varies according to spheres of activity. In the economic arena it is and has always been high. Among the entrepreneurial class, this proportion is even higher than 90 percent.¹ To the extent that Malawi's economic policies - regional co-operation in matters of commerce, industry and technology with all states regardless of their politics - find practical implementation, European economic immigration is likely to increase. Indeed, unlike elsewhere in traumatic neo-colonial Africa, Malawi presents, at present, no signs of erratic deterioration of conditions for expatriate immigrants. Malawi's relations with European countries exclude the possibilities of crisis. In fact, the expatriate community, instead of dwindling, exhibits the potential for future increase. Beyond the normal processes of africanization, mainly in the civil service, there is no serious threat of economic uncertainty for much of the foreign-owned estates, commercial banks and industries, all of whose business is booming beyond all proportion to their intrinsic importance.²

1 Report on Survey of Requirements for Trained Manpower in Malawi, Zomba 1967

2 See, in particular, Reserve Bank of Malawi: 1972 Annual Report and Statement of Accounts; Banda, A.K.: Malawi: Investment Opportunities, in: New Commonwealth, 47, 8, August 1968, pp. 43 - 44; Hooker, R.J.: The Businessman's Position: Observations on Expatriate Commerce in Malawi, in: Fieldstaff Reports, Central and Southern Africa Series, Vol. XV, No. 4, 03755, US.

Intermarriage, which is another essential criterion of participation and integration into the life of the country, is almost negligible, if not non-existent. More important is the participation of immigrants in the intellectual life of the country. Although, of course, it is not a means of mass participation, it gives the immigrants influence over the intellectual elite, particularly in the higher institutions of learning such as the university and its five constituent colleges, as it contributes to the national patterns of intellectual and artistic expression. The consequences of this fact, indeed, are far-reaching in the creation of a specific character of bureaucratic, political, economic and even ideological elites in the power and decision-making institutions of the developing country.

With regard to acculturation and identification - the immigrants' absorption of the cultural patterns of Malawian society - this varies according to the immigrants' intentions and consists of relatively superficial learning among the professional, technical and commercial expatriates whilst it appears to have penetrated deeply into the personalities of missionaries, 'peace-corps', 'volunteers', development project experts and other social workers interested in the religious, political and economic conversion of the African.

As for the identification - and acculturation - there are still communities of ecological segregation which seem not to affect their universalistic roles in the economic and civil service structures within the society as a whole. However, with increasing Malawianization of strategic posts, the departure of colonial expatriates, which has been greater during 1971/72 than during any other period since independence,¹ is being replaced by an African elite² so that

¹ Malawi Government Gazette, Zomba 1971, passim

Footnote number 2, on page 149

The outcome seems to be an emerging synthesis that is creating a new cultural type - particularly visible in most large towns - the influences and imitations in language, gestures, dress and leisure customs of a past colonial society.

Footnote number 2, from page 148

2 The civil service of Malawi is now over 85 percent africanised and this figure is likely to increase significantly (Baker, C.: The Administrative Service of Malawi: A Study in Africanization, in: JMAS, 10, 4, 1973, p. 560) ; in the early 1970's as President Banda's confidence in the loyalty and competence of the civil service returned, africanization has proceeded at a faster rate in other areas of national life and at the highest levels. This has not been confined to the administrative service, but included the Commissioner of Police in July 1971 ('The Malawi Times', Blantyre, 15 July 1971) and the attorney general and the commander of the army in May 1972 ('The Times of Zambia', Ndola, 6 January 1972) as well as the africanization efforts in private industry and commerce (See 'The Establishment of the National Manpower Assessment and Utilization Programme under ILO auspices', in: Report of Ministry of Labour, Zomba 1971).

Chapter VIII

MALAWI'S LABOUR FORCE

(1) Historical Evolution

In terms of paid employment, it can be said that until the fifties, there was no clear distinction between the peasant farmer and the employee who works for wages. There was no class¹ of unskilled workers in existence dependent solely upon wage-earning for its livelihood; after a short period of work for an employer either in Malawi or abroad, the average Malawian returned to cultivate his own garden land, as indeed he must if he was to preserve his own livelihood.

While this factor was of importance as a buffer against unemployment, it also operated to produce a very high turnover in labour, with few workers remaining long enough in one job to acquire skill or training. A further result was that each year at the beginning of the rains, when Africans must prepare their gardens, there was a severe shortage of labour, handicapping labour-employing estates, particularly those engaged in the production of tea and tobacco. To remedy the situation, encouragement was given to expatriate employers to build permanent labour force wedded to estates. As a consequence, many problems arose, particularly the reluctance of the African to sever his connection with subsistence agriculture.

Precise statistics on the numbers of the gainfully employed over the years were not available until 1956 when census enumerations were carried out. In terms of the estimates of Malawian labour force in the fifties, the 1956 census gives the following statistical breakdown:

¹ Nyasaland Government : Annual Report of Labour Department 1959.

Able - bodied males	430,000
Employment in Malawi	150,000
Employment outside Malawi	140,000
Self - employment	120,000

Source: Nyasaland Government, 1956 Census, Zomba

During the same decade, statistical returns of the federal census of 1956 showed the following employment trends among Malawian migrants in neighbouring territories:

Working in Rhodesia	100,000
Working in South Africa	26,000
Working in Zambia	13,000
Other territories (mainly Tanzania)	1,000

In the sixties, during the period of reorganization of the country's development plans, particularly in 1962, 1963 and 1964,¹ employment opportunities were limited; whereas in 1961 and 1962, the yearly average numbers of persons in wage employment were estimated at 152,000 and 141,000 respectively, these numbers fell in 1963 and 1964 to an estimated 136,000 and 128,000 respectively. From 1965 onwards, following the attainment of political independence, employment opportunities increased so that during 1965/67 the average level of wage employment was estimated between 140,000 and 160,000.²

(2) Labour Force Structure

Except for the 1967 'Report on the Survey of Requirements for Trained Manpower in Malawi', which was a summary analysis of the manpower situation in the higher and intermediate level occupations

1 See Nyasaland Report for 1962/63, London 1964

2 Compendium of Statistics for Malawi, Zomba 1970. On the whole the figures are a conservative estimate. Seasonal variations affect the numbers employed in agricultural sectors, notably in the tea and tobacco industries where the wage employment numbers include some 20,000.

showing public and private sector employment and requirements up to 1975, no other research efforts have been attempted on the labour force structure. For the purposes of obtaining, provisionally, an approximation of the size of the structure of Malawi labour force, a method has been adopted.¹ Rough estimates have been computed by applying ILO estimates of labour force participation rates, i.e. the percentage of economically active persons, comprising the employed and unemployed who 'want work' for East Africa to the sex and age distribution of Malawi in 1966. According to these estimates², the Malawi labour force would amount to 1,482,000 of whom 930,000 would be males and 552,000 females. Of the 1,482,000 some 778,000 would be in the southern region, 530,000 in the central, and 174,000 in the northern region.³

The relatively low labour force participation rates could be explained by:

- (1) the relatively high proportion of children in the total population;⁴
- (2) emigration, predominantly of males of working age. The total number of males abroad at the time of the last census

1 Ypsilantis, J.N.: World and Regional Estimates and Projections of Labour Force, ILO, August 1966

2 The supporting statistics that follow are drawn from the 'Malawi Labour Ministry Report for 1963-67', Zomba.

3 Percentagewise and in relation to its total population (4,039,000) the labour force would amount to 36.7% (48.6% of the male and 26.0% of the female population), varying from 37.7% of the population in the southern region to 36.0% in the central and 34.9% in the northern region.

4 43.9% of the Malawian population was in 1966 under 15 years, age-structure being one of the important determinants of the proportion of a population which is economically active. See Economic Bulletin for Africa, Vol. X, No. 1, June 1970, table 49, 'National Breakdown of Distribution of Population by Age Groups', p. 64.

was estimated at some 180,000¹, i.e. one out of six men of the labour force;

- (3) The preponderance of women whose labour force participation rate is low among African immigrants into Malawi²;
 - (4) the low labour force participation rates of the female population.³
- (3) Labour Force Employment Strategy

In the context of such a labour force structure, considered in conjunction with the projected annual growth rate in the country's population, it seems evident that the highest priority is on a labour force which is directed towards meeting the needs of the modern sector of the economy, including agriculture, if the momentum of the present general economic expansion is to be not only maintained but also sufficiently strengthened to meet the significant task of increasing economic production and social services to preserve and even improve upon the present standards of living of workers of Malawi.

Important measures are in vogue to lessen the urge to the towns, to raise the level of employment in the agricultural sector and thereby provide a stabilizing influence in rural communities to help arrest the persistent drift causing inland displacement and migration out of the country;

¹ Had there been no emigration, the total male labour force in Malawi would be 1,110,000 (930,000 + 180,000)

² In general, there has been a predominance, especially in comparison with Malawian immigration of females among the immigrants (138,000 males and 146,000 females)

³ This is not an observed fact, but is implied in the use of ILO estimated rates for East Africa assuming that these rates apply equally to Malawi. The true rates in Malawi can only be obtained by means of a national labour force sample survey.

- (1) In the case of the high proportion of children, as figures below suggest,

Distribution of Population by Age

Age	%	Population
under - 1	3.0	121,000
1 - 4	16.0	647,000
5 -14	25.0	1,011,000
15 -44	42.0	1,697,000
45 +	14.0	566,000
Total	100.0	4,042,000

Source: Malawi Census Report for 1966

only 35 percent of the school-age population, because of Malawi's limited economic resources, can be taken into schools. The educational system based on the three-tier system, viz. primary, post-primary, and higher education, constantly takes cognizance of both the main national and individual objectives. Principles underlying such plans are founded on practical grounds, notably the development of the country by 'serving the nation in education'; and education has meant that agriculture must be recognized by pupils as the most important practical science. The introduction of agriculture has meant, also, that the development of Malawi will be accelerated as school-leavers who return to the community will be equipped to deal with and understand the rural problems as well as take a full part in rural development.

- (2) With regard to large inland displacements of population and unbalanced sex-ratios that are strongly affected by male migratory exodus (see diagram below) and regional inequalities in socio-economic development, Malawi

Number of Males per 100 Females in the Age Group 15 - 45				
	Salima	Dedza	Lilongwe	Ft. Johnston
Urban	136	125	155	134
Rural	59	34	101	66
	Blantyre	Zomba	Nsanje	
Urban	122	151	176	
Rural	90	85	66	

Source: Weyl, U. et al.: Soziale und Wirtschaftliche Aspekte zwischenstaatlicher Bevölkerungsbewegungen in südlichen Afrika, dargestellt am Beispiel des Wanderarbeitertums in Malawi, in: IAF, July/August 1973, p. 450

government has embarked on rural development programmes for the economic articulation of the interior. Within regional frameworks, Malawi is pushing forward development projects to open up agricultural possibilities in the entire country. Already four large integrated cash-crop schemes aimed at diversification of the agricultural economy offer alternative employment, increase productivity of land and labour, and more important, create conditions for a stable and viable rural population.

- (3) Finally, national considerations call for manpower planning with respect to Malawian workers in neighbouring territories. Several reasons may be advanced as to why such a planning is necessary:

To begin with, it is an integral part of the labour policies of the South African authorities, in the long-run, to repatriate all 'foreign' labourers and their dependants, replacing these from domestic sources. Already such a turning-point has been reached during the Verwoerd administration¹ when a committee was appointed to examine the position

¹ See 'The Star', (SA), 24 July 1964; RDM, (SA) 28 August 1961.

of foreign Africans in the Republic following Boer militancy directed against the increasing free-flow movements of dark-skinned workers from tropical countries who engendered a deep-seated feeling of racial uneasiness in the South African scene. Public discussions centred around the political implications of acceding to such foreign migration became a question of great emotive force that divided white society across party lines.

Second, the traditional sources of supply of foreign mine labour, notably Malawi, Mozambique, Angola and the former High Commission Territories, are no longer as 'reliable' as they were, and although none of these areas could easily do without the income earned by their nationals in the mines, the possibility of sudden interruptions in the supply of labour cannot be ignored in these so-called 'troubled' areas.¹ Already the accumulation of incidences of labour disturbances and the possible communication of foreign distrust to the South African mining economy may create a state of uncertainty about the future and cause concerted action by the industry to attract more local African labour to the mines.

Thus, besides Zambia and Tanzania, which ended recruitment for the South African mines soon after their independence, and Mozambique, whose Portuguese government agreement with South Africa to supply labour to the mines is likely to come under revision after independence, there are also the ex-protectorates of Swaziland and Botswana, whose economies

¹ There is, for instance, OAU general agreements on specific measures to increase economic and political pressure against South Africa, including withdrawal of migrant African workers which could be critical for South African industry. See report under the headline 'African Nations to tighten Squeeze on Vorster Regime', in: The Times, (UK), 12 April 1975, p. 5.

as High Commission Territories were closely linked with South Africa, but whose economic development since independence has resulted in a steady decline in the flow of mining recruits. These territorial changes with respect to migration and the implied reservations on the part of African governments about the desirability of indentured labour, especially in view of its possible injury to their own vital industries, should provide important incentives for Malawi's re-examination of her own migration policy.

Third, Malawi's series of labour negotiations with South Africa in the recent past regarding the documentation and legalization of all Malawian nationals in the free-flow movements, which culminated in the realization of the labour agreement of 1967, reflect policy orientation towards eventual repatriation of foreign labour.

The crux of the labour agreement is the 'safety valve' it provides to the South African authorities to deviate from an active policy of labour stabilization with its inevitable demands for family wages, social security, vocational training, education and pensions. The official classification of Malawian citizens into repatriable categories provided by the terms of the agreement, reveal not only the immediate objective of serving the economic well-being of the country, but also the long-term political aim of migrant expulsion:

1. Category A includes all nationals on periodic visits, who may not take up any form of employment;
2. Category B are those entitled, through temporary contracts, to work in South Africa for periods of up to two years: these include Malawians who are married and have family commitments in South Africa. They are subject to repatriation to Malawi to be re-contracted at the request of the employer following a residential period

of not less than six months in Malawi;

3. Category C are Malawians illegally in South Africa at the period of enforcement of the agreement: these are to be entered into contracts of employment with their existing employers for periods of two years following which they would be subject to repatriation; and
4. Category D are citizens illegally in South Africa following the date of the labour agreement: this category is subject to immediate deportation.

For Malawian workers, the term of the repatriation agreement perpetuated conditions of work in which they received the worst of the two worlds: on the one hand, as 'birds of passage' in a foreign country with little incentive to excel or acquire meaningful skills, and on the other, as citizens of a developing state based on subsistence and commercial agriculture with limited possibilities for economic and industrial diversification.

In view of this, manpower studies and planning are indispensable: first, to minimize the necessity and demand for migratory labour, and second, to re-engage returning workers with valuable skills that are likely to serve as an important human infrastructure that can be of benefit to the country's economic and industrial development. Both planning objectives are crucial if national sovereignty in employment terms is to be achieved. Put another way, post-independence changes, rather than encourage more people to make money through economic migration, must seek ways to promote internal productivity especially in agricultural work and rural development. The economic destiny of Malawi will lie in its manpower utilisation and efficiency. In this the future will rest on the laps of Malawians themselves.

Chapter IX

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has sought to examine Malawian migration in terms of multiple causality. Within that context, the attempt has been to raise to the level of investigation several dimensions:

- (a) Malawian migration as representing a development process originating out of a complex configuration of factors in which the country's demographic and land pressures occasioned by accident of colonial reality, especially the economics of colonialism with its twin processes of underdevelopment and dependence, have deleteriously affected traditional socio-economic structures, effecting in the process internal dislocations and domestic patterns of population movements that spread in search of alternative modes of existence leading eventually to regional inter-territorial migrations.
- (b) The latter aspect, therefore, reflects a 'trek' from areas of domestic impediment to new ones of external but subtle exploitation evidenced by the incapacity of returning migrants to contribute meaningfully towards sustained development of their home countries.
- (c) This obviates the strategic importance of a people-directed development planning on the part of Malawi and other labour-exporting countries in which agricultural and rural modernization become basic socio-economic priorities.

In so far as the theoretical implications of the study are concerned, it must be stressed that the character of Malawian migration is inextricably bound up with the form and internal dynamics of the political and economic organization at both the Malawian and receiving ends of the migration stream. Hence the enormous variability involved renders a single unifying theory of migration in the Malawian context not possible at this time and may never be feasible.

With hard work and modern farming techniques supported by good rural administration, distribution and marketing systems, Malawi has been able to free itself from the 'humiliating' dependence on foreign aid. The Country's economy weathered the turbulent years of 1973 and 1974, maintaining relative domestic stability and a most respectable rate of economic development.¹

This has brought about a measure of independence from the Southern African mining and industrial complex. Whilst Malawi has, through the export of her manpower, developed the resources of a foreign country, from the standpoint of domestic development she has suffered serious disadvantages: her economic weakness, industrially and agriculturally, meant permeability to external exploitation. The study, as already indicated, vindicates the necessity for labour-intensive as against capital-oriented approach for Malawi's domestic development.

Such a strategy has important socio-economic consequences since meaningful development must rest upon the principle that the true wealth of a country depends on the productivity of its workers. Due to Malawi's lack of resources, 'know-how' and capital, there is no facile solution to the problem of migratory labour; but it is certain that wherever the answer lies it involves, for a country whose biggest industry is agriculture, an agricultural re-orientation and education of ordinary people and a change of their attitudes towards rural life and agricultural work. When it can be demonstrated that commercial agriculture can provide the employment opportunities with which to reduce rural poverty and raise the standards of living, then some of the movement towards town and mines may be ameliorated.

¹ See, in particular, Report of the Reserve Bank of Malawi, 1974; 'Malawi Economic Progress', in: Africa Confidential, Vol. 14, No. 10, May 1973, pp. 6 - 7; African Development, February 1975, p. 18; Barclays International Review, London 1972, p. 23; 'Malawi', in: Standard Bank Review, April 1974, p. 28.

In the long-range, however, the crucial question facing Malawi is whether the state itself should closely guide development or whether that should be left more or less to private initiative and activities. It is another question whether in addition to central planning also centrally guided implementation must take place. To some degree, these are dependent on some basic decisions in the political field. It is in such crucial areas that Banda, unlike a large number of African leaders who have declared that they aim to pursue socialism and state intervention in the economy, has co-opted in favour of private enterprise and against any form of state capitalism. Still, Malawi is far from being a full-blown capitalist system. The country is in a stage of transformation, laying foundations for new political and economic structures. This process of crystallization of the social system has been by no means completed; rather, it is still in the embryonic stage of development, with the pro-capitalist and pro-socialist elements in the relations of production and the general thinking of people being still rather undefined and, therefore, open to change.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMM	Anti-Apartheid Movement
ARB	Africa Research Bulletin
BAD	Bantu Administration Development
FU	Free University
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
IAF	Internationales Africa Forum
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IESS	International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILR	International Labour Review
JAH	Journal of African History
JAS	Journal of African Society
JCPS	Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies
JDS	Journal of Development Studies
JMAS	Journal of Modern African Studies
JRLI	Journal of Rhodes-Livingstone Institute
JRAI	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
JRSA	Journal of Royal Society of Arts
NJ	Nyasaland Journal
RALSC	Rhodesian African Labour Supply Commission
RDM	Rand Daily Mail
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SA	South Africa
SAJE	South African Journal of Economics
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SASO	South African Student Organization
UCRN	University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
UNESCO	United Nations Educational and Scientific Council

UNISA	University of South Africa
WNLA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Agency

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